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
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
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A Strategy for Dealing with Cuba in the 1980s

Edward Gonzalez

September 1982

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→ Cuba poses a threat that could, if unchecked, fundamentally alter the U.S. geostrategic position in the Caribbean Basin and cause severe problems in the event of a U.S.-Soviet conflict elsewhere. The complex dimensions of this challenge make effective, viable policy option toward the Cuban government imperative, but elusive. This report proposes a strategy for gaining and applying leverage over Castro to bring about needed changes in Cuban foreign policy. Part 1 of the study provides the background against which a new Cuban strategy must emerge. Part 2 discusses a possible leverage strategy against Cuba and demonstrates how it could exploit the Castro regime's vulnerabilities and core interests. The military dimensions of the plan are assessed and specific military policies are proposed. → The report elaborates the additional political, economic, and diplomatic policies needed to ensure an effective strategy. Potential problems and questions for future study are identified.

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R-2954-DOS/AF

A Strategy for Dealing with Cuba in the 1980s

Edward Gonzalez

September 1982

**Prepared for the
Department of State and the
United States Air Force**



PREFACE

This report is based on research for two separate Rand projects: one commissioned by the U.S. Department of State to formulate possible strategies for dealing with Cuba and the other for Project AIR FORCE assessing future USAF requirements in the Caribbean Basin. This report molds research for those projects into a comprehensive strategy proposal that in the view of the author combines disparate policy instruments into a coherent design for enhancing U.S. leverage over Cuba. This study does not, however, represent the views of the Department of State or Executive Branch but is simply an independent approach by the author. The author is a Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles, and a resident consultant of The Rand Corporation.



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SUMMARY

Castro's Cuba now poses a threat that could, if unchecked, fundamentally alter the U.S. geostrategic position in the Caribbean Basin and cause substantial difficulties in the event of a U.S.-Soviet conflict elsewhere. The new and complex dimensions of this challenge make effective, viable policy options toward Castro imperative--but elusive. This study proposes a new strategy by which to gain needed leverage over Havana to advance U.S. interests.

THE NEW CUBAN CHALLENGE AND U.S. POLICIES

As the global power equation has changed, Cuba has presented a greater threat to U.S. and Caribbean Basin security. The United States no longer enjoys strategic superiority over the Soviet Union. And in an era when separate regional theaters are strategically interdependent, the security of the Basin has become more important because the United States and NATO vitally need easy access to its sea lanes (SLOCs) and petroleum resources. Unfortunately, the U.S. military presence in the Basin has been receding while Cuba's military power and presence have grown. Moreover, Central America is plagued with low-level conflict, and pro-Castro regimes have established themselves in Nicaragua and Grenada.

Cuba represents both a strategic security threat and a regional threat. In spite of its obvious weaknesses relative to the United States, Cuba is becoming a strategic security threat because (1) the Soviets use the island to project military power, (2) the Castro regime collaborates militarily with the Soviet Union in Africa and the Basin,

and (3) Cuba's growing military capabilities make it the region's most potent second-order power, thus a potential threat to the SLOCs and other targets in the Basin. If there were an acute international crisis or conventional war involving the United States and the Soviet Union, the Cuban threat would constrain U.S. actions and introduce new risks. At a minimum, Cuba would tie down substantial USAF and USN units in the Florida Straits and the Caribbean.

Cuba also poses a regional threat to the Basin's security and stability. It has increased its conventional military capabilities for aiding new revolutionary regimes in the region. It also has developed a more effective strategy, and has greater institutional, logistical, and international resources for exploiting new targets of revolutionary opportunity than it had in the 1960s.

All of these circumstances dictate that the primary U.S. policy goals should be (1) to neutralize the combined Cuban-Soviet strategic threat and (2) to terminate Cuban support for insurgencies in the region. However, despite U.S. military superiority over Cuba, U.S. policies have been ineffective in promoting these goals. Employment of military power has been constrained in part by the minimal allocation of U.S. forces in the Basin (traditionally considered an "economy of force" region) and in part by U.S. moral ambivalence and the lower threat levels associated with Cuba. As indicated by the opposition to Secretary of State Haig's confrontational policy, unless Cuba becomes linked to an international crisis or war situation involving the Soviet Union, the United States will find it difficult to employ military force against Castro. So far, Castro has successfully modulated Cuban activities below the threshold that would trigger U.S. retaliations.

Alternative policy options present additional difficulties:

- o A purely punitive approach, employing overt or covert military pressures, would face the same constraints that affected the Haig stance and would solidify the Cuban regime and galvanize popular support behind Castro.
- o A conciliatory policy would seek Cuban foreign policy concessions in exchange for access to U.S. markets and normalization of relations. Given the resurgence of hard-liners within the regime since 1979, and U.S. inability to match the levels of Soviet economic and military aid to Cuba, this option is even less likely to produce results now than it was five years ago. The Carter Administration had to abandon a similar approach when it failed to prevent Cuba from becoming involved in Ethiopia and renewing support for Central American insurgencies.
- o A linkage approach would seek to undermine Cuba from within by renewing U.S. trade, investment, and tourism, even without first securing major concessions from Castro. Such a move could send a wrong and potentially dangerous signal to Havana and the Soviets. It would also probably be rejected by Havana precisely because it would contaminate Cuba's revolutionary society.
- o A dependency strategy would seek to intensify Cuba's dependence on the Soviet Union so much that, as happened with Sadat's Egypt, Havana would eventually be provoked to break with Moscow. However, this approach does not specify how Cuba's dependence could be increased over present levels. Worse, it ignores the security implications for the United States of Cuba's becoming more of a satellite and an extension of the Soviet empire.

These four options, and recent U.S. policies, are predicated on questionable assumptions concerning Cuba and the Havana-Moscow relationship. Thus, an effective new strategy toward Cuba must build on more realistic premises:

- o The Castro regime will remain viable over the foreseeable future.

- o Efforts to reach a compromise with Cuba will remain difficult because of contradictory U.S.-Cuban interests, which are essential to each country's international role and self-image.
- o Cuban-Soviet ties will remain strong: Cuba's role as an international paladin serves Soviet interests; and Cuba benefits from high levels of Soviet economic and military assistance, and privileged status, as a valued ally of the Soviet Union in the Third World and Latin America.
- o With the renewed dominance of fidelista and raulista elites and of the military as an institution, a more militant leadership controls the Party and government today than in the 1970s, probably making Havana no more amenable to moderation than it was two decades ago.
- o Resolution of the Cuban problem will continue to defy quick fixes and will require, instead, long-term policies that can win sustained support, domestically and internationally.

A STRATEGY FOR LEVERAGE OVER CUBA IN THE 1980S

Although the Castro regime remains viable, the United States now has new opportunities to exploit Cuban vulnerabilities and interests, and thereby moderate Cuba's behavior. Recent international and domestic changes have aggravated Cuba's vulnerabilities, hence making them more exploitable. However, at the same time, the Castro regime's essential interests have remained the same: (1) to ensure the regime's survival, (2) to regain autonomy from the Soviet Union, and (3) to promote the island's economic development. Cuba cannot achieve the first two goals unless the United States stops its pressures, accepts the existence of a socialist Cuba, and provides Cuba with less reason for security ties with and dependence on the Soviet Union. Moreover, although the United States cannot supplant the Soviet Union as Cuba's benefactor, lifting the U.S. embargo could have modest but not inconsequential economic advantages for Cuba. By carefully coordinating pressures on Cuba's vulnerabilities with inducements addressed to the regime's interests, the United States can gain considerable leverage over Havana.

A leverage strategy would aim primarily at inducing the regime (1) to alter Cuba's military relationship with the Soviet Union, (2) to abandon its active support for insurgencies in the Basin, and (3) to a lesser degree, to curtail its overseas military activities. Because the Soviet Union has such a considerable ideological, political, economic, and military investment in the Castro regime, U.S. pressures against Cuba might also provide indirect leverage over the Soviets.

Unlike a confrontational approach, a leverage strategy would not attempt to modify Cuban behavior by intimidating Castro. Rather, it would encourage Havana to conclude that it could best minimize its vulnerabilities and maximize its essential interests by ceasing activities hostile to U.S. interests. By carefully orchestrating military, political, and economic pressures and inducements to oblige Havana to reassess its priorities, the United States could encourage the Castro regime to stop pursuing maximalist goals and adventurist policies. Instead, Havana would seek to advance its essential interests by redefining its relations with the United States. The leverage strategy's success would require open channels of communication to make U.S. resolve and intentions clear to Cuba and to better exploit new openings or developments there.

Cuban Vulnerabilities

Although Cuba has always had its strategic and domestic vulnerabilities, current international and domestic conditions have made it particularly vulnerable in the following areas:

- o Geostrategic: Cuba is the most exposed salient of the Soviet empire. It thus becomes a potential pressure point to counter Soviet moves in Europe or the Middle East, thereby maintaining Cuban anxiety over the island's exposure.
- o Energy: Cuba is 98 percent dependent on imported oil supplies which are vulnerable to interruption. Because the Soviet Union supplies all but a small fraction, Cuba faces a more acute energy predicament after 1985, when the Soviets may have to curtail exports.
- o Financial: At the end of 1980, Cuba owed \$2.6 billion in hard-currency debt, of which \$1.7 billion was owed to Western commercial banks, who are now reluctant to provide new hard-currency loans. Debts will probably continue to be rolled over, but Cuba's interest payments should increase from \$200 million in 1980 to over \$320 million in 1983.
- o Economy: Although more realistic than other plans, the 1981-85 Five-Year Plan's goals may also go unfulfilled. The regime has had to call for renewed austerity and sacrifice, and the economy's slow, spasmodic growth cannot provide sufficient employment for Cuba's burgeoning labor force.
- o Polity: There are signs of greater political regimentation and intolerance. Further, the Castro government remains unrepresentative of the Cuban population; its top leadership is dominated by the guerrilla elite and is essentially exclusionary.
- o Foreign policy: Cuban-Soviet ties have damaged Cuba's position in the Third World, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Yet Cuba cannot loosen those ties because its economy depends crucially on trade with the Soviet Union. It also depends on Soviet subsidies for Cuban sugar and nickel exports, and Cuban oil imports.

Requirements for Implementing a Leverage Strategy

Gaining maximum leverage would require careful coordination of pressures and inducements, and special groundwork in the United States.

Pressures and inducements must be carefully coupled and sequenced.

Coupling would impose a double penalty on the regime: it would incur increased costs to combat pressures, at the same time forgoing agreements with the United States that could minimize vulnerabilities

and enhance the regime's essential interests. By applying pressures and offering inducements--in that sequence--the United States could also clarify its intentions to all Cubans and make the inducements doubly attractive. However, pressures and inducements cannot be effectively coordinated without a broad-based U.S. consensus within and outside the government. Equally important, the strategy cannot succeed without policy orchestration by a high-level office authorized to make Cuban policy, coordinate it within the Executive Branch, and guarantee its implementation.

The basic political objective of leverage becomes the "Finlandization" of Cuba. To achieve that and gain broader domestic and foreign support for U.S. policy, the government must reformulate policy objectives in the following ways:

- o Assign the Caribbean Basin new priority as a region that directly affects U.S. domestic and security interests.
- o Create greater public understanding and consensus about the nature and seriousness of the Cuban-Soviet threat to Basin security.
- o Clarify objectives concerning Cuba, affirming that opposition to Castro is largely confined to the strategic and regional threat Cuba poses, rather than to its ideology and politics.

Under this formulation of policy objectives, the United States would respect the integrity of Cuba's political institutions, economic system, and international autonomy, provided that Cuba respected U.S. security interests. This formulation would make possible "peaceful coexistence" with Havana and "ideological pluralism" in the Basin. Further, it would build greater support for U.S. policy at home, in Latin America, and in Western Europe. Finally, it could also undermine

public support for the regime within Cuba and intensify elite divisions, thus helping fragment the Cuban polity.

Military measures would raise Cuba's costs for engaging in threatening behavior. However, use of military power will be most effective only if the United States fulfills the following requirements:

- o Acquire the broad spectrum of military capabilities needed to match means with ends, whether the United States seeks to harass Cuba, assist other governments in combating insurgencies, or carry out major military actions against Cuba itself.
- o Select parsimonious military options against Cuba to avoid weakening U.S. commitments to other vital regional theaters. Options should assure success under a worst case situation without requiring drawdown of USAF, USN, or USA units required elsewhere.
- o Design military options that enable U.S. forces not only to undertake the initial action, but to respond with secondary and tertiary actions should Cuba and the Soviet Union escalate the conflict.
- o Minimize domestic and foreign reaction, including Cuban reprisals, by limiting U.S. actions to short, low-intensity operations or by directing them against targets outside Cuba.
- o Develop a military posture that Castro perceives as sustainable and credible.

Military Options

U.S. military options are limited by the political and military requirements identified above and, currently, by the "economy of force" concept traditional for the region. However, developing a military posture that would enhance U.S. leverage over Cuba could begin with these steps:

- o Increase U.S. surveillance and interdiction capabilities in the Basin.
- o Strengthen U.S. air defense and attack capabilities in the southern United States.
- o Increase the U.S. naval, air, and troop presence in Guantanamo, Puerto Rico, and the Panama Canal area, secure USAF landing privileges elsewhere in Central America, and employ the Basin for additional military training exercises.
- o Increase U.S. counterinsurgency support to governments endangered by Cuban-supported guerrilla movements.
- o Modernize the defense capabilities of countries potentially vulnerable to Cuban attack.
- o Upgrade the military capabilities of Venezuela, Colombia, and, if possible, Mexico, as friendly second-order powers in the region.
- o Actively promote the concept of coalitional defense by encouraging individual states in the Basin to assume greater and more active security roles.

These measures require more U.S. defense spending and military assets, and higher priorities for the Basin. However, aside from a leverage strategy, if they are not undertaken soon, the United States could later confront an even stronger Cuba, and possibly a greater Soviet presence. Ultimately, the United States would have to make a much larger commitment to protect its interests in the Basin.

Political, Economic, and Diplomatic Options

In addition to military measures, the United States has a number of political, economic, and diplomatic options for increasing leverage over Cuba.

Future broadcasts by Radio Marti could provide an effective political tool for exploiting domestic vulnerabilities and putting the regime on the defensive. These vulnerabilities include:

- o The regime's mismanagement of the Cuban economy and record of broken promises,
- o Its subordination to the Soviet Union in domestic and foreign affairs,
- o Its diversion of men and scarce material resources to ambitious foreign policy undertakings, including overseas military operations, and
- o Its unrepresentative nature and the exclusive, privileged status of its guerrilla elite.

Whatever its final format, Radio Marti should serve the U.S. national interest rather than the interests of the Cuban exile community or other groups in this country. To be effective, it must be credible: It should provide accurate, balanced, and verifiable news reporting. It should also be relevant: Given the socioeconomic and political transformations that have occurred in Cuban society since 1959, Radio Marti's political approach will necessarily have to be to the left of the current Administration as well as the Cuban exile community. Finally, it should have broad-based appeal: Radio Marti should not compete with the regime as a propaganda organ, but should instead offer a wide variety of programming, including informative commentaries, docudramas, and diverse political viewpoints.

Washington's public posture could further strengthen U.S. leverage by exploiting the regime's interests in survival, autonomy, and economic development. Official U.S. pronouncements would underscore U.S. determination to maintain pressures as long as Havana pursued its threatening activities. They would also reiterate U.S. readiness to relieve the pressures and to work toward more normal relations--once Cuba's objectionable behavior ceased.

The U.S. trade embargo puts pressure on the regime. Enforcement of the embargo damages the regime just when the Cuban economy and society are confronted with their greatest difficulties since the 1960s. On the other hand, these same difficulties make lifting the embargo a potent economic inducement for Cuba to alter its foreign policy. Besides allowing access to trade, lifting the embargo could give Cuba access to U.S. investments, which is now feasible under Havana's recent enactment of legislation designed to attract foreign capital to the island. Removing the embargo could also give Cuba access to U.S. coal for its thermoelectric power plants, which currently consume about 25 percent of Cuba's oil imports.

U.S. diplomacy should strive for its allies' tacit cooperation, if not active support, in limiting Castro's international options. Within the Caribbean Basin, the United States needs to:

- o Strengthen its military, political, and economic commitments to the region,
- o Curtail rhetoric that alarms friendly governments but may not intimidate Castro over the long run, and
- o Persuade Basin states that the Cuban challenge is serious and get them to cooperate in collective security arrangements.

As an example of the last point, the United States could secure more leverage over Castro if it could get greater cooperation from Mexico. Mexico's present financial plight has made its future role as a regional power more uncertain. Consequently, it may become a more compliant but less effective U.S. ally. Still, U.S. and Mexican interests might best be served if Mexico discreetly cooperated with the United States on security issues directed against Castro, while also

exporting oil to Cuba. This arrangement would give both countries new sources of leverage for constraining Castro.

CONCLUSION

The Reagan Administration has already undertaken steps--ranging from the Caribbean Basin Initiative, Radio Marti, and increased security support for the region--that provide some of the instruments for applying leverage. Nevertheless, a leverage strategy is both complex and subtle. It will require centralized coordination to ensure policy orchestration that can effectively exploit Cuban vulnerabilities and interests through the use of pressures and inducements. To reduce the economic burden that a "Finlandized" Cuba might place on the United States, leverage will also have to be fine-tuned to ensure that the Soviets maintain a sufficient economic commitment to Cuba--even though the Cuban-Soviet military relationship is rendered benign. In the meantime, the United States needs to identify and assess the basic elements of the Cuban negotiating style in previous talks with Washington in order to counter Castro better, and exploit Cuban weaknesses, in future U.S. encounters with Havana.

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PART 1

THE CUBAN CHALLENGE: THE NEED FOR A NEW POLICY

I. INTRODUCTION

Seven U.S. Administrations have had to wrestle with the "Cuba problem" since Fidel Castro came to power in 1959. In the 1980s, Cuba looms as potentially an even greater challenge than in the past. Recent global trends, increases in Soviet and Cuban military capabilities in the Caribbean Basin, and instability in the region itself, which Havana exacerbates by its support for guerrilla insurgencies, all endanger U.S. interests and give urgency to the development of a more effective policy toward Cuba.

This study elaborates a strategy for gaining and applying leverage over Castro to bring about needed changes in Cuban foreign policy. It builds on two previous, different draft studies that were submitted to the Air Force and Department of State under separate contracts in mid-1981 and early 1982. These separate studies have now been reconciled, updated, and considerably expanded into a single integrated report for both clients. The integration of the two studies, which are mutually reinforcing, became essential because leverage over Cuba requires that the United States carefully orchestrate a combination of military, political, and economic instruments, and diplomatic approaches, in the years ahead.

Part 1 of this study provides the essential background against which a new Cuban strategy must emerge. It begins by assessing the new security challenges posed by Cuba and the Soviet Union, and the strengths and weaknesses of recent U.S. policies toward Havana. It next critically examines four different policy options that either have been

advanced or conceivably might be proposed in the future. Finally, it analyzes the present Cuban context to establish a realistic set of premises for a U.S. strategy during the 1980s.

Part 2 outlines and operationalizes a possible leverage strategy for use against Cuba. It first conceptualizes leverage and its essential components as they would apply to Cuba, demonstrating how they could exploit the Castro regime's new vulnerabilities and core interests. It then carefully assesses the military dimensions of the strategy, emphasizing the requisites that must be met, and proposes specific military-type instruments that could be employed to enhance U.S. leverage over Cuba. Next, because leverage cannot be sustained by military means alone, it elaborates the political, economic, and diplomatic policies needed to ensure an effective strategy. Finally, it examines some of the obstacles or problem areas that might confront a leverage strategy and that need resolution through additional investigation:

II. THE SECURITY DIMENSIONS OF THE CUBAN PROBLEM

Cuba is a small, underdeveloped island-nation, yet today it presents a military threat to the security of the United States and its allies in the Caribbean Basin. Later in the 1980s Cuba could pose an even greater threat. The threat emanates from Cuba's collaborative military ties with the Soviet Union, from its increasingly modernized military arsenal, and from its disruptive international behavior. These factors gain added significance from the strategic position of the island as it sits astride the Caribbean Sea where--geographically speaking--it commands the entrance to the Gulf of Mexico, the Florida Straits, the eastern approaches to Central America, the northern region of South America, and the Eastern Caribbean. Cuba's strategic, regional, and overseas threat potentials gain still greater importance when viewed within the broader international context.

CUBA AND THE CHANGING GLOBAL POWER EQUATION

Five international and regional developments are altering the global power equation in ways that heighten Soviet capabilities and that magnify the importance of Cuba and the Caribbean Basin for both the United States and the Soviet Union. These developments are even more dramatic when viewed against conditions at the time of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.

First, two decades ago the United States enjoyed an overall strategic superiority over the Soviets as well as an overwhelming preponderance of conventional military power in the Caribbean theater. In contrast, there is now a rough strategic parity between the two

countries. This, and the fact that the Soviets have now achieved a superiority in land-based nuclear missiles, reduces the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent in stemming direct or indirect Soviet expansionism in contested areas of the world, and perhaps even in the Basin itself.

Second, the world has entered a new era of complex strategic interdependence since the 1970s. Soviet aggression or local instability in the Middle East or Europe thus greatly increases the security importance of the Caribbean Basin as a vital logistical supply route for U.S. forces, and as a source of needed raw materials, including petroleum. Conversely, an insecure Basin could force the United States to concentrate greater military assets in the region, thereby diminishing its capacity to deploy military power elsewhere in the world.

Third, Cuba is no longer a young revolutionary state with an insignificant, inadequately trained and equipped military. Instead, its armed forces have grown from some 46,000 personnel in 1960 to an estimated 227,000 in 1982. The quality of the armed forces has also greatly increased as they have become professionalized, modernized, and combat-tested.[1] Indeed, Cuba is becoming a fortress-like island

[1] Cuba has carried out two successful wars abroad, in Angola (1975-76) and Ethiopia (1977-78). A total of more than 100,000 troops--counting the original 48,000 or so combat troops plus their subsequent replacements--have served in these two countries. During these conflicts the Cubans were fighting inferior and poorly equipped Angolan and Somalian troops. However, Cuban troops reportedly acquitted themselves well against the South Africans in the first phase of the Angolan civil war, and later Cuba's Expeditionary Force in Ethiopia successfully executed a classic counteroffensive in the Ogaden. On the Cuban involvements in Africa, see Stephen T. Hosmer and Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Policy and Practice Toward Third World Conflicts, Lexington Books, D.C. Heath, Lexington, Mass., forthcoming.

possessing an offensive as well as defensive military capability which, together with a gradually expanding Soviet presence on the island, makes the vital Basin militarily more vulnerable than at any time since the 1962 missile crisis.

Fourth, political instability and revolutionary turmoil--not created but abetted by Cuba--are endangering the security of the Caribbean Basin. Leftist guerrilla forces came to power in Nicaragua in 1979, and insurgent struggles continue in El Salvador and Guatemala. A pro-Castro regime has been in power in Grenada since 1979.

Fifth, these global and regional changes are occurring precisely at a time when the U.S. military presence in the Basin has atrophied. Excluding forces on the U.S. mainland, there were over 22,000 U.S. military personnel in the Basin in 1960, rising to a peak of over 25,000 in 1968, but these then declined to under 16,000 by 1981. This drawdown of personnel has been accompanied by the closing of military installations in the region, including Puerto Rico and Panama.[2] With the Basin no longer its exclusive preserve, the United States is having to share its influence there with Cuba as the second most powerful state in the region.

As a consequence of these developments, Cuba poses a more complex and serious threat to the security of the United States and its regional allies than was the case two decades ago. Specifically, the Castro regime poses three types of military-related threats in the 1980s: strategic, regional, and overseas.

[2] These data are drawn from a Project AIR FORCE study of Caribbean Basin security issues currently under way at The Rand Corporation. Under the direction of Joseph Stodder, this study contrasts the Basin's geopolitical, socioeconomic, and military profiles of 1960 and 1980.

CUBA AS A STRATEGIC SECURITY THREAT

In the event of a U.S.-Soviet confrontation, a hostile Cuba, as an ally of Moscow, could endanger the sea lanes (SLOCs) in the Caribbean that are vital not only to the United States and Caribbean Basin states, but to Western Europe as well. Additionally, Cuba could strike at critically needed oil fields and refineries in the Eastern Caribbean, Venezuela, and possibly even Mexico. Under certain circumstances, Cuba might pose a direct threat to the southern coastal regions of the United States. To be sure, a rational Cuban leadership would seek to avoid being drawn into a war with the United States because the conflict would result in heavy civilian as well as military casualties on the island. Still, there are conditions under which the strategic threat posed by Cuba cannot be ignored without serious peril to U.S. security, and these conditions could turn out to be beyond the control of even the most rational of Cuban leaders. The assessment of the strategic threat from Cuba must begin, however, with Cuba's close ties to the Soviet Union and with its own military capabilities.

Cuba as a Soviet Ally and Basing Facility

The Cuban strategic security threat is greatly heightened by the degree of military collaboration that exists between the Castro regime and the Soviet Union. Cuba's Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) have engaged in combat operations that have become more closely coordinated with the Soviet Union over time. Thus, Havana evidently took the lead in the initial Angolan operation, with the Soviets supplying only logistical support to Cuban combat troops. But from the very start of the Ethiopian campaign of 1977-78, Cuba's new Expeditionary Force of

some 12,000 combat troops was airlifted and given full logistical support by the Soviet Union. Moreover, in Ethiopia the Cubans served under the strategic command of a Soviet Lt. General and his 1000 to 1500-man advisory force.[3] In the meantime, to enable the Cuban Air Force to gain combat experience overseas without sacrificing its primary mission of air defense, Soviet pilots flew Cuban MiGs on the island while Cuban pilots conducted combat missions over Ethiopia.

Close collaboration between the Soviet and Cuban military continues today in Cuba itself. At least 2000 Russian personnel constitute the Soviet Military Advisory Group in Cuba, in addition to the 2600 to 3000-man Soviet brigade on the island.[4] The use of Cuba by Soviet reconnaissance aircraft, submarines, and naval flotillas for refueling and other purposes in recent years further increases the strategic dimension of the Cuban threat in the event of war. According to a recent State Department study, for example, 21 Soviet task groups were sent into the Caribbean between 1969 and May 1981, with virtually all making portvisits in Cuba.[5] The Soviets also regularly deploy their long-range TU-95 Bear reconnaissance aircraft to the island on their swing southward from the North Atlantic. In the meantime, the Soviet electronic monitoring complex at Torrens, west of Havana, is the largest

[3] See Hosmer and Wolfe. See also Edward Gonzalez, "Cuba, the Soviet Union, and Africa," in David E. Albright (ed.), Communism in Africa, Indiana University Press, 1980, pp. 145-167; and "Cuban Policy Toward Africa: Activities, Motivations, and Outcomes," in David E. Albright and Jiri Valenta (eds.), The Communist States in Africa, Indiana University Press, forthcoming.

[4] The Advisory Group is separate from the Soviet brigade that has remained on the island since 1962, and which was the cause of tension between Washington and Havana in August-September 1979.

[5] U.S. Department of State, Cuban Armed Forces and the Soviet Military Presence, Special Report 103, Washington, D.C., August 1982, p. 5.

such facility that the Soviets have outside the Soviet Union. Its location offers the Soviets a "window of vulnerability" through which access is gained to sensitive governmental communications and missile guidance information on the U.S. mainland.

Cuba as a Second-Order Power

Even without the added Soviet dimension, Cuba's own Revolutionary Armed Forces cannot be dismissed by the United States, much less by Cuba's other Caribbean Basin neighbors. Numbering 109,500 personnel in 1970, the FAR has more than doubled in size in the intervening years, with the most rapid growth occurring in the years surrounding Cuba's African expeditions--that is, well before U.S. hostility toward Cuba was resumed in 1979. Currently, in 1982, the FAR consists of an estimated 227,000 enlisted and officer personnel--200,000 in the Army (including ready reservists), 16,000 in the Air Force, and 11,000 in the Navy--which makes it by far the largest military in the Basin except for U.S. forces on the mainland.[6] Within the FAR, the Army continues to be the leading service owing to its primary mission of island defense and its military triumphs in Africa. The increasing modernization of the FAR has not only greatly strengthened the island's defenses, but has also transformed Cuba into the strongest second-order power in the Basin, one which is now capable of projecting its military power into the region.

Air power. Although thus far lacking a long-range strategic capability, the Cuban Air Force is equipped with over 200 combat jet

[6] This and the following data on the FAR are drawn from Cuban Armed Forces and the Soviet Military Presence; Air Force Magazine, December 1981; and Wall Street Journal, July 27, 1982.

aircraft in addition to support aircraft. These include not only older vintage MiG-21, -19, and -17 fighters and interceptors, but also three squadrons of MiG-23s, including the more advanced (non-export) Flogger B model that can reach targets in the United States and much of the Caribbean. With its combat radius of 520 n mi, the MiG-23 can strike targets as far away as Mobile (AL), Savannah (GA), Puerto Rico, and the Yucatan Peninsula. Landing and refueling sites in Nicaragua and Grenada would greatly extend its combat radius to encompass southern Mexico, all of Central America, northern South America, the entire Eastern Caribbean, and even a portion of the South Atlantic.

Sea power. In both quantity and quality, the Cuban Navy is dwarfed by the U.S. Navy. Nevertheless, Cuba's high speed and missile-laden boats could threaten Caribbean shipping. Although designed for defensive missions, the Navy's 12 Osa and 12 Komar-class missile attack boats have a 400 and 200 n mi radius, respectively, that give them a combat range encompassing the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, and Honduras. The recent acquisition of a Koni-class frigate and two Foxtrot-class diesel submarines could further extend the range and interdiction capabilities of the Cuban Navy.

Air defense. Cuba has a substantial ground air defense system that includes advanced radar stations and some 24 surface-to-air (SAM) battalions in the Air Defense Force, plus additional SAM sites manned by the Army. Together with the Air Force's MiG squadrons, these defenses would compel the United States to divert a considerable number of USAF and USN attack aircraft to neutralize the Cuban Air Force and Navy.

The Cuban Strategic Threat Contingency

The strategic threat posed by Cuba should not be overdrawn. Cuba's growing military capabilities do not in themselves presage the intention to attack either the United States or its allies in the Basin. Moreover, much of the FAR's capabilities remain defensive in character; and whether defensive or offensive, they still do not match the U.S. forces that could ultimately be deployed to neutralize Cuba militarily. However, the issue is more complex and subtle than a scenario in which Cuba remains isolated from international developments, and in which the military conflict is reduced to a one-on-one confrontation between the United States and Cuba.

Instead, Cuba becomes a "strategic security threat" once a crisis or conventional war develops between the United States and the Soviet Union in Europe or the Middle East. In such situations, Castro's military collaboration with the Soviets, together with Cuban military capabilities, hostility, and paranoia, are far too credible for the United States to disregard given the strategic importance and vulnerability of the Basin. The logistical flow of supplies and reinforcements through the Basin's SLOCs, particularly the Florida Straits, together with shipments of refined petroleum from refineries throughout the Basin, are absolutely vital to U.S. and NATO defense efforts in either the European or Middle Eastern theaters of war.

Were a U.S.-Soviet crisis or conventional war situation to arise, Cuba could thus seriously complicate the U.S. strategic calculus, with potentially highly undesirable outcomes, as can be seen in the following cases:

- o In either an acute crisis or war situation, Cuba could represent a military threat too uncertain to justify a U.S. preemptive attack, but sufficiently plausible to tie down a large number of USN and USAF units near the island.[7]
- o Were U.S. forces to destroy Cuban MiGs or naval craft deemed threatening to the security of the SLOCs or U.S. facilities, Havana might retaliate by launching both military and terrorist attacks against Guantanamo or the United States itself.
- o Were a conventional war with the Soviets prolonged, and reinforcements to NATO or the Middle East theaters stepped up, U.S. forces around the island probably would have to be redeployed to the war theater, thereby reducing the U.S. conventional force deterrent against Cuba.
- o The drawing down of USN and USAF units around the island could leave the United States with tactical nuclear weapons as its principal deterrent against future Cuban attacks against the SLOCs, other Basin targets, or the U.S. mainland. In the worst of cases, the employment of such weapons against Cuba could become the signal for escalating the conventional war between the two superpowers into a nuclear war.

In the meantime, the proficiency and readiness of the Cuban armed forces should not be underrated, particularly in view of the losses suffered by the British during the Falkland crisis. Unlike Argentina's armed forces, who had not fought a war since the last century, the FAR has been tested in two recent wars and, for the most part, is far better equipped and trained. Moreover, Cuba's strategic threat potential is likely to intensify in the years ahead if the present Cuban arms buildup--currently rated at 60,000 metric tons per annum in Soviet deliveries--continues unabated. Cuban access to military facilities in Nicaragua and Grenada, or a military alliance with these countries,

[7] Defense Department studies indicate that the ability of the United States to destroy the FAR's offensive capabilities is not in question once military hostilities commence. Nevertheless, the potential threat that Cuba poses to the SLOCs and other strategic targets in the Basin is considered sufficiently serious to warrant the deployment of large numbers of USN and USAF units to cope with Cuba militarily.

could further confront the United States with a hostile triangle in the Basin. As the 1980s progress, therefore, the USAF and USN may need to deploy an even greater number of planes, carriers, and other vessels than at present to neutralize the FAR in the event of an international crisis or war situation.

CUBA AS A REGIONAL THREAT

Cuba not only has emerged as a second-order military power, but it also remains a revolutionary power that threatens the stability of the Basin. Starting in 1977, Cuba began intensifying its support for leftist revolutionary forces in parts of the Caribbean Basin; it played a direct political-military role in the insurgencies in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Colombia. Having secured new regional allies in the pro-Castro regimes of Grenada and Nicaragua, and with the potential of gaining additional allied governments elsewhere in Central America, Cuba has a strong incentive for continuing to support leftist guerrilla movements in the region. Hence, although revolutionary unrest has its indigenous causes, Cuba constitutes the principal external cause of revolutionary violence and instability in the Basin as it exploits new targets of opportunity in the region.[8]

Cuba's potential for effectively exploiting new targets of revolutionary opportunity is considerably enhanced over its efforts in the 1960s. The so-called "objective" conditions necessary for revolution now appear more favorable than they were some two decades

[8] See the Department of State Special Report, Cuba's Renewed Support for Violence in Latin America, December 1981. For a judicious and comprehensive analysis of Cuban policy in the region, see also Jorge I. Domínguez, "Cuba's Relations with Caribbean and Central American Countries," August 1982, a paper to be presented at the conference on "Stability/Instability in the Caribbean Basin in the 1980s," University of Pittsburgh, October 28-29, 1982.

ago: the dependent economies of the Caribbean Basin are floundering owing to high energy prices and the global recession; traditional political elites, regimes, and formulas are under attack; a new generation of young and radicalized leaders has emerged; a larger number of participants have entered the political arena; and the hegemony of the United States over the region has visibly receded in recent years. For its part, Cuba today espouses a more effective strategy for armed struggle and the seizure of revolutionary power than in the past. Equally critical, Cuba possesses far greater institutional, logistical, and global resources with which to influence the outcome of local guerrilla struggles in the Basin and to defend revolutionary regimes once they are in power.

Improvements in Strategy

Cuba's approach to revolutionary strategy has become far more sophisticated with the success of the Nicaraguan revolution. During the 1960s, for example, the foco theory of Che Guevara and Castro was premised on the belief that protracted armed struggle by a guerrilla force in the countryside could eventually create the political as well as military conditions necessary for the overthrow of the established government. In contrast, as occurred first in Nicaragua after the mid-1970s, and as is presently occurring in El Salvador and Guatemala, radical Marxist or Marxist-Leninist groups not only engage in guerrilla warfare. They also work to develop broad political fronts that enlist the participation of Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, and other non-Marxist elements. They additionally emphasize the formation of mass organizations (e.g., trade, student, and peasant associations) at the grass-roots level in order to further mobilize popular support for the

revolutionary struggle. They seek broader international support both within and outside the hemisphere, thereby helping to legitimize the revolutionary struggle, as occurred first in Nicaragua and now in El Salvador. For its part, Havana has played a pivotal role not only by actively espousing the new strategy, but also by requiring the unification of rival guerrilla groups and political movements as a condition for further Cuban backing.[9] In the meantime, Cuba has strengthened its own capabilities for promoting armed revolution and ensuring the permanency of new pro-Castro regimes in the Basin.

Greater Institutional Capabilities

Within Cuba, the Castro regime has strengthened its institutional infrastructure for carrying out intelligence and covert operations, guerrilla training, and revolutionary propaganda. Centralized control over these activities is provided by the Americas Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba. Founded in 1974, and headed by Manuel Pineiro, confidant of Fidel Castro and formerly chief of Cuban intelligence, the Americas Department directs and coordinates Cuban revolutionary activities on the island and abroad, and cultivates ties with Marxist-Leninist and other radical-left organizations in Latin America. Working closely with the Americas Department, the General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI), in the Ministry of Interior, supplies intelligence agents and carries out covert operations in the field. All

[9] On changes in both Cuban and Soviet strategy, see Cuba's Renewed Support for Violence in Latin America. For additional but differing perspectives, see Jiri Valenta, "Soviet Policy and the Crisis in the Caribbean," and W. Raymond Duncan, "Cuba in the Caribbean and Central America: Limits to Influence," both in H. Michael Erisman and John D. Martz (eds.), Colossus Challenged: The Struggle for Caribbean Influence, Westview Press, Boulder, Colo., 1982; and the testimony of Robert S. Leiken before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, September 24, 1981.

of these activities are further supported on the island by a network of guerrilla training camps and indoctrination schools--including the Party's Nico Lopez Training School--where aspiring revolutionaries from Central and South America, and the Caribbean, receive instruction in guerrilla warfare tactics, weapons use, and propaganda and agitation for upward of six months.

Cuba's institutional outreach in support of revolutionary movements and regimes in the Caribbean Basin has been further enhanced by the professionalization of the FAR and the creation of the Special Troops Battalion in the Ministry of Interior (MININT). The FAR has an estimated 2000 military advisors in Nicaragua and 30 in Grenada as of 1982. The Special Troops Battalion within MININT is under Fidel Castro's personal command. It serves as an all-purpose elite force capable of being dispatched abroad in a crisis situation--as occurred when it was airlifted to Angola following the invasion of South African forces in October 1975. The Special Troops Battalion could thus be used to help shore up a friendly regime in the Caribbean Basin, as with the Bishop government in Grenada or the Sandinista government in Nicaragua, in the event of a domestic crisis or external aggression. The Special Troops Battalion could also be used to back a pro-Cuba faction in an internal power struggle in a friendly Basin country.

The dispatch of Cuban combat forces to a Basin country would, of course, entail grave risks for Havana. Yet Cuba did send troops to Angola and then to Ethiopia, to the considerable surprise of most analysts in and outside the U.S. Government.[10] Even within the Basin,

[10] A major overseas Cuban military operation was, however, predicted in Edward Gonzalez and David F. Ronfeldt, Post-Revolutionary Cuba in a Changing World, The Rand Corporation, R-1844-ISA, December 1975, completed prior to the Angolan intervention.

proximity to the United States did not deter the Cuban Air Force from attacking and sinking the Bahamian patrol boat Flamingo in Bahamian territorial waters in May 1980, from carrying out subsequent attacks on the surviving crew members, and from harassing a U.S. Coast Guard helicopter later dispatched to the scene. In any event, a future deployment of Cuban ground or air units to a Basin country would probably be undertaken incrementally and in response to the request of a host government or one of its leadership elements. In turn, both conditions would lessen the risks associated with the Cuban military move, while the host government's request could serve to legitimize the Cuban action.

Greater Logistical Capabilities

Cuba's interventionist potential in these or other scenarios has been improved by the development of greater logistical capabilities since the Angolan and Ethiopian campaigns. Since 1975, Cubana de Aviacion has acquired seven IL-62 long-range jet transports and several TU-154 medium- to long-range transport aircraft; although used for civil aviation, each is capable of airlifting between 150 and 200 combat-equipped troops.

The Cuban Air Force has also obtained an estimated 20 AN-26 short-range military transport planes.[11] The AN-26 has a radius of approximately 600 n mi when carrying 40 fully equipped paratroopers for an airdrop, and a substantially longer radius of roughly 900 n mi when ferrying supplies. Thus, Cuba's military airlift capabilities alone

[11] The figure of 20 AN-26s is given in the annual inventory of the world's military forces in Air Force Magazine, December 1981.

place the Bahamas, most of the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Belize, and Honduras within reach of Cuban airborne troops when the AN-26 is flown to the target and back to Cuba, whereas all of Central America and the northern portion of South America are within its radius if flown from landing sites in Nicaragua (or Grenada).

Greater Access to Global Resources

Cuba now possesses access to far greater global resources in pursuing its revolutionary strategy. The captured documents reproduced in the State Department White Paper on El Salvador in February 1981 reveal that Soviet bloc arms were funnelled through Cuba to the Salvadoran guerrillas. The seaborne deliveries of 60,000 metric tons of Soviet military supplies to Cuba between January and September 1981, some of which may have been destined for Nicaragua, are further evidence of intensified Soviet support for Cuba.

Outside the Soviet bloc, Cuba has been able to enlist the support of radical Arab states as well as an assortment of "internationalist fighters" from Western Europe, the Middle East, and Latin America, including members of the Baader Meinhoff gang, for the guerrilla insurgencies of Central America. Thus, Cuba today may not need to send its own "volunteers"--as it did in 1967, to Venezuela and Bolivia--to aid in these struggles. An "Internationalist Brigade" fought on the southern front in the Sandinista war against Somoza in 1979, and many non-Salvadorans reportedly have been fighting in the ranks of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) today in El Salvador.

CUBA AS AN OVERSEAS THREAT

Cuba has developed an overseas military capability and presence that has been closely coordinated with and supported by the Soviets in Angola and, especially, Ethiopia, and that continues to promote Soviet interests in Africa. As an international paladin, Cuba dispatched no less than 36,000 combat troops to Angola during 1975-76, according to Castro's "secret speech" of December 27, 1979, and another 12,000 were dispatched to Ethiopia during 1977-78.[12] Cuba had its own interests to promote in each of these instances, but the Cuban military presence was also indispensable for advancing Soviet goals in South Africa and the Horn. Serving in a role similar to that performed by the Red Army in Eastern Europe after World War II, Cuba's combat forces installed a new Marxist regime in Angola following the Portuguese withdrawal and ensuing civil war; and they prevented the collapse of another in Ethiopia following the Somalian invasion of the Ogaden and the resurgence of the Eritrean war.

In early 1982, the U.S. Government estimated that 20,000 Cuban military personnel remained in Angola, another 11,000 to 13,000 were still in Ethiopia, and 200 to 300 were in South Yemen, while an additional 6700 civilian advisors were also in these countries.[13] These large-scale Cuban military deployments are dependent on Soviet logistical support, and thus they continue to serve as the cutting edge of Soviet expansionism in parts of Africa and the Middle East.

[12] Castro's figures were 50 percent greater than the highest Western intelligence estimates reported by the U.S. press for Angola (24,000), and 25 percent lower for Ethiopia (16,000).

[13] Cuban Armed Forces and the Soviet Military Presence, p. 9.

As before, however, the Castro regime continues to have its own incentives for maintaining a large-scale overseas presence. As shall be shown later, Cuba's paladin role enables it to extract higher levels of Soviet economic and military assistance in the post-1975 period. Cuba also obtains financial remuneration from the host countries that pay Havana for the soldiers it sends--reportedly as much as \$40 per head per month in Angola. Activism in the Third World enables Havana to secure additional political influence, to develop close ties with allied regimes, and to remain an influential player in the revolutionary struggles of the Third World. Perhaps just as important, Cuba's "internationalism" enhances the regime's sense of mission and legitimacy in its own eyes and in the eyes of its most fervent supporters within Cuba.

SORTING OUT THREAT PRIORITIES

Of the three military problems associated with Cuba, either singly or in combination with the Soviet Union, the overseas threat remains the least serious for the United States. The Cuban military presence in Africa less directly affects U.S. security interests, and might be effectively contained with the assistance of third parties. For example, U.S. allies or proxies could be used to tie down Cuban forces in protracted struggles, as has occurred with the guerrilla movements in Angola, the Ogaden, and Eritrea. Alternatively, if it is desirable to diminish the Cuban presence in southern Africa, then the settlement of the Namibia issue could lead to a reduction of Cuban troops in Angola, particularly if the South African threat to the MPLA government were removed.

The strategic and regional threats do, however, directly affect U.S. security, and they pose the most serious as well as the most immediate problems for the United States. These threats stand out not only because they emanate in proximity to the U.S. continental mainland. They are also of critical concern because of the pivotal role that the Caribbean Basin has performed for the United States since the turn of the century.

In short, a secure Basin supports the United States in its role as a world power: with a secure Basin, the United States can minimize its military presence in the region, and concentrate instead on the global projection of its military power and influence.[14] Thus, a growing Cuban-Soviet threat in the Caribbean, or further increases in Castro-supported insurgencies and takeovers in the region, would transform the Basin from an "economy of force" region into one requiring considerable increases in the allocation of U.S. military forces. Over the long run, a better armed Cuba and an ever more insecure Basin could inhibit or even foreclose U.S. military commitments to NATO, the Persian Gulf, or other theaters.

At a minimum, therefore, U.S. policy toward Cuba should strive to attain the following goals, with priority given to the first two:

1. Neutralize the strategic threat in the Basin that stems from Cuba's collaborative military relationship with the Soviet Union;

[14] The strategic importance of the Caribbean Basin in this connection is analyzed by David Ronfeldt in Geopolitics, Security, and U.S. Strategy in the Caribbean Basin, a forthcoming Rand study under Project AIR FORCE.

2. Terminate Cuba's active support for leftist insurgencies in the Basin; and
3. Curtail Cuba's overseas military operations in Africa and elsewhere.

The effectiveness of U.S. policy and alternative policy options in achieving these objectives will be explored shortly. In the meantime, we will examine more closely the different ways in which Cuban threats may manifest themselves in the Caribbean Basin.

CUBA, THE BASIN, AND THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

Within the Basin, Cuba presents three different kinds of security problems for the United States depending on the international context in which they arise. In increasing order of seriousness, these are:

1. The Basin in general peacetime: The United States faces no imminent military or security threat in the Basin or other regions of the world. But within the Basin it does face protracted low-intensity conflicts promoted by Cuba as a revolutionary power, which in turn threaten regional stability and security.
2. The Basin in time of international crisis: Where there are direct or indirect Soviet military pressures on, for example, the Persian Gulf, Poland, South Korea, or South Africa, Cuba may become militarily linked to these events. The linkage occurs either because of Cuba's own supportive activities as an ally of the Soviet Union, or because the United States deliberately moves against Cuba as a counter to the Soviet action.
3. The Basin in time of war: In the context of a conventional war between the United States and the Soviet Union over Europe or the Persian Gulf, Cuba becomes a direct military concern--and potentially a military target--for the United States because of the danger it poses to the U.S. mainland, and especially to the SLOCs, petroleum refineries, and critical raw materials located in the Caribbean region.[15]

[15] Only a conventional war is considered here because, depending on circumstances, a nuclear war presumably would render Cuba either less relevant or subject to an immediate nuclear attack by the United States.

In the first context, Castro has successfully controlled and modulated the revolutionary threat perceived by U.S. and world public opinion. It is in this context that he has mainly played and, by and large, he has skillfully exploited the repugnance felt by liberal societies toward repressive dictatorial or military regimes to legitimize Cuba's subversive activities. As a consequence, he has thus far succeeded in operating under the threshold of an immediate and unambiguous military threat to the United States, and has thereby avoided becoming the target of large-scale military reprisals.

In the second and third contexts of major crisis and a U.S.-Soviet war, the Castro regime has virtually no control over international events that could draw Cuba into the line of fire. Hence, Castro's increasing concern during the past year over the rise in international tensions reflects his realization that Cuba could become a casualty in the event that either an acute international crisis or a war between the superpowers becomes a reality.[16] Having committed himself as a stalwart ally of the Soviet Union, and having actively pursued a confrontational policy toward the United States, Cuba might thus find it difficult to escape becoming a U.S. military target even if Cuban neutrality were declared.

[16] Confirmation of Castro's anxiety regarding the dangerous implications of the Polish situation for Cuba was supplied by Gabriel Garcia Marquez in an interview in Havana. A personal friend and admirer of Castro, the Colombian writer affirmed that "As far as Poland is concerned, I would say that the Cubans . . . are holding their breath. They know very well that if the Soviet Union invades Poland, the United States will immediately invade Cuba, and subject Havana to massive bombing. So their fate will be sealed more than 10,000 kilometers away." Manchester Guardian-Le Monde, October 25, 1981 (English edition).

THE U.S. MILITARY QUANDARY

Without an international crisis or general war situation, U.S. superiority in military power has been effectively neutralized even though the Cuban strategic, regional, and overseas threats have grown. In effect, the United States has been prevented from translating its putative military power in the Caribbean Basin into actualized power that could be used both to contain revolutionary subversion in the region and to compel fundamental changes in the Castro regime's international behavior. This paradox--the gap between the existence and employment of U.S. power--stems from the following set of circumstances:

1. U.S. military power can neither be forcefully projected in the region nor used effectively as an instrument of U.S. policy as long as the Cuban threat appears ambiguous--i.e., it remains essentially "political" or "revolutionary" in nature, and thus below the threshold of directly endangering U.S. national security. Such an incremental, low-intensity threat deprives the United States--both domestically and abroad--of the necessary moral justification for using military force against Cuba.

2. Because of U.S. global priorities and security commitments elsewhere in the world, and because of the assumption that the Basin is or can be rendered secure, the U.S. military continues to see the Basin as a region in which it can minimize its force allocations. Even were it to be less constrained by domestic and world public opinion, therefore, the United States might still be reluctant to commit scarce military assets to the Caribbean theater, and especially to undertake direct military actions against Cuba that would tie down U.S. naval, air, and ground forces in a protracted conflict.

3. In turn, as long as Cuba does not become linked to an international crisis, or as long as a war situation does not develop, the United States will not have cause to turn its military power against Cuba. Indeed, the only occasion in which a U.S. Administration was prepared to employ maximum force against Cuba was during the October 1962 missile crisis, precisely because the installation of Soviet missiles on the island was perceived as a direct military threat to the United States. Consequently, U.S. contingency plans exist for coping with Cuba in an all-out war, but the continued absence of either an acute crisis or situation linking Cuba to the Soviet Union prevents such plans--and the corresponding employment of full U.S. military force--from being used against the Castro government.

THE NEED FOR A NEW POLITICAL-MILITARY STRATEGY

The foregoing indicates that U.S. military power alone cannot serve as the basis for U.S. policy toward Cuba. Such power is constrained (a) by the U.S. perception concerning the moral ambiguity and lower threat level associated with Cuba; (b) by the higher U.S. military priorities and force commitments assigned to other regional theaters; and (c) by the absence thus far of Cuba becoming linked to the Soviet Union in an international crisis or war situation. Short of changes in any of these three elements in the U.S.-Cuban equation, therefore, any quick-fix military solution for dealing with Cuba as the "source" of Caribbean Basin instability becomes untenable.

Yet, unless the Castro regime is compelled to cease its revolutionary subversion and close military collaboration with the Soviets, the United States may encounter even greater difficulties in

dealing with Cuba and the Soviet Union as the 1980s progress. To be sure, the Reagan Administration's planned increases in defense spending are meant to arrest further deterioration in the strategic equation. Still, in the worst of futures, the Soviets could attain overall strategic superiority, Cuban and Soviet military capabilities in the Basin could both be far greater than at present, and Cuba could have new pro-Castro regimes as additional allies in the region. Were such trends to become visible in the years ahead, pressures could mount for the United States to strike preemptively against Cuba precisely to head off the seriously worsening situation in the Caribbean Basin.

Hence, a new and integrated strategy that combines both political and military instruments becomes imperative if the United States is to effectively constrain Cuban behavior along lines less damaging to U.S. security and regional interests in the 1980s. Such a strategy is proposed in Part 2 of this study. The following sections, however, first assess recent U.S. policies, and hypothetical alternatives, and conclude by positing the Cuban context on which future U.S. policy should be premised.

III. RECENT U.S. POLICIES AND CUBA'S RESPONSES: AN ASSESSMENT

Cuba is both a paradox and a vexing problem for U.S. policy. Despite Cuba's proximity and weaknesses, the United States has been unsuccessful in discouraging the Castro regime from pursuing activities that directly undermine U.S. security and foreign policy interests. Hence, Cuba stands in sharp contrast to Finland's accommodative but independent posture toward its neighboring superpower, the Soviet Union. Indeed, no matter whether a "conciliatory" or "hard-line" policy has been adopted, Washington repeatedly has lacked the means for changing Cuban behavior--other than when Fidel Castro has chosen to make short-term tactical adjustments. That such has been the case becomes clear when assessing recent U.S. approaches to Cuba under both the Carter and Reagan Administrations.

THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S APPROACH

Soon after taking office, the new Carter Administration boldly moved to break the long-standing conflict between Washington and Havana.[1] It reasoned that new political and economic ties with the United States might moderate Cuban behavior; at the very least, such ties could provide instruments for U.S. leverage which were otherwise denied to Washington in the absence of U.S.-Cuban linkages. Thus, in

[1] On the Carter approach, see Edward Gonzalez, "Cuba: The Impasse," in Robert Wesson (ed.), U.S. Influence in Latin America in the 1980s, Praeger Publishers and Hoover Institution Press, 1982, pp. 199-226. For a highly critical view of both the Carter and Reagan Administrations' policies by a former insider, see the recently published article by Wayne S. Smith, "Dateline Havana: Myopic Diplomacy," Foreign Policy, Fall 1982, pp. 157-174. Smith was the director of the State Department's Office of Cuban Affairs (1977-79) and chief of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana (1979-82).

April 1977, the two governments signed a fisheries agreement regulating and demarcating access to each other's fishing grounds, along with a new boundaries agreement. The following June, agreement was reached for the establishment of Interests Sections in each other's capitals starting in September, thereby ending 16 years of diplomatic isolation between the two countries. Meanwhile, these diplomatic steps were paralleled by the prospects of normalizing commercial relations, as Cuban trade and economic officials visited the United States and U.S. businessmen were invited to Havana.

In spite of these conciliatory steps and the prospects for normalized commercial relations, the Castro government resumed its "internationalist" activities. In late 1977, it began dispatching Cuba's second Expeditionary Force to Africa--combat troops were sent to defend Ethiopia against Somalia at the request of the beleaguered Marxist regime of Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam. Cuba's new overseas operation marked a major turning point in the Administration's assumptions concerning the prospects for moderating Castro's policies. U.S.-Cuban relations thereafter began to steadily deteriorate as a result of the arrival of the first shipment of MiG-23s on the island and the Shaba II incident involving alleged Cuban complicity in the Angolan-supported incursion into Zaire (May 1978);[2] the U.S. discovery of the existence of a special Soviet brigade on the island (August 1979); and the unregulated flow of Cuban refugees to Florida (May-September 1980).

[2] A similar incursion by Angolan-based Shaba exiles occurred in March 1977. The second invasion in May 1978 led to a strong reaction by the Carter Administration, which accused the Castro regime of having supported the new invasion, which was perceived as further evidence of Cuban aggressiveness in light of the earlier Ethiopian venture.

The Carter posture succeeded in regaining a much needed diplomatic presence in Havana, in reopening channels of communication with the Castro regime, and in restoring travel between both countries. Moreover, the latter did have a profound effect on internal Cuban affairs. Set against the context of a new downturn in the economy and renewed austerity, the return of over 100,000 Cuban exiles on short visits to the island beginning in late 1978 precipitated political unrest, leading to the mass exodus to the United States of over 125,000 Cubans in the "Freedom Flotilla" of 1980.

Otherwise, however, the initial policy of inducements had no visible impact in moderating Cuban policy. As shall be discussed later, U.S. political and economic inducements simply could not match the levels of Soviet economic and military assistance received by Cuba, nor the political returns Castro could obtain in pursuing a pro-Soviet and activist foreign policy. These payoffs had been first obtained following the Cuban intervention in Angola, and they would again accrue with the new Ethiopian operation starting in late 1977.

These considerations are simply ignored by Wayne Smith, former head of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, in his recently published condemnation of the Carter and Reagan policies. Instead, Smith argues that a November 17, 1977 statement by a "high ranking U.S. official" (to be read as Brzezinski), accusing the Cubans of a renewed buildup in Angola, effectively scuttled the Havana-Washington rapprochement. The Cubans then went into Ethiopia the following January. Although Smith may not have intended it, the logic of his argument is that Washington rather than Havana was ultimately responsible for the new Cuban intervention in Ethiopia.[3]

[3] Smith, 1982, pp. 171-172.

Smith's thesis is selective in its use of evidence. He does not consider those Cuban motivations and interests that in themselves might have accounted for the new Cuban operation irrespective of U.S. policy. For example, until the Ethiopian operation, prospects were still good that U.S.-Cuban relations would continue improving, with the Castro regime enjoying access to the U.S. Congress, media, and academic and business communities. Nonetheless, the regime decided to forsake these prospects as early as December 1977 (not January 1978) when it began its new Ethiopian venture. Moreover, once the Cuban intervention started, high U.S. officials warned Havana that the new rapprochement between the two countries could not continue. Clearly, then, Cuban foreign policy was impelled by considerations other than the cues or miscues emanating from Washington.

In fact, Havana resumed its "internationalist" activities not only in Africa, but also in Central America, where large-scale material support and direction began to be given to the Sandinista forces in 1978. As a result, Carter's conciliatory approach could not be sustained. Indeed, adverse trends in the Caribbean Basin during 1979--the Grenadian coup in March, the triumph of the Sandinistas in July, and the confirmation of the presence of a Soviet brigade in Cuba in August--led the Carter Administration to strengthen the U.S. military presence in the region as a counter against both Cuba and the Soviet Union.

THE HAIG APPROACH UNDER THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION

From the outset, the Reagan Administration adopted a visibly more hard-line posture toward Fidel Castro, with Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig evidently assuming personal control over the new policy. Although not articulated as such, what public evidence there is suggests that Secretary Haig sought to employ a "carrot and stick" approach to Castro, but with far more visible emphasis on the "stick" in the form of both direct and indirect methods of confrontation. Direct confrontation might entail the use of military force or new economic sanctions against Cuba. Indirect confrontation, on the other hand, would seek to pressure or weaken the Castro regime from outside Cuba--for instance, by undermining the new Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, or by raising the costs of Cuba's overseas military operations in Africa.

Thus, Secretary Haig threatened early on to deal with Caribbean Basin revolutionary instability "at the source." Indeed, as the American press began reporting on possible U.S. military measures against Cuba, the Castro regime placed its armed forces on alert starting in fall 1981. In the meantime, there had been reports that, were Castro to acquiesce to a U.S. ultimatum demanding cessation of destabilizing activities in Central America and elsewhere, "he can count on compensation in the form of normalization of relations with the United States, trade, technology and other economic benefits." [4] This initial period of heightened tensions ended on November 23, 1981, when Secretary Haig held a secret meeting with Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez in Mexico City. According to Smith, however, "Nothing

[4] U.S. News and World Report, April 6, 1981, p. 20.

concrete came of the encounter. They simply restated well-known positions." [5]

The same pattern of pressures followed by talks was again repeated during the first half of 1982. Tensions remained high throughout the winter and spring with the press reporting further U.S. planning against Cuba and Nicaragua and a new Soviet shipment of MiG-23s to the island, while the Administration charged Cuba with continued intervention in El Salvador. However, the Administration's Ambassador-at-Large, Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, made a secret trip to Havana during the latter part of March. The only details available come from Smith, at the time chief of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana:

Walters outlined a number of issues of concern and asked whether the Cubans would be disposed to discuss them. They answered affirmatively. They were not, in other words, unresponsive. Yet the United States spread the word that it had found the Cubans rigid in their positions. However, it also pointed to the meeting as proof of U.S. willingness to talk. [6]

In fact, Smith insists that the Haig-Rodriguez and Walters-Castro encounters were not serious probes by the Reagan Administration, but "simply a way to parry domestic and foreign criticism." [7] Indeed, the Administration soon after tightened the U.S. economic boycott. Charging that Cuba was "actively sponsoring armed violence against our friends and allies," the Treasury Department banned tourist and business travel

[5] Smith, 1982, p. 166.

[6] Smith, 1982, p. 169.

[7] Smith, 1982, p. 169. In a talk to businessmen after the Walters mission, Secretary of State Haig implied that U.S. economic concessions to Cuba might be forthcoming once Castro became "a legitimate member of the Western Hemisphere community of nations." The New York Times, April 24, 1982.

to the island after May 15, 1982, with the aim of reducing the Castro regime's hard currency earnings.[8]

U.S. POLICY AND THE CURRENT IMPASSE

In spite of the criticisms levelled by Smith and others, the Reagan Administration's "stick" may have momentarily succeeded in reducing the breadth and intensity of Cuban backing for the guerrilla insurgent movements in Central America, and in moderating the regime's confrontational posture toward the United States. Still, as will be argued shortly, the Cuban shift may be more tactical than substantive. In the meantime, however, the Administration's confrontational approach appears too weak to yield major concessions from Havana in the near future, and too alarming to be intensified and sustained over the long term.

New Signals: Missed Opportunities in Havana?

The Castro regime's new tack became evident in early April 1982 during a two-day conference and series of discussion meetings held in Havana for 10 American academics and journalists who talked with high Cuban officials, including Vice President Rodriguez. According to a published account written by two members of the American delegation, Professors Seweryn Bialer (Columbia) and Alfred Stepan (Yale), the Cuban position emerged as follows:[9]

[8] The New York Times, April 20, 1982.

[9] See Seweryn Bialer and Alfred Stepan, "Cuba, the U.S., and the Central American Mess," The New York Review of Books, May 27, 1982, pp. 17-21.

- o Cuba remained committed to the principles of "internationalism" and "solidarity" with revolutionary and liberationist struggles, and to the permanency of close political and economic (and military?) bonds with the Soviet Union.
- o Nevertheless, revolutionary militancy had to be tempered because Cuba was now increasingly "exposed" owing to the growing tensions between the two superpowers, and to the Reagan Administration's bellicosity toward Havana. As a result, Cuba had been in a state of "full military mobilization" since November 1981.
- o While Cuban-Soviet bonds remained unshakeable, Havana doubted not only Moscow's willingness to assist Cuba militarily in the event of aggression, but also its ability to continue to supply Cuba with the same level of economic subsidies as in the past. Meanwhile, the heavy-handedness of Soviet policy toward Afghanistan, Africa, and Poland has compromised Cuba among Third World and Socialist International circles.
- o As a consequence, Havana was prepared to seek a "relative accommodation" and to practice "mutual restraint" with Washington, as evidenced by the fact that Cuba had not shipped arms to El Salvador for the last 14 months.
- o Cuba would thus be willing to enter into broad negotiations with the United States on such multilateral issues as South Africa and Central America, including the creation of an international peace-keeping force in El Salvador. Moreover, in a major departure from the past, Cuba would no longer insist on the lifting of the U.S. embargo as a precondition for the negotiations.

That the Cubans arranged the Havana meeting, as well as the very substance of the Bialer-Stepan account, suggest that the Administration's hard line was having an effect: the Cubans did appear genuinely alarmed over continuing tensions, while their proposal was considerably more accommodative than in the past. Indeed, both the new substance and tone of the Cuban position have now received additional credence with Smith's account of his own experience following the Havana meeting:

A few days after this proposal, a Cuban official confirmed to me Cuba's seriousness of purpose: "We want a peaceful solution in Central America. We understand your security concerns and are willing to address them. If you are willing to meet us halfway and to deal with us on the basis of mutual respect, there is no reason we cannot at long last begin to put aside this unproductive animosity between us. We are as weary of it as you are." [10]

Although it had evidently succeeded in eliciting new signals from Havana, the Administration did not test the seriousness of these overtures. Unfortunately, therefore, there is no way of ascertaining whether Washington did in fact miss a major opportunity for starting a constructive dialogue with Havana. Nevertheless, there are grounds for doubting the genuineness of the Cuban overtures as well as the ultimate efficacy of the Administration's approach for advancing U.S. interests and objectives toward Cuba.

The Cuban Position: A Tactical Adjustment

The genuineness of the Cuban overtures is suspect because Havana chose to use members of the American academic community and media as vehicles by which to publicize, within the United States, its position. This in itself suggests that the real intention of the Castro regime, as in the past, was to prevent the Administration from adopting new confrontational measures, either against Cuba directly or, more likely, against Nicaragua. [11] In fact, large-scale U.S. and allied naval

[10] Smith, 1982, p. 167.

[11] Except in the event of a U.S.-Soviet military conflict, the Cuban leadership by late 1981 had become less alarmed over prospects for direct U.S. aggression against the island because of U.S. press and Cuban intelligence reports to the contrary. However, Havana may well have become concerned over the likelihood of new U.S. economic sanctions that would worsen Cuba's current problem of liquidity and debt repayment to Western creditors. In the meantime, U.S. military moves against Nicaragua were both probable and potentially dangerous for Cuba. Were a U.S.-Nicaraguan conflict to occur, Cuba would be faced with a dilemma:

maneuvers were scheduled to begin in the Caribbean Basin at the end of April under "Ocean Venture '82," with the U.S. Navy deploying two carriers for the exercise.

Moreover, Cuba's apparent moderation and readiness to seek a solution to the Salvadoran civil war, and to stabilize the Central American situation, can be seen as a tactical adjustment to recent developments in the region. Thus, the very holding as well as the outcome of the Salvadoran elections on March 28 constituted a dramatic rebuff to the Marxist guerrilla forces. For the moment, therefore, the prospects for a guerrilla triumph were not promising at the time the American delegation was in Havana in April. Also, the Sandinista regime was having to cope with mounting problems on the domestic front, while losing international support from Mexico and Venezuela at the very time when tensions were increasing with Honduras and the United States. Consequently, the momentary shift in the "correlation of forces" in Central America further underscored the need for Havana to adopt a new and more accommodative public posture.

Finally, Cuba's professed readiness to engage in "mutual restraint" was contradicted only weeks after the departure of the U.S. delegation. For over 30 attending delegations representing revolutionary parties and organizations, Havana hosted a three-day international conference in late April on the revolutionary process in Latin America and the Caribbean, addressed by Rodriguez and other high-ranking Cuban

Havana could render "fraternal" assistance to its revolutionary ally but at the risk of being drawn into a military showdown with the United States, or forsake its "internationalist obligations," thereby safeguarding Cuba but at great cost to the Castro regime's reputation and credibility.

officials. Among the latter was Manuel Pineiro, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) and head of the PCC Americas Department, who "placed special importance on the role of armed struggle" in securing the revolutionary process.[12]

In short, the Cuban leadership appears to have lowered its militant public profile primarily for U.S. consumption, while not altering its long-term revolutionary and foreign policy commitments. Such a move was in fact consistent with Havana's past pattern of behavior in dealing with the United States.

The U.S. Approach: Short-Term Sustainability

Bialer and Stepan concede that Havana's shift was more tactical than substantive. However, they also argue that U.S. willingness to compromise might have resulted in Havana's tactical shift becoming a permanent change in Cuban foreign policy.[13] But such a proposition is contradicted by the evidence. The initial accommodative line under President Carter did little to restrain Castro, whereas the Reagan Administration's confrontation stance thus far has produced greater Cuban tactical moderation, however expedient and temporary in nature. Hence, the issue is whether the present Administration's approach can be sustained long enough to compell permanent changes in Cuban behavior. Unfortunately, several considerations suggest that the confrontational

[12] Havana Domestic Radio, April 28, 1982. See also Granma, April 29, 1982, for the opening address by Jesus Montane Oropesa, Alternate Member of the PCC Political Bureau and Member of the PCC Secretariat.

[13] They thus assert that "Practically all changes by revolutionary regimes in the direction of compromise with opponents are tactical when they are first made. If such a willingness to compromise is taken advantage of and a mutual accommodation is actually achieved, the duration of the policy becomes prolonged, and the change might become incorporated into Cuban strategy." Bialer and Stepan, 1982, p. 18.

approach can be neither a viable nor effective long-term policy for the United States:

1. Castro's anxiety in recent months probably stems principally from his fear that Cuba could become an immediate U.S. target in the event of war between the two superpowers even if Cuba were to declare its neutrality. That such in fact could be the case was indicated by the Administration's new emphasis on horizontal escalation. According to one senior State Department official, U.S. armed forces would probably have to attack Cuba in the event of Soviet armed aggression in Europe if only because its Revolutionary Armed Forces could otherwise threaten 70 percent of U.S. seaborne reinforcements to NATO.[14] Such a prospect means that ultimately Castro has little control over the state of U.S.-Cuban relations. Inexorably, Cuba could be drawn into an international crisis involving the United States and the Soviet Union, even were it to take place in Europe or the Middle East.

The problem, however, is that a high level of international tension between the two superpowers is required to make this form of U.S. leverage effective. The maintenance of a high tension level--including prospects of a general war--between the United States and the Soviet Union surely becomes too high a price to pay to gain influence over Cuba. In turn, such a policy is unlikely to receive the support of the Congress and the American people.

2. A policy of overt confrontation is certain to be disruptive to U.S. relations with several key regional allies, such as Mexico and Venezuela. For example, the Lopez Portillo Administration found it incumbent to assert Mexico's own Cuban policy and to defuse the conflict

[14] Air Force Times, May 24, 1982.

between Havana and Washington precisely at a time when the Reagan Administration was intensifying its pressures. To be ultimately sustainable and effective, therefore, U.S. policy should engage potential regional partners in a broad coalition against Castro.

3. Short of all-out war, the Castro regime probably could cope with most confrontational measures by the United States, and in some instances turn them to its own political advantage. Thus, Cuban defenses have been greatly strengthened by new Soviet arms shipments during 1981-82, including most recently MiG-23B fighter interceptors, and by the creation of the 500,000-man Territorial Troop Militias to backstop the regular armed forces in the FAR. Overt military threats against Cuba also supply the regime with the external enemy necessary to galvanize mass support. As long as the regime can thus avail itself of domestic and foreign countermeasures, neither harsh rhetoric nor talk of military action is likely to impress the regime sufficiently to affect its policy over the long run. In this respect, Smith is correct in noting that, by ordering Cuba's mobilization in fall 1981, Castro had "called Washington's bluff," thereafter forcing the latter to downplay the threat of an impending U.S. invasion.[15]

4. Castro has shown extraordinary skill in modulating Cuban activities so as to avoid a showdown with the United States. As exemplified during the visit by the U.S. delegation in April, the Cuban position emerged more conciliatory than at any time in the recent past. That Cuba allegedly has not shipped arms to El Salvador for 14 months becomes a virtuous achievement, and is now accepted by many as proof of Cuba's new "restraint," notwithstanding the fact that the regime had

[15] Smith, 1982, pp. 163-165.

previously denied making any shipments whatsoever. Although remaining a threat to other countries in the region, Cuba can thus counter a U.S. offensive by switching to a moderate stance.

5. The highly porous quality of the American polity and society provides the Cuban regime, particularly in the persons of Fidel Castro and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, with openings by which to exploit the U.S. political process to Cuba's advantage. The "Cuban problem" remains a controversial one in U.S. politics, and Congressmen, academics, and journalists who visit the island often return advocating negotiations and normalization with the Castro government. Professors Bialer and Stepan were thus joined by two other academics in the American delegation in publishing articles in major newspapers and journals calling for an end to the Reagan Administration's hard line and for a new policy of accommodation with Castro.[16] At the very least, the voicing of these kinds of policy recommendations by public opinionmaking circles within the United States constrains the latitude with which confrontational measures can be used against Cuba. In this respect, the legacy of Vietnam, and the prior restraint exercised by American public opinion, prevents the use of force against Cuba unless there is visible and unambiguous provocation from Castro.

Despite its problems, however, the Administration's hard-line stance remains instructive in developing a new policy toward Cuba. Its apparent success in obtaining a degree of Cuban moderation illuminates

[16] See Peter Winn, "Cuba's Overture Falls on Deaf U.S. Ears," Los Angeles Times, April 27, 1982, and "Don't Say No To Havana," The New York Times, July 8, 1982; and William LeoGrande, "Cuba Policy Recycled," Foreign Policy, Spring 1982, pp. 105-119. For rebuttals to the LeoGrande article, see the letters by Myles R. R. Frechette and Edward Gonzalez in Foreign Policy, Fall 1982, pp. 175-179.

some of the Castro regime's vulnerabilities that could be exploited under a new strategy. In turn, its deficiencies can be identified and thus guarded against in forging such a new strategy.

IV. FOUR U.S. POLICY OPTIONS: A CRITIQUE

The preceding pages have assessed U.S. policies that have been pursued toward Castro over the past five years. This section evaluates four policy options that, as ideal types, delineate a broad range of different alternatives that could be adopted toward Cuba in the 1980s. The options in fact constitute analytical pairs: As will be seen, the punitive and conciliatory options are mutually exclusive since each can be adopted only by rejecting its opposite. The U.S.-linkage and Soviet-dependence options are also polar opposites, but each is a variation of the dependency approach and has the same objective of altering Cuba and its Soviet ties. By critically assessing each of these hypothetical options, this section thus lays the analytic foundation for constructing the leverage strategy that is elaborated in Part 2 of this study.

The four alternatives will be assessed with regard to their effectiveness and feasibility in advancing the following minimum U.S. policy objectives:

1. To neutralize the security threat posed by the Cuban-Soviet relationship;
2. To stop Cuba's active support for guerrilla insurgencies in the Caribbean Basin, including the potential use of the FAR in the region; and
3. To discourage Cuban overseas military operations in Africa, the Middle East, and elsewhere.

Additionally, the options will be assessed with regard to advancing these maximum objectives: using Cuba's exposed position as leverage

against the Soviet Union, fundamentally altering the Cuban-Soviet relationship, and changing the nature and composition of the Cuban regime.

THE PUNITIVE AND CONCILIATORY POLICY ALTERNATIVES

The Punitive Option

The punitive policy would have the United States adopt political and military postures that would seek to punish the Castro regime for its behavior, to constrain its active support for revolutionary movements, and, if necessary, to eliminate the regime itself.[1] The range of military measures includes the resumption of intelligence overflights over the island, the interdiction of Cuban supplies destined for revolutionary forces in the Caribbean Basin, and the active support to be given Cuban exiles in the waging of a "war of national liberation" against Castro.

Although risky, the punitive option would directly address the principal external source for heightened instability and insecurity in the Caribbean Basin. It could also eliminate entirely the Soviet security threat in Cuba, provide the United States with a leverage hold over Moscow in the interim, and perhaps ultimately bring down the Castro regime altogether. At the very least, the punitive policy would raise the costs to Cuba were it to persist in its objectionable behavior.

[1] This is essentially the position taken by the Committee of Santa Fe, made up of L. Francis Bouchey, Roger Fontaine, David Jordan, General Gordon Sumner, and Lewis Tambs, in their report, A New Inter-American Policy for the Eighties (Council for Inter-American Security, May 1980). A relatively balanced assessment of the difficulties confronting the implementation of the punitive approach can be found in "Reagan's Goal: Cutting Castro Down to Size," U.S. News & World Report, April 6, 1981, pp. 20-22.

Many of the above punitive measures would be self-defeating for U.S. interests or ineffective against Cuba, however. The closing of respective Interests Sections would eliminate a useful U.S. window on internal Cuban developments. The travel ban would prevent the return of U.S.-based Cuban exiles to the island, thereby shielding the Castro regime from the destabilizing effects of their visits. The abrogation of the fishing agreement--which in fact has been allowed to lapse--would not hurt Cuba except in the distant future since U.S. fishing grounds are presently of marginal importance to the Cuban fishing industry.

Major U.S. military moves against Cuba, whether directly through U.S. naval and air actions or indirectly through U.S. support for an anti-Castro war by Cuban exiles, could seriously alienate Venezuela and, especially, Mexico. Both of these countries have emerged as critical regional players in the Caribbean Basin, and their cooperation has become all the more essential if U.S. policy is to succeed against Castro. Military hostilities between the United States and Cuba, however, could well compel the Venezuelan and Mexican governments to oppose the United States for reasons of international law and domestic politics.[2] Not only these two governments but also other Latin American and Caribbean governments could be additionally confronted with major domestic disturbances in the event of U.S. military aggression.

[2] Both Venezuela and Mexico have strong nationalistic constituencies which their respective governments cannot ignore. Moreover, the current Venezuelan COPEI administration may be replaced in the 1983 elections by the Accion Democratica party, which could well adopt a regional policy that is less supportive of the United States. The foreign policy of the Miguel de la Madrid administration in Mexico, which assumes office in December 1982, has yet to be defined.

Indeed, the United States itself most likely would not be immune to domestic disturbances were military operations carried out against the Castro regime. Renewed U.S. support for exile strikes against the regime, for example, could precipitate a wave of counter-terrorist actions by radical groups allied with Havana, including Puerto Rican and Middle Eastern terrorist organizations.

From a military viewpoint, prolonged large-scale operations against Cuba also work against the strategic need for maintaining the Caribbean Basin as an "economy of force" region. For example, interdiction of Cuban supplies to Central American insurgents or Nicaragua would require the redeployment to the Caribbean of U.S. naval and air units that are already stretched thin in the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean, Mediterranean, and elsewhere in the world. Such an undertaking becomes all the more hazardous because military measures can have consequences which are neither controllable nor predictable, and which may escalate into a broader international conflict. Given the present siege mentality of the Castro leadership, it is conceivable that Cuba might retaliate against U.S. targets that are within the estimated 520 mi combat radius of its MiG-23s, or threaten to overrun the weakly defended Guantanamo Naval Base. There are in fact precedents for such defiant Cuban responses to be found in the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961, the October missile crisis, and the Flamingo incident in May 1980. In the meantime, an expanding U.S.-Cuban conflict would create pressures on Moscow to assist Cuba at least indirectly, for example, by threatening counter moves against West Berlin, the Middle East, or elsewhere.

Once started, the United States could not afford to lose a war with Cuba. But a U.S. victory in Cuba would be costly in the international arena, especially in the Third World, in the same manner that Afghanistan severely set back Soviet diplomacy.[3] Unlike Moscow, however, Washington could be constrained by international and domestic reaction--as well as by Soviet pressures--from employing the very level of force necessary to assure a military solution to the Cuban problem. In turn, the longer the United States remains engaged in a military conflict with Cuba, the less sustainable the military action becomes, and the greater the likelihood that the United States would be forced to disengage.

The launching of a new exile war must also be evaluated in terms of its prospects for success, especially in light of the Bay of Pigs fiasco twenty-one years ago. There is no certainty that a new exile invasion would be welcomed and supported by Cubans on the island. To be sure, the departure of over 125,000 Cubans in 1980, along with indications that perhaps as many as 2 million more wish to leave, are in themselves evidence of popular discontent over the Castro government's poor economic performance and political oppressiveness. However, the three major waves of Cuban emigration since 1959 have all coincided with periods of "severe economic malfunctioning," with the net result that the Castro regime has "exported its opposition to the United States." Among those Cubans who have remained on the island, there are many who

[3] Additionally, U.S. military moves against Cuba would be interpreted internationally as evidence that the United States, by its very action, was adhering to the concept of legitimate spheres of influence between the superpowers. Hence, it would be difficult for the United States to condemn similar Soviet moves against Afghanistan, Poland, or even Western Europe.

are "clearly in agreement with the government," and it may still retain considerable mass support.[4]

The mere prospect of U.S. military actions or the renewal of exile attacks on the island provides Castro with the spectre of "Yankee aggression" with which to rally Cuban nationalism to the side of his regime.[5] The initial rise in U.S.-Cuban tensions enabled him to give urgency to the organization of the new Territorial Troop Militia throughout the island beginning in late 1980. Within a year, some 500,000 civilian volunteers had joined the militia as a home guard to back up the regular armed forces.

Also, unlike traditional authoritarian regimes, Castro's political system rests on the organization and mobilization of mass support among Cuba's population of 10 million. As a consequence, the individual fate of hundreds of thousands of activists and cadres depends on the survival of the regime:

- o The Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs) alone have a membership of 5.3 million; the combined, overlapping membership of all four of Cuba's principal mass organizations (including the CDRs) amounts to 10.2 million; and some 450,000 belong to the university and high school student federations.

[4] Jorge I. Domínguez, "Cuba in the 1980s," Problems of Communism, March-April 1981, pp. 57-58.

[5] The theme of expected U.S. aggression, for example, was especially strident in Castro's speech before the National Assembly of People's Power on December 28, 1980: "We must raise our guard, vigilance must be increased because the attacks may not only involve military action or a naval blockade; they can also consist of the introduction of animal diseases and plant blights--these people have no scruples of any kind--and they can consist of sabotaging the economy and starting the business of trying to murder leaders again and that sort of thing. . . . As we said in the Main Report [to the Party Congress], they'll have to assume responsibility for their acts. This also holds true for counterrevolutionary activity; we must use an iron fist and crush the slightest sign of counterrevolution." Granma Weekly Review, January 11, 1981, p. 2.

- o Membership in the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) and its affiliated youth organization has grown to 434,134 and 422,000 regular members and candidates, respectively.[6]
- o The Revolutionary Armed Forces number an estimated 167,000 active-duty personnel, State Security Troops account for another 15,000, and still other tens of thousands of Cubans work for the Ministry of Interior as well as other government agencies.

In the meantime, the new Central Committee unveiled in December 1980 accorded greater recognition to second echelon elites, reflecting in turn the importance attached to civilian as well as military institutions and their cadres.

Such a vast organizational membership and network of organizations have important consequences for the Castro regime and for U.S. policy toward Cuba:

1. The regime can command the political support and military service of the vast majority of able-bodied males and females 14 years old and up;
2. While many of those mobilized may be only nominally committed or even opposed to the Castro regime, the latter's mobilization structures and controls are likely to make mass defections or opposition to the regime highly problematical; and
3. At the very least, the regime can count on the loyalty of hundreds of thousands of cadres who occupy low and middle level posts in the mass organizations, the Party, the military and security organs, and the other governmental bodies, and who thus have a strong personal stake in the survival of the Castro regime.

Indeed, it is precisely the spectre of an island-wide bloodbath associated with the fall of the Castro regime, and the return of certain

[6] The mass organization, student federation, and party figures are taken from Castro's Main Report to the Second Party Congress, December 28, 1980, pp. 10-12 (see Granma Weekly Review, January 11, 1981).

exiles to power, that further ensures the loyalty and commitment of vast numbers of Cubans who have integrated themselves into the regime. The prospects of a frontal assault from abroad thus helps to solidify the regime and its ties to the popular masses.

The Conciliatory Option

The conciliatory option would have the U.S. Government offer the Castro regime the restoration of trade relations, the availability of U.S. credits and technology, and the normalization of diplomatic relations. This approach could be made without conditions or quid pro quos. [7] Or, more realistically, it could be advanced on the condition that Cuba (a) cease being an active military ally of the Soviet Union in the service of Soviet expansionism and (b) terminate its support for revolutionary insurgencies in the Western Hemisphere. [8] This approach aims at realizing the minimum U.S. objectives of neutralizing the Soviet-Cuban security threat, discouraging Cuba's role as a military paladin of the Soviet Union, and arresting Cuba's promotion of revolution in the Americas. Such an approach could also logically lead to the eventual realization of the maximum goals of fundamentally altering the Cuban-Soviet relationship and perhaps the regime itself.

The conciliatory option has three advantages over the punitive alternative. First, it is a low-risk policy that would not intensify world tensions. Second, it would not require the redeployment of scarce

[7] For example, see Peter Winn, "Cuba's Overture Falls on Deaf U.S. Ears," Los Angeles Times, April 17, 1982, and "Don't Say No to Havana," The New York Times, July 8, 1982.

[8] See Abraham F. Lowenthal, "Reagan's Best Weapon Against Cuba May Be the Threat of Peace," Los Angeles Times, April 5, 1981, Part V, p. 3. See also Wayne S. Smith, "Dateline Havana: Myopic Diplomacy," Foreign Policy, Fall 1982, pp. 157-174.

military resources to the Caribbean, but would instead enable the United States to use its abundant economic and technological advantages to bargain with the Castro government. Finally, were Castro to reject U.S. public overtures, the conciliatory approach might undermine regime cohesion and its basis of popular support, rather than reinforce them as is likely to occur with the punitive approach.

There are three major difficulties with the conciliatory approach, however. To begin with, it disregards the changes that have occurred in the Cuban leadership since 1979, which have had the effect of strengthening hard-line elements in the regime. As will be discussed in the following section, the more moderate technocratic elements--precisely the leaders most interested in accommodation with Washington--have been largely displaced. In their stead, the old guerrilla veterans who are loyal to Fidel and Raul Castro, and the military as an institution, have significantly expanded their control over the Party's Political Bureau, Secretariat, and Central Committee, and over the government's principal decisionmaking body as well. Given the hard-liners' new and overwhelming predominance, the regime is even less likely now to alter its behavior as a result of conciliatory U.S. moves than it was five years ago, notwithstanding the Carter Administration's accommodative stance and Cuba's increased economic ties with the West in the mid-1970s. Indeed, the mind-sets and organizational interests of the newly dominant elites suggest that they would treat a U.S. conciliatory stance as a sign of weakness--as they did with President Carter--to be exploited to Cuba's advantage.

The second major difficulty with the conciliatory option concerns its economic and political feasibility. It would be difficult for the

United States to replace the Soviet Union as Cuba's principal trading partner and subsidizer. The Soviets, for example, provided Cuba with almost \$5.7 billion in repayable aid between 1960 and 1979, and an additional sum of nearly \$11 billion in grants and trade subsidies for the same 20-year period. During the 1976-79 four-year period alone, however, Cuba cost Moscow an estimated \$9.6 billion in total economic assistance, most of it outright grants and trade subsidies.[9] The \$9.6 billion subsidy amounts to \$2.4 billion per annum, which in turn was 47 percent of the \$4.567 billion that the United States provided in total development assistance in 1979. In addition to the economic problem, it would surely be difficult to obtain the necessary political support within the United States for such a large subsidy for the Castro government, particularly given the legacy of mutual confrontation and hostility over the last two decades.

As for trade, the Soviet Union accounted for 73 percent of Cuba's exports and 65 percent of its imports in 1979. For the current year, according to Castro, the socialist countries continue to account for 80 percent of Cuba's imports, with the Soviet Union remaining the predominant source of imports.[10] Thus, the Soviets alone supply the island directly or indirectly with about 98 percent of its petroleum imports at a discounted price of about 50 percent of the world price, both of which the United States could ill afford. Additionally, the Soviet Union is Cuba's principal sugar buyer, again at a preferential price, with Cuban sugar exports to the Soviet Union due to rise from 2.5

[9] National Foreign Assessment Center, Central Intelligence Agency, The Cuban Economy: A Statistical Review--A Reference Aid, ER81-10052 and PA-10074, March 1981, p. 39.

[10] Granma Weekly Review, August 8, 1982, p. 4.

to 3 million tons in 1981-82, which the United States could not absorb owing to the established position of domestic and other international sugar suppliers in the U.S. market. Therefore, even if the Soviet Union is unable to sustain its high levels of support, and even if Havana were willing to realign itself, the United States could not replace the Soviet Union as the Castro regime's principal benefactor and trading partner.

On a more modest scale, the United States might try to provide Castro with inducements for distancing himself from the Soviet Union, and for curbing his revolutionary ambitions in the hemisphere, by giving Cuba limited access to U.S. trade, technology, and credits. Indeed, one observer has proposed a "strategy of gradual engagement" on the more pliant bilateral issues dividing Washington and Havana, with the ensuing mutual accommodation enabling the United States to use its economic leverage to gain eventual concessions from Castro.[11]

However, the more pliant bilateral questions involve precisely those peripheral issues which have little to do with the principal sources of conflict and tension between the United States and Cuba. Consequently, Cuba's military ties with the Soviets, and its internationalism, would not be addressed by this approach.[12] Even were such central issues addressed, limited access to the U.S. largess provides only weak inducements, which in turn would give the United States little leverage in bargaining for major Cuban foreign policy concessions. Indeed, as was demonstrated in 1977-78, Washington has virtually no bargaining power in such situations because of Havana's ability to extract both very high levels of Soviet economic support and

[11] See William M. LeoGrande, "Cuba Policy Recycled," Foreign Policy, Spring 1982, pp. 105-119.

[12] This is in fact LeoGrande's position in Foreign Policy, Spring 1982, and in his subsequent letter in Foreign Policy, Fall 1982, pp. 181-184.

to pursue its own preferred foreign policy inclinations as Moscow's most valued ally in the Third World.

Finally, the conciliatory approach cannot be sustained over the long term. For it to receive sustained support from within the Executive Branch, the Congress, and the public at large, a conciliatory U.S. policy would require prompt successes in terms of visible changes in Cuban international behavior. Conversely, such support rapidly dwindles when the desired changes are not forthcoming, which is one reason why detente with the Soviet Union collapsed after the mid-1970s. A similar outcome greeted the Carter Administration's initial Cuban policy as a result of Havana's military foray into Ethiopia. In the 1980s, the nonsustainability of the conciliatory approach is likely to be repeated because of the new predominance in the regime of the fidelistas, raulistas, and military elites.

VARIATIONS ON THE DEPENDENCY APPROACH

Softening Up Cuba through U.S. Linkages

Unlike the conciliatory approach, the linkage alternative does not believe that the Castro regime can be weaned away from its Soviet patron or persuaded to moderate its international behavior through U.S. concessions. However, it also contends that the U.S. possesses neither a credible military threat nor other forms of leverage to compel the Castro regime to make policy concessions on issues of vital interest to the Cubans. Nevertheless, the proponents of the linkage option do view such Cuban activities as endangering U.S. security interests. To ultimately assure those interests, they would seek to undo Castro's revolutionary order from within.[13]

[13] Although the linkage approach has not been publicly proposed, it does have advocates among former foreign policy advisors in the

The basic premise underlying this approach is that the Cuban regime is vulnerable not to guns but to butter. The return of over 100,000 Cuban exiles starting in late 1978, for example, initially sparked internal unrest and then the mass exodus through Mariel of over 125,000 Cubans to the United States in 1980. This approach advocates the normalization of relations with Cuba, particularly in the areas of foreign trade, investment, and tourism, without insisting upon major Cuban foreign policy concessions. Instead, Cuba's present command system, confrontational postures, and activist backing of "liberationist" and "revolutionary" movements abroad would be gradually eroded as Cubans became contaminated by bourgeois values through the exportation of American goods, tourists, and capital (in joint U.S.-Cuban companies) to the island. No longer could pent-up demands for more consumer goods and housing, and for a more ordered and better life, be indefinitely postponed.

As happened after 1978 with the return of Cuban exiles, increased public dissatisfaction could force the regime to again tighten its political controls to ensure societal conformity with appropriate revolutionary norms, but at the cost of increased popular alienation from and opposition to the government. Alternatively, the regime could adopt a more liberal stance that permitted free-market mechanisms and Western-style cultural trends to retain mass support.[14] In either

Carter Administration. Its closest public formulation can be found in Abraham F. Lowenthal, "Reagan's Best Weapon Against Cuba May Be the Threat of Peace," Los Angeles Times, April 5, 1981, Part IV, p. 3.

[14] The regime did, in fact, introduce some liberalizing measures beginning in 1980 that aimed at revitalizing the economy and popular support. These included linking higher wages to increased productivity, pledging the greater availability of some consumer goods, and allowing the operation of a peasant free-market in which prices are governed by

instance, the regime might eventually be compelled to turn its attention inward and away from foreign policy adventurism to maintain domestic order and stability. In both there is also the potential for long-term system disequilibrium and decay.

The linkage approach recognizes that there would be short-term costs in promoting the normalization process without first obtaining quid pro quos from Cuba. But it is prepared to absorb those costs in the expectation that, over the long run, the emergence of a consumerist society could unravel Cuban communism or at least severely constrain the regime's capacity to govern and embark upon internationalist activities adverse to U.S. interests. In the meantime, the approach could be implemented with ease since it is not dependent on the coordination of the cumbersome and fragmented U.S. Government bureaucracy.

This option is, however, neither politically feasible nor likely to be policy effective with respect to desired outcomes:

1. Major sectors of the U.S. public, media, and the Congress would oppose normalization without first obtaining quid pro quos from Havana. No Republican or Democratic Administration could in turn afford to take the political risk of Cuba continuing its pro-Soviet and subversive activities while enjoying the economic advantages of normalization with the United States.

the forces of supply and demand. The latter has begun to ease the shortage of agricultural staples and other food items that so vexed Cuban consumers for nearly two decades. But this and other similar arrangements, according to Fidel Castro, have created a new "capitalist" class of rich peasants and entrepreneurs whose "lust for gain" he sharply condemned at the IV Congress of the Young Communist League. See Granma Weekly Review, April 18, 1982, pp. 3-4.

2. Were the United States to adopt such a policy option, the regime could control the normalization process in ways to minimize its subversive impact on Cuban society. For example, the regime could regulate the type of imports ordered from the United States, closely limit and monitor U.S. investments in joint enterprises, and control the length of time and the mobility of American tourists visiting the island. The regime's political structures could thus offset many of the otherwise negative effects of increased Cuban linkages with the United States.

3. The United States could insist on an "open door policy" for the unrestricted flow of economic goods and people as a requisite for normalization. However, the Cubans would surely reject this condition not only because it would constitute an infringement upon Cuban sovereignty, but also because it would be perceived as posing an acute danger to the very survival of Cuba's revolutionary ethos and perhaps to the regime itself.

4. Unconditional normalization would damage relations between the United States and its key Caribbean Basin allies such as the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Colombia, and Venezuela. The governments of these states would view normalization as a betrayal by the United States of its long-standing policy of containing Castro which they themselves have actively supported. Indeed, the new posture would reward a hostile regime that had long endangered the security and stability of the entire region.

5. Most critically, normalization without major Cuban concessions would send a wrong signal to both Havana and Moscow regarding U.S.

interests and resolve on the Cuban issue. In fact, such a move might lead the Cubans and their Soviet allies to undertake new military and foreign policy moves that ultimately could be destabilizing to world peace. Such an eventuality is increased by the hard-line profile of the Castro regime and by the rising Soviet presence in Cuba and the Caribbean over the past decade.

The possibility that the Cubans and Soviets might eventually miscalculate and cross the threshold of U.S. tolerance during the 1980s thus becomes appreciably greater with a U.S. policy of unconditional normalization. Emboldened by such a modus vivendi, Havana and/or Moscow could take a step--such as the dispatch of Cuban troops to shore up a friendly government in a Basin country or the emplacement of SS-20 missiles on the island--which the United States could not ignore. As in the missile crisis, the U.S. Government would then have to opt for a military solution to the new crisis, but under far more dangerous circumstances given the vast increases in both Cuban and Soviet military power since the early 1960s.

In short, the linkage approach to the Cuban problem entails great risks for uncertain benefits. It is predicated upon questionable assumptions concerning the impact of U.S. ties on Cuban society, while it proposes a policy posture that could affect Cuban and Soviet elite perceptions and thereby dangerously loosen the external constraints on their international behavior. It could thus increase the possibilities of direct military confrontation in the future between the United States and Cuba and/or the Soviet Union.

Breaking the Moscow Axis through Greater Dependency

Like the punitive option, this approach would have the United States increase its military pressures on Cuba and tighten the economic embargo. But rather than aiming at the overthrow of the regime, this alternative would seek to further heighten the regime's dependence on the Soviet Union in order to precipitate Cuba's rupture with Moscow. In essence, it is a psycho-political stratagem for inducing a radical change in the behavior of the Castro regime through cost-raising--i.e., through the creation of an intolerable situation of extreme client-state subordination to the patron power.

The model for this stratagem is Sadat's Egypt. As occurred with the Egyptian regime in 1972-74, Cuba's further political, economic, and military dependence on the Soviet Union could ultimately produce in Cuba a feeling of intense suffocation with the increased Soviet presence, thereby triggering Havana's rupture with Moscow. Hence, the stratagem is premised upon using Cuban nationalism, and especially the Castro leadership's yearnings to rid itself of its dependent and subordinate relationship, to produce a reversal of alliances.

This approach is flawed by the assumption that the United States can intensify pressures on Cuba to an extent even greater than at any time during the past two decades. But leaving that question aside, there still remain three fundamental problems with the approach as a viable option for U.S. policy:

1. Deliberately intensifying Cuba's dependence on the Soviet Union could heighten the risks for U.S. security interests while waiting for the anticipated rupture in the Cuban-Soviet relationship. If increased

dependence did in fact lead to increased Cuban subordination to the Soviets, then the Castro regime's ability to resist future Soviet demands for new basing facilities--including possibly medium-range missile sites--would be reduced. Indeed, an objective of U.S. policy should be to induce the Cubans themselves to resist such demands and ultimately to insist that the island not be used as a Soviet strategic outpost.

2. The stratagem rests on the assumption that Cuba's dependence on the Soviets would become so onerous as to precipitate a rupture, but as yet there is no evidence suggesting that such an outcome would occur. On the contrary, the Soviets have generally been skillful in managing their relations with Castro. Even when they have enjoyed the upper hand in securing Cuban compliance on both domestic and foreign policy issues, as occurred especially during the 1969-75 period, the Soviets have exercised care in dealing with Castro, including providing his regime with generous economic and military assistance and with political deference.[15] Havana would thus break with Moscow only if there developed a sharp and irreconcilable conflict of interests as opposed to the broad convergence of interests that has thus far cemented the Cuban-Soviet alliance.[16]

[15] See Edward Gonzalez, "Castro's New Orthodoxy," Problems of Communism, January-February 1976, pp. 1-19; Cole Blasier, "The Soviet Union in the Cuban-American Conflict," in Cole Blasier and Carmelo Mesa-Lago (eds.), Cuba in the World, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979, pp. 37-51; and Merrit Robbins, "The Soviet-Cuban Relationship," in Roger E. Kanet (ed.), Soviet Foreign Policy in the 1980s, Praeger Special Studies, 1982, pp. 144-170.

[16] As one observer has recently written: "Historically, Cuba and the U.S.S.R. have experienced political fluctuations; an undisrupted relationship, however--with both sides being aware of mutual benefits and costs--can be expected to continue in the 1980s. . . . [I]f Cuba continues to prove its loyalty, it will exercise leverage and secure higher levels of support from the Soviet Union. Moreover, its Soviet-style institutions appear firm, despite recent difficulties." Robbins, 1982, p. 162.

3. The stratagem also rests on the assumption that the Castro leadership would perceive, as did Sadat in Cairo after the early 1970s, that Cuba could in fact choose a new patron. But such has not been the case for more than two decades precisely because, unlike Egypt with the United States, Havana has always seen the "Colossus of the North" as Cuba's historic and primary antagonist. As the external enemy, "Yankee imperialism" has been essential to the regime's ability to mobilize mass support, to demand revolutionary sacrifices, and to monopolize political power. Moreover, even if the United States stood ready to embrace Castro's Cuba, there is little prospect that Castro could abandon his generous Soviet patron because the United States could not easily provide Havana with the same levels of economic and military assistance and political deference.

In brief, Cuba's economic, political, and military dependence on the Soviet Union not only is a historic fact, but it is also a situation that is likely to persist. In light of the limited ability of the United States to subsidize the Cuban economy, moreover, it would be advantageous for U.S. interests if Cuba remained an economic client-state of Moscow, provided it also became less sovietized in its military ties.

V. THE CUBAN CONTEXT FOR A U.S. POLICY IN THE 1980S

The foregoing assessments of the Carter and Reagan Administration policies, and of the four different policy options, demonstrate the difficulty in fashioning a strategy toward Castro that can effectively advance U.S. interests and objectives under peacetime rather than general war conditions. As evidenced by those assessments, part of the difficulty lies in making questionable assumptions about the Cuban regime, the Cuban-Soviet relationship, and the state of U.S.-Cuban affairs. If future U.S. policy is to become effective it must thus reassess these assumptions and establish more realistic premises on which to implement policy. For the 1980s these policy assumptions and premises appear to be fivefold.

THE VIABILITY OF THE CASTRO REGIME

For the purposes of policymaking, the long-term viability of the Castro regime must be assumed. Fidel Castro is only in his mid-fifties, his regime consolidated its power long ago, and the political process has been largely institutionalized during the past decade. Most importantly, members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, the Ministry of Interior, and other security organs thus far appear loyal to the two Castro brothers, and they retain a vested interest in defending the current regime.

Although such an assessment is required for policymaking, it does not mean that the permanency of the regime is assured: unforeseen contingencies, such as Castro's unexpected death or a sharp deterioration in the domestic situation, could undermine the regime or

even lead to a military coup. The regime does face serious economic problems which could worsen in the years ahead. There is also popular discontent, as evidenced by the Mariel exodus in 1980 and by the desire of still several hundred thousand more Cubans to leave the island.

Perhaps more serious is the potential for divisions within the armed forces and between the military and civilian leadership. In the years ahead, for example, divisions may well develop between generations of military officers, between veterans of the African campaigns and nonveterans, and between the more technocratic and better educated military professionals and those officers whose careers started in the guerrilla struggle. Potential tensions, in turn, between the regime and the military might also arise due to policy differences over provoking a possible Cuban-U.S. confrontation, incurring heavy Cuban casualties in new combat operations in Africa or elsewhere, and acquiescing to greater Soviet control over Cuban affairs.[1]

For the present, however, U.S. policy cannot be premised on the above contingencies materializing within the foreseeable future. On the contrary, the Castro regime has withstood U.S. pressures for more than two decades, and it could well be in existence two decades hence. Popular discontent currently does not pose a serious challenge to the regime's grasp on political power. Rather than offering overt opposition, the discontented hope to emigrate abroad, while the majority of Cubans evidently have accommodated themselves to the regime or may support it in varying degrees of intensity.[2]

[1] Uncorroborated reports by Cuban exiles allege that Castro has imposed stringent security measures to guard against a military coup. See, for example, the interview given by Huber Matos in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, August 17, 1982.

[2] One specialist who has recently visited Cuba notes that the Castro regime has "exported" much of its opposition to the United States. Among those who remain are Cubans who clearly identify with and

Moreover, the regime has worked to ensure the continued loyalty of the armed forces through a number of devices: special perquisites are granted to military officers, including housing and consumer goods privileges; new weapon inventories have been acquired for all the military services; the FAR continues to be accorded great public prestige; and military ties to the Party are strong. In fact, some 80 percent of the FAR's graduating officers in recent years have been members of either the Party or its auxiliary, the Young Communist League. As will be noted shortly, the FAR also constitutes the single largest bloc within the Party's Central Committee.

The regime's evident viability thus means that the United States must be prepared to deal with Castro on a sustained and long-term basis in the 1980s. Equally critical, U.S. policy should be more concerned with the external behavior of Cuba as it affects U.S. interests than with the regime's domestic politics and ideology.

THE ELUSIVENESS OF COMPROMISE

Particularly during the 1970s, commentators and policymakers alike assumed that the U.S.-Cuban conflict could be resolved through mutual compromise. However, U.S.-Cuban interests are not simply conflictual; they are also contradictory. Such issues as Cuban claims to Guantanamo and U.S. demands for Cuban compensation for nationalized American properties are examples of conflictual interests which are nevertheless potentially resolvable through a political settlement. In contrast,

support the regime because they feel they are participating in an indigenous revolution and because they have benefited from the regime's public health, educational, and equalitarian policies. See Jorge I. Domínguez, "Cuba in the 1980s," Problems of Communism, March-April 1981, pp. 57-68.

contradictory interests preclude such settlements because they lock both countries into irreconcilable antagonisms: each party perceives its national interests as requiring adherence to international principles and activities essential to their respective global positions and roles, but which directly contradict the other party's interests.[3]

Compromise thus becomes exceedingly difficult for Washington and Havana because it requires one or both parties to sacrifice those principles or activities that are deemed essential to the country's vital interests. For example, Cuba cannot easily alter its relationship with the Soviets, nor abandon its internationalist activities, because they provide the Castro regime with the means for ensuring its survival and heightening its international influence, and for constantly legitimizing itself. Conversely, the United States cannot accept these conditions because they endanger its security and foreign policy interests.[4] To overcome these and other contradictory interests, the United States will have to develop a long-term strategy and a range of instruments by which to oblige Cuba to cease its objectionable behavior.

[3] For a fuller elaboration of these distinctions, see Edward Gonzalez, "U.S. Policy: Objectives and Options," in Jorge I. Domínguez (ed.), Cuba: Internal and International Affairs, Sage Publications, 1982, pp. 193-221.

[4] Some commentators, however, deny that Cuba's overseas activities are contradictory to U.S. interests. In describing Cuban policy in South Africa, for example, William M. LeoGrande argues that "Cuba has acted more as the 'stabilizing force' described by Andrew Young . . . than as a promoter of conflict," and that "Cuban policy has been consistent with Western interests, not in conflict with them." ("Cuba Issue Binds U.S. in Namibia," The New York Times, July 29, 1982.) Such a view ignores the principal cause of U.S.-Cuban antagonism in the region--i.e., Cuba's role in advancing Soviet interests and in consolidating Marxist-Leninist regimes.

THE CONGRUENCE OF CUBAN-SOVIET TIES

As in the past, the United States will find it exceedingly difficult to break the Havana-Moscow axis. Ever since 1960, Soviet political, economic, and military ties with Cuba have been indispensable to the survival of the Castro regime. Since 1970, moreover, these ties have become increasingly institutionalized. Thus, the Cubans and Soviets closely coordinated command functions and logistics in the Ethiopian operation, and the Soviets retain a large military advisory group in Cuba. Havana's General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI) also works in tandem with the KGB.

The Cuban economy has become largely integrated with that of the Soviet Union's through the presence of Soviet technicians and advisors, the creation of joint governmental commissions, and the Cuban Five-Year Plans for 1976-80 and 1981-85. To a considerable extent, the Five-Year Plans closely link the island's economy to the Soviet Union. By 1978, in fact, 73 percent of the island's total exports were to the Soviet Union, while the latter accounted for 65 percent of Cuban imports, with this trade dependence expected to increase even more during the 1980s.[5]

Increased economic dependence implies increased influence by Moscow over Cuban domestic and foreign affairs. This has been demonstrated in recent years by Cuba's pro-Soviet position on key international issues. Thus, the Cuban forces in Ethiopia served under the Soviet general staff stationed in that country; Cuba later championed the Soviet Union as the

[5] Lawrence H. Theriot, Cuba Faces the Economic Realities of the 1980s, A Study Prepared for the Use of the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress of the United States, March 22, 1982, pp. 7-8.

"natural ally" of the Third World at the Havana conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1979; and Cuba steadfastly sided with the Soviet Union in voting against the U.N. General Assembly's resolution calling for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1980. Moreover, at the Second Party Congress in December 1980, Castro publicly proclaimed the socialist camp's "right" to intervene in Poland in order to "save" that country from imperialism's onslaught.[6] In brief, as a dependent client state, Cuba must operate within the political and ideological parameters set by its international patron.

Nevertheless, Castro has succeeded in minimizing the extent of indirect as well as direct Soviet penetration of his regime, as evidenced by the limited number of "old Communists" who occupy important party and governmental posts.[7] Moreover, while supportive of Moscow's foreign policy interests, Cuba has had its own interests to pursue in Latin America, Africa, and elsewhere in the Third World. The convergence of otherwise separate Cuban and Soviet interests in these areas, in turn, has often yielded mutual advantages for both parties.

Thus, Cuba's overseas military operations in Angola (1975-) and Ethiopia (1977-) provided Castro with new leverage for dealing with Moscow. Because of its singular success in advancing Soviet interests in Africa, including securing Marxist regimes in both Angola and

[6] Granma Weekly Review, December 28, 1980.

[7] The "old Communists" were from the Moscow-oriented Popular Socialist Party (PSP) in pre-1959 Cuba. Only three of its members are currently in the 16-man Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC), two are among the 11 Alternates to the Political Bureau, and one is in the 9-member Secretariat. Former PSP members accounted for about 20.5 percent of the the PCC Central Committee in 1975, and their percentage in the new 1980 Central Committee may have declined slightly. No "old Communist" occupies a high-command or sensitive position in the military or security forces.

Ethiopia, Cuba became a privileged ally of the Soviet Union. In essence, Cuba emerged from its African campaigns as an international paladin whose services on behalf of Soviet interests now enabled it to obtain higher levels of Soviet economic and military assistance.[8]

The extent to which Cuba was able to command greater economic concessions from the Soviet Union in the post-1975 period is seen in Table 1. It shows a dramatic increase in only a 4-year period of over \$9.5 billion in total cumulative Soviet assistance between 1976-79, which represents a 135 percent increase over the total cumulative assistance previously provided in the entire 1961-75 period. As a consequence, Cuba was receiving over \$3.1 billion per annum in total Soviet assistance by 1979.

In addition, Cuba strengthened its military ties with the Soviet Union as a result of its successful African operations. In particular, stronger professional bonds were forged between the FAR and the Soviet military after Ethiopia: Cuban officers served under the overall strategic command of Lt. General Vasiliy Ivanovich Petrov and his Soviet general staff, and the Cuban army gained new professional standing as a result of its brilliant counteroffensive in routing Somalian troops in the Ogaden region. Even more importantly, the FAR acquired new weapons inventories from the Soviets after Angola and Ethiopia, including the first shipment of MiG-23s that arrived in spring 1978. Subsequently, Soviet arms deliveries to Cuba were vastly increased, reaching well over 60 million metric tons in 1981--a figure that was more than three times the level of annual deliveries in the previous five years--with

[8] On Cuba's paladin role and leverage, see Edward Gonzalez, "Cuba, the Soviet Union, and Africa," in David E. Albright (ed.), Communism in Africa, Indiana University Press, 1980, pp. 145-167.

Table 1

SOVIET ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, 1961-79
(In million U.S. \$)

| | 1961- 1970 | 1975 | 1976 | 1977 | 1978 | 1979 |
|-------------------------------|---------------|-------|-------|--------|--------|--------|
| Cumulative yearly total | 3,568 [a] | 7,099 | 8,606 | 10,588 | 13,556 | 16,664 |
| Annual grand total [b] | 1,018 [a] | 901 | 1,357 | 1,672 | 2,638 | 2,667 |
| Per annum total assistance | | 1,051 | 1,507 | 1,982 | 2,968 | 3,107 |

SOURCE: Adapted from the National Foreign Assessment Center, Central Intelligence Agency, The Cuban Economy: A Statistical Review--A Reference Aid, ER 81-10052 & PA 81-10074, March 1981, p. 39.

[a] Figures represent cumulative totals for entire 1961-70 period.

[b] Includes sugar, petroleum, and nickel subsidies, as well as nonrepayable aid.

deliveries in 1982 evidently proceeding at the same high rate.[9]

Despite economic dependence and political subordination, therefore, Cuba's relationship with Moscow does yield substantial advantages for the regime in terms of heightened political status as a privileged client state, generous subsidies for the Cuban economy, and professionalization and modernization of the Cuban armed forces. Moreover, Cuba would find it difficult to replicate such advantages elsewhere: even were it favorably disposed toward Castro, the United

[9] The infusion of Soviet arms, of course, is no longer linked to Cuba's African exploits, but to the perceived threat from the United States. Nonetheless, both the quality as well as quantity of Soviet arms shipments is suggestive of the FAR's strong ties with the Soviet armed forces.

States would be hard pressed to match Soviet levels of political, economic, and military support for Havana. Thus, despite occasional strains, U.S. policy should be predicated on the expectation that close ties between Havana and Moscow will continue. Accordingly, U.S. policy objectives should be to reduce or eliminate the adverse effect of those ties on the security of the United States and the Caribbean Basin.

RENEWED MILITANCY OF THE DOMINANT POLITICAL ELITES

Ever since 1959, Castro has been the supreme architect of Cuban foreign policy as well as the final arbiter of policy disputes within his regime. During the 1970s, however, his regime came to encompass a larger and more diversified elite coalition whose members shared a basic consensus, but whose policy preferences and interests often differed with respect to policy priorities. The broadening of the coalition--particularly the appointment of more technically qualified personnel to high decisionmaking posts--was an important factor in moderating the regime's behavior in the 1970s. Thus, new constraints were imposed on Cuba's socialist caudillo by the greater diversity and competence of the new elites; and Castro in turn needed to preserve the unity of this broader coalition by pursuing more pragmatic and balanced policies.[10]

Today, however, these coalitional constraints have been weakened: the regime not only is dominated by Castro, but also by political elites whose values, policy goals, and organizational interests reinforce his political inclinations and policy preferences. From within the regime, therefore, Cuban foreign policy tends to be impelled along highly activist and pro-Soviet lines.

[10] For a further elaboration of these points, see Edward Gonzalez, "Institutionalization, Political Elites, and Foreign Policies," in Cole Blasier and Carmelo Mesa-Lago (eds.), Cuba in the World, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979, pp. 3-36.

The new elite dominance is exercised by fidelista and raulista civilian and military leaders, and by the armed forces as an institution. They all have demonstrated their personal loyalty to Fidel and Raul Castro, with most having served as guerrilla fighters under the two Castro brothers a quarter century ago. The reascendancy of these elites has significantly lessened the influence of the more moderate technocratic elements in the regime--precisely the one elite grouping that is most inclined toward pragmatism both at home and abroad, and that thus is less ideologically driven and the least committed to internationalism. As a consequence, the new dominance of the hard-liners is likely to make the regime even less responsive to U.S. conciliatory postures than was the case five years ago.

At that time, the technocratically oriented elites occupied important leadership posts in the Communist Party of Cuba and especially the government. Led by Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and Minister of Trade Marcelo Fernandez, the technocratic elites were the driving force behind efforts to normalize trade relations between Cuba and the United States in 1977. In fact, Fernandez and other economic officials visited Washington that year in hopes of securing needed credits with which to obtain elusive U.S. agricultural equipment, technology, computer hardware, and other goods. Starting in December 1979, however, the ranks of the technocrats were decimated by purges that sacked Fernandez and 22 other ministers, presidents of state committees, and other high officials, removing them from the Council of Ministers and, in nine cases, from the new Central Committee that was installed in December 1980. [11]

[11] For details on these leadership changes, see Jorge I.

The demise of the technocrats opened the way in 1980 for the reconcentration of power in the hands of the fidelistas and raulistas, and the FAR as an institution, with important consequences for Cuban foreign policy:

The fidelistas: Led by Fidel Castro and composed primarily of his veteran guerrilla followers from the Moncada attack and Sierra Maestra campaign, the fidelistas have long occupied the key civilian posts in the Party and government. Although concerned with the problem of Cuba's economic underdevelopment, Castro and his closest associates assign even higher priority to the fulfillment of revolutionary obligations at home and abroad, and to enhancing the regime's international influence. The fidelistas thus constitute the primary political force driving the regime toward the realization of maximalist foreign policy goals. Among their objectives are:

- o Maintaining Cuba's independence from and opposition to the United States;
- o Actively supporting revolutionary movements in Latin America;
- o Promoting national liberation and socialism in the Third World;
- o Acquiring influence and supportive allies among Third World states; and
- o Securing maximum Soviet military, economic, and political commitments.

Active pursuit of such goals, of course, is tempered by the need to realize the regime's core objectives: it must ensure its own security,

Dominguez, "Revolutionary Politics: The Demands for Orderliness," in Jorge I. Dominguez (ed.), Cuba: Internal and International Affairs, Sage Publications, 1982, pp. 22-33.

survival, and autonomy, and it must also promote the island's economic development. Thus, Cuba seeks to expand its credit and trade ties with the West, and to maintain close relations with Mexico as well as other less radical states. Still, the maximalist aspirations of the fidelistas have led to military operations overseas, to ever closer political and military collaboration with Moscow, and to renewed support for revolutionary insurgencies in the Caribbean Basin, even when they have required sacrificing economic advantages with the West.

The raulistas: The followers of Raul Castro share the general attributes and interests of the fidelistas. Unlike the latter, however, they have literally been Raul's camp followers since the days of the guerrilla struggle, remaining with him in the Revolutionary Armed Forces. When the raulistas did assume high civilian posts in the PCC and government, they normally did so only in the late 1960s and 1970s.[12]

The military: Headed by Army General Raul Castro in his capacity as Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR), the FAR provides the principal institutional force backing Fidel Castro's maximalist

[12] The distinction between fidelistas and raulistas officers initially derives from their primary associations with the Castro brothers during the anti-Batista struggle. Generally, the fidelistas joined Fidel in the Moncada attack of 1953, and/or later remained with him on the First Front during the course of the guerrilla struggle, whereas the raulistas later joined the younger Castro brother in establishing the Second Front in 1958. In the post-1959 period, several of the most prominent fidelistas guerrilla veterans became civilianized as they assumed permanent leadership positions in the Party and government, and thereafter constituted the core of the inner circle around Fidel. A number of other fidelistas remained with the FAR and became professional soldiers. Although some raulistas officers were reassigned to civilian posts in the late 1960s and 1970s, the majority remained in the FAR as close associates of Raul. Within the top ranks of the professional military, therefore, there are nearly as many fidelistas senior officers as there are raulistas. However, the younger, junior, or middle-grade officer corps could well be considered raulistas in orientation given Raul's direct control of the FAR.

objectives. The top military commanders of the FAR consist of both raulistas and fidelistas who, following the guerrilla struggle, remained in the FAR as professional military officers.[13]

Beginning in the early 1970s, the FAR enhanced its modernization, professionalization, and overall military capabilities. This process enabled the Cuban army to expand its primary organizational role from defense of the homeland to a new external mission supportive of Castro's foreign policy objectives.[14] In this connection, a large military advisory group was sent to South Yemen in 1973; Cuban tank troops served on the Golan Heights in the late stages of the October 1973 war with Israel; and 36,000 combat troops were dispatched to Angola beginning in 1975, and another 12,000 to Ethiopia beginning in late 1977. Having become the cutting edge of Castro's foreign policy, the FAR received new arms shipments from the Soviets in the late 1970s, thereby further strengthening the external role of the Cuban armed forces. The overseas successes of the FAR in turn enhanced its position as the premier institution within Cuba.[15]

The new dominance of the fidelistas, the raulistas, and the military as an institution is readily seen in the tables at the end of this section. They show the changes that occurred within the top echelons of the Party as a result of the Second Congress of the

[13] The ranking raulista army officers include Div. Gen. Abelardo Colome, who commanded Cuban forces in Angola, and Div. Gen. Senen Casas, a First Vice Minister in the MINFAR and Chief of Staff; Div. Gen. Arnaldo Ochoa, who commanded Cuban troops in Ethiopia, is the most prominent of the fidelistas.

[14] See Jorge I. Domínguez, Cuba: Order and Revolution, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1978, pp. 341-378.

[15] For further details on this point, see Domínguez, "Revolutionary Politics," in Domínguez (ed.), 1982, pp. 53-59.

Communist Party of Cuba in December 1980. Briefly, the following highlights stand out:

- o In the new PCC Central Committee, the FAR decreased its representation from 32.3 percent of the combined membership in 1975 to 27.6 percent in 1980, but the military is still by far the largest single bloc in the new body (Table 2). Even more significantly, active-duty officers account for fully one-third of the 75 Alternates in the 1980 Central Committee.
- o In the newly enlarged PCC Political Bureau, the fidelistas expanded their representation to 10 regular members, while the raulistas accounted for 3 regular members, thus providing the Castro brothers and their followers with 13 out of the 16 seats in the Party's highest policymaking organ (Table 3).
- o Among the new 11 Alternate members to the Political Bureau, the first 3 were Div. Generals, 5 of the civilian members were also from the ranks of the fidelistas and raulistas, and at least 7 members had been guerrilla veterans (Table 4).
- o In the combined regular and alternate membership of the Political Bureau, only 3 out of the 27 members--Rodriguez, Humberto Perez, and Dorticos--can be associated with the technocrats (Tables 3 and 4).
- o In the new 9-man PCC Secretariat, the fidelistas and raulistas hold a near monopoly, marking the first time that the "old Communists"--among them Carlos Rafael Rodriguez--have been virtually excluded from that body since its formation in 1966 (Table 5).

The two Castro brothers and their respective followers are also in full control of the pivotal Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers, which was assigned enlarged powers under the governmental reorganization in early 1980. Indeed, the old guard of civilian guerrilla veterans--fidelistas and raulistas--along with the FAR now occupy the top posts of the Party and government to an extent unparalleled since the 1960s. The current profile of the regime thus indicates that it will be no more amenable to moderation or to U.S. conciliatory policies than it was two decades ago.

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A STRATEGY FOR DEALING WITH CUBA IN THE 1980S(U) RAND
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
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NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

Communist Party of Cuba in December 1980. Briefly, the following highlights stand out:

- o In the new PCC Central Committee, the FAR decreased its representation from 32.3 percent of the combined membership in 1975 to 27.6 percent in 1980, but the military is still by far the largest single bloc in the new body (Table 2). Even more significantly, active-duty officers account for fully one-third of the 75 Alternates in the 1980 Central Committee.
- o In the newly enlarged PCC Political Bureau, the fidelistas expanded their representation to 10 regular members, while the raulistas accounted for 3 regular members, thus providing the Castro brothers and their followers with 13 out of the 16 seats in the Party's highest policymaking organ (Table 3).
- o Among the new 11 Alternate members to the Political Bureau, the first 3 were Div. Generals, 5 of the civilian members were also from the ranks of the fidelistas and raulistas, and at least 7 members had been guerrilla veterans (Table 4).
- o In the combined regular and alternate membership of the Political Bureau, only 3 out of the 27 members--Rodriguez, Humberto Perez, and Dorticos--can be associated with the technocrats (Tables 3 and 4).
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Table 2

COMPOSITION OF 1965, 1975, AND 1980 PCC CENTRAL COMMITTEES
(ACCORDING TO MEMBERS' PRIMARY ACTIVITY[a])

| | 1965 Full Members | 1975 Full Members | 1975 Combined Membership | 1980 Full Members | 1980 Combined Membership |
|------------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Primary Activity[b] | (N=100) | (N=112) | (N=124) | (N=148) | (N=225) |
| Party leadership and activity | 10.0% | 28.6% | 26.6% | 20.3% | 21.3% |
| Govt. bureaucracy | 17.0 | 17.9 | 17.7 | 16.9 | 17.3 |
| Military | 58.0 | 32.1 | 32.3 | 24.3 | 27.1 |
| Foreign relations | 3.0 | 8.9 | 8.1 | 7.4 | 6.2 |
| Mass organizations | 7.0 | 6.3 | 8.1 | 18.9 | 15.6 |
| Education, science, and culture | 4.0 | 5.4 | 5.6 | 6.8 | 5.8 |
| Other | 1.0 | 0.8 | 1.6 | 5.4 | 6.7 |

[a] Adapted from Jorge I. Dominguez, "Revolutionary Politics: The Demands for Orderliness," in Jorge I. Dominguez (ed.), Cuba: Internal and International Affairs, Sage Publications, 1982, p. 24.

[b] Dominguez has classified the members' primary activity as follows: Party leadership and activity includes those nonmilitary personnel whose principal posts are in the PCC or the Communist Youth Union; Government bureaucracy excludes the ministers of the MINFAR and MININT, and those working in foreign relations, but includes those whose principal jobs are in government and state organizations; Military includes only those officers on active duty; Foreign relations, Mass organizations, and Education, science, and culture involve those persons working in these areas; and Other includes workers and similarly lesser categories. There were 1 and 4 unknowns among the 1980 full and combined columns, respectively.

Table 3

16 REGULAR MEMBERS OF THE PCC POLITICAL BUREAU, DECEMBER 1980
(LISTED IN THE ORDER GIVEN BY GRANMA)

| Political Bureau: Name & Rank Order | Pre-1959 Political Origins ^a | Primary Institutional Affiliation and Positions, 1981- |
|--|---|---|
| (c) Fidel Castro (1st Sec.) | M-26-7:Fg | Pres., Councils of Ministers ^b & State; Commander-in-Chief |
| (c) Raul Castro (2nd Sec.) | M-26-7:Rg | 1st V. Pres., Councils of Min. ^b & State; Minister, MINFAR |
| (c) Juan Almeida (Mem.) | M-26-7:Fg | V. Pres., Councils of Min. ^b & State |
| (c) Ramiro Valdes (Mem.) | M-26-7:Fg | V. Pres., Councils of Min. ^b & State; Minister, MININT |
| (c) Guillermo Garcia (Mem.) | M-26-7:Fg | V. Pres., Councils of Min. ^b & State |
| (c) Jose Ramon Machado (Mem.) | M-26-7:Rg | PCC Secretariat |
| (c) Blas Roca (Mem.) | PSP | Member, Council of State |
| (c) Carlos Rafael Rodriguez (Mem.) | PSP | V. Pres., Councils of Min. ^b & State |
| (c) Osvaldo Dorticos (Mem.) | M-27-7:Fu | V. Pres., Councils of Min. ^b & State |
| (c) Pedro Miret (Mem.) | M-26-6:Fg | PCC Secretariat |
| (c) Sergio el Valle (Mem.) | M-26-7:Fg | Min. of Public Health; Member, Councils of Ministers & State |
| (c) Armando Hart (Mem.) | M-26-7:Fu | Min. of Culture; Member, Council of State |
| (c) Arnaldo Milian (Mem.) | PSP | V. Pres., Councils of Min. ^b ; Member, Council of State; Min. of Agricul. |
| (c) Jorge Risquet (Mem.) | M-26-7:Rg | PCC Secretariat |
| (n) Julio Camacho (Mem.) | M-26-8:Fu | PCC 1st Sec., Havana |
| (n) Osmani Cienfuegos (Mem.) | M-26-7:Fu (ex-PSP) | Sec., Councils of Min. ^b & State |

NOTE: (c) = Continuing member; (n) = New member.

SOURCES: Granma Weekly Review, December 23, 1979, January 1980, and January 4, 1981.

^a The abbreviations in this column are: M-26-7 = (Castro's) July 26 Movement; F = Fidelista; R = Raulista; g = guerrilla veteran; u - urban resistance; PSP = Popular Socialist Party (pre-Castro Communist Party).

^b Member of the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers. Under the governmental reorganization of January 10, 1980, the President, First Vice President, and remaining 12 Vice Presidents, who constitute the Executive Committee, assumed responsibility for designated clusters of ministries and functional areas of government.

Table 4

ALTERNATE MEMBERS OF THE PCC POLITICAL BUREAU, DECEMBER 1980
(LISTED IN THE ORDER GIVEN BY GRANMA)

| Alternates in the Political Bureau: Name and Rank Order | Pre-1959 Political Origins[a] | Primary Institutional Affiliations and Positions, 1981- |
|---|-------------------------------------|---|
| Abelardo Colome (Div. General) | M-26-7:Rg | 1st V. Min., MINFAR; 1st Substitute Minister of the FAR, responsible for Cuba's overseas forces |
| Senen Casas (Div. General) | M-26-7:Rg | 1st V. Min., MINFAR; 1st Substitute Minister of the FAR & Chief of Staff, responsible for Cuba's home front defenses |
| Sixto Batista (Div. General) | M-26-7:Fg | V. Min., MINFAR; Chief, Central Political Directorate |
| Antonio Perez | M-26-7:Rg | PCC Secretariat |
| Humberto Perez | M-26-7:R | V. Pres., Councils of Min.; Min. Pres., Central Planning Board (JUCEPLAN) |
| Jesus Montane | M-26-7:Fg | PCC Secretariat |
| Miguel Cano | u.k. | PCC 1st Sec., Holguin Province |
| Vilma Espin (wife of Raul Castro) | M-26-7:Rg | Pres., Fed. of Cuban Women (FMC)[b]; Member, Council of State |
| Roberto Veiga | u.k. | Sec-Gen., Central Organization of Cuban Trade Unions (CTC)[b]; Member, Council of State |
| Jose Ramirez | PSP:Rg | Pres., National Assoc. of Small Farmers (ANAP)[b]; Member, Council of State |
| Armando Acosta | PSP | Coord., Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs)[b]; Member, Council of State |

SOURCES: Granma Weekly Review, December 23, 1979, January 13, 1980,
and January 4, 1981.

[a] The abbreviations in this column are: M-26-7 = (Castro's) July 26
Movement; F = Fidelista; R = Raulista; g = guerrilla veteran; PSP =
Popular Socialist Party (pre-Castro Communist Party); u.k. = unknown.

[b] Mass organization.

Table 5

9 MEMBERS OF THE PCC SECRETARIAT, DECEMBER 1980
(LISTED IN THE ORDER GIVEN BY GRANMA)

| Secretariat: Name and Rank Order | Pre-1959 Political Origins[a] | Party Position and Area of Functional Responsibility |
|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|---|
| (c) Fidel Castro | M-26-7:Fg | First Secretary |
| (c) Raul Castro | M-26-7:Rg | Second Secretary |
| (c) Pedro Miret (Mem.) | M-26-7:Fg | Public Consumption & Serv., Basic Industries |
| (c) Jorge Risquet (Mem.) | M-26-7:Rg | Transp., Comm., & Construct. |
| (c) Antonio Perez (Mem.) | M-26-7:Rg | Educ. & Revol. Orientation |
| (c) Lionel Soto | PSP | Economy |
| (c) Jose Ramon Machado | M-26-7:Rg | PCC Org.; General Affairs; State & Judiciary; Mass Org., Adm. and Finance |
| (n) Jesus Montane | | Foreign Relations & PCC Americas Dept. |
| (n) Julian Rizo | | Sugar, Agriculture & Livestock |
| Not Reappointed: | | |
| Carlos Rafael Rodriguez (Mem.) | PSP | |
| Blas Roca (Mem.) | PSP | |
| Arnaldo Milian (Mem.) | PSP | |
| Julio Camacho | M-26-7:Fu | |

NOTE: (c) = Continuing member; (n) = New member.

SOURCES: Granma Weekly Review, December 23, 1979, and January 13, 1980.

[a] The abbreviations in this column are: M-26-7 = (Castro's) July 26 Movement; F = Fidelista; R = Raulista; g = guerrilla veteran; u = urban resistance; PSP = Popular Socialist Party (pre-Castro Communist Party).

THERE ARE NO QUICK FIXES FOR THE CUBAN PROBLEM

As in the past, resolution of the Cuban problem will continue to prove elusive for the United States. There are no easy and quick formulas by which to rid Cuba of Castro nor the United States of Cuba. For example, direct U.S. intervention on the island would entail not only heavy casualties, but also a major and prolonged allocation of U.S. military forces as an occupying army. Similarly, the sudden death of Castro could prove destabilizing to the regime, yet it also might require long-term U.S. intervention to restore both political order and a viable government in the political vacuum left by Castro's departure. In the meantime, the United States must contend with the present realities of the Cuban regime--its apparent permanency, its contradictory interests with the United States, its close relationship with Moscow, and its militant, hard-line leadership.

Given these conditions, sustained efforts will be required over the long term to bring about significant changes in the regime's international behavior. As will be pointed out later, the regime has a number of vulnerabilities that are potentially exploitable by U.S. policy. However, Castro also has domestic and international resources with which to check or neutralize many U.S. measures--ranging from the tripling of Soviet arms deliveries to strengthen Cuban defenses and the mobilization of mass support within Cuba to the cultivation of U.S. and foreign public opinionmakers. Thus, U.S. policy options toward Castro need to be assessed in terms of not only their desired outcomes but also their long-term viability--including their ability to generate sustained domestic and international support.

PART 2

A LEVERAGE STRATEGY FOR THE 1980s

VI. COMPONENTS OF LEVERAGE AGAINST CUBA

The second part of this study elaborates a new strategy for developing leverage against Cuba in the 1980s. The strategy is predicated on three policy assumptions regarding the Cuban problem:

- o U.S. policy toward Cuba needs to be sustainable over the medium to long term because of the regime's entrenched power.
- o New opportunities have emerged for gaining and sustaining leverage over Castro. Although lacking political and economic linkages to the island, the United States could begin to exploit a number of Cuban vulnerabilities and interests to U.S. advantage.
- o As a consequence, U.S. policy should concentrate first on changing Cuba's international behavior to minimize the strategic and regional threats to U.S. interests.

Hence, we need to examine how the concept of leverage could be applied to Cuba, and to the policy requirements that need to be met to ensure an effective strategy toward Castro.

LEVERAGE: CONCEPTS AND OBJECTIVES

Leverage vs. Carrots and Sticks

As an instrument of statecraft, leverage consists of the ability of the United States to compel the Castro regime to alter its policies in accordance with U.S. interests through Havana's own recognition that it can best minimize its vulnerabilities and maximize its interests by complying with U.S. demands.[1] Thus conceived, Cuba is obliged to come

[1] In spite of its common usage, "leverage" remains an elusive concept that has attracted little theoretical or empirical work in the literature on international politics. It might be considered an extension of "power," yet power as conventionally defined need not be necessary for the exercise of leverage, as demonstrated by the ability of small or client states to manipulate major powers. For an early,

to terms because of the regime's own perception that the United States can effectively damage or advance Cuban interests. The United States can exploit the regime's most acute vulnerabilities through military, political, and economic pressures; and it can also advance the regime's core interests in assuring its survival and autonomy, and the island's economic development.[2] The greater the leverage possessed by the United States, therefore, the higher Cuba's relative costs become if it does not comply with U.S. demands because vulnerabilities are being exacerbated while core interests are being forsaken.

Such a strategy might appear similar to the "carrot and stick" approach attempted by Secretary of State Haig. But that approach was not a strategy that either identified the regime's vulnerabilities and interests, or that exploited them through carefully orchestrated pressures and inducements. More importantly, the Haig approach relied very heavily on confrontational postures, including threats of military action, to secure Castro's behavior modification, with rewards for good behavior offered only implicitly if at all. As has been noted, such an approach may have forced Havana to make tactical adjustments to forestall the threatened punishment. However, it did not induce

pioneering effort to develop leverage as a distinct analytical concept, see Richard W. Cottam, Competitive Interference and Twentieth Century Diplomacy, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967. Although its focus is principally on "bargaining," see also Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard University Press, 1960.

[2] As employed in this study, U.S. leverage would be active rather than passive. The latter is the type of leverage that a small power can sometimes develop in its relations with a patron or neighboring superpower. See, for example, Robert O. Keohane, "The Big Influence of Small Allies," Foreign Policy, Spring 1971; George Maude, The Finnish Dilemma, Oxford University Press, 1975; and David F. Ronfeldt, "Superclients and Superpowers--Cuba: Soviet Union/Iran: United States," Conflict, Vol. I, No. 4, pp. 272-392.

fundamental changes in Cuban interests and goals that resulted in permanent changes in behavior.[3] Ultimately, the "sticks" were too weak and the "carrots"--if any--too meager to overcome the regime's dominant value system, maximalist goals, and organizational interests, all of which impel it toward an activist foreign policy and alignment with the Soviets.

There are three essential differences between the two approaches. First, although a leverage strategy actively engages Cuba by employing pressures, it does not rely on overtly confrontational postures to intimidate Castro. Second, rather than rewarding "good" behavior and punishing "bad," a leverage strategy works systematically on interests--it exploits the regime's most acute vulnerabilities and core interests to oblige the latter to reassess its interests and thus to alter its policy priorities. Cuban foreign policy behavior may then change--the regime abandons its maximalist and adventuristic position, and seeks instead to better promote its core interests of survival, autonomy, and economic development by redefining Cuba's relationship with the United States. Third, a leverage strategy requires open channels of communication both to communicate U.S. intentions and conditions to Havana, and to enable Washington to effectively exploit changes or trends in the Cuban situation.

[3] The sought-after goal of behavior modification could be no more successful than when punishments and rewards are normally used with a rebellious adolescent: neither the punishments nor the rewards are sufficient to prevail over the teenager's preferred behavior mode; or the teenager complies momentarily to prevent the punishment and secure the reward but without long-term constructive changes in behavior.

Policy Objectives

A leverage strategy would enable the United States to pursue both the minimum and maximum objectives toward Cuba and the Soviet Union that were discussed in Part 1. In descending order of priority, the minimum objectives are compelling Havana (1) to alter its military relationship with the Soviet Union, (2) to abandon its active support for insurgencies in the Caribbean Basin, and (3) to curtail its overseas military activities.

Because of the Soviet Union's high ideological, political, economic, and military investment in the Castro regime, the United States might also use U.S. pressures against Cuba as leverage to force Soviet policy concessions. Whether leverage is applied directly against Cuba or indirectly against the Soviet Union through Cuba, its potential rests upon the kinds of Cuban vulnerabilities and interests that are exploitable by the United States.

EXPLOITABLE VULNERABILITIES

Later portions of this study assess those factors--ranging from domestic, local, and international--that limit or constrain the use of U.S. military power against Castro. Here we itemize the various strategic as well as domestic vulnerabilities of the Castro regime that could be targeted by a leverage strategy. Although Cuba has always had a number of such vulnerabilities in the past, both changes in the international context as well as within Cuba itself have now intensified their present seriousness.

Geostrategic Vulnerability

Cuba is the most exposed salient of the Soviet empire. It is situated some 6000 miles from the Soviet Union and only 90 miles from the United States. Its geostrategic isolation, coupled with its value for the Soviets, makes Cuba a potential pressure point against Moscow--e.g., in the event that Soviet (rather than Polish) troops were to occupy Poland or new Soviet military pressures were applied in the Middle East.

In turn, Cuba's exposure is perceived by the Castro leadership as one of its greatest vulnerabilities. In spite of stepped-up arms deliveries, Moscow has avoided making any commitments to defend Cuba. On a visit to the island in February 1981, for example, Marshal Nicolai V. Ogarkov, head of the General Staff of the Soviet armed forces, expressed "solidarity" with embattled Cuba. But he also implied that Cuba's defense remained the responsibility of the Revolutionary Armed Forces by stressing the need for further combat training by the FAR.[4] Two months later, Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev did pledge his country's "firm" support for Cuba as an "inseparable part of the socialist community." [5] Nevertheless, Cuba remains outside the Warsaw Pact and without a formal security commitment from the Soviet Union. From Havana's vantage point, therefore, the absence of such commitment portends potential Soviet abandonment in the event of a head-on confrontation between Washington-Havana or Washington-Moscow.[6] Cuban

[4] Granma Weekly Review, February 22, 1981.

[5] Washington Post, April 8, 1981.

[6] The lack of Soviet resolve in the 1962 missile crisis made it appear that Cuba was in fact expendable. Cuba's increased economic, institutional, and military integration into the Soviet bloc since the

anxiety over its exposure at the time of intensified international tensions thus becomes a new factor that the United States can exploit.

Energy Vulnerability

The Cuban economy is extremely vulnerable to any major disruption of its imported oil supplies. Foreign oil imports provide no less than 98 percent of Cuba's petroleum requirements, of which Soviet oil shipments--amounting to roughly 200,000 barrels per day in 1980--account for all but a small fraction. Additionally, Cuba possesses a limited capacity for refining petroleum, with its Nico Lopez refinery in Havana harbor alone providing about 70 percent of all island production. Storage capacity is limited.

Given the economy's heavy reliance on imported oil, either the interruption of foreign deliveries or refinery production, or the destruction of storage facilities, could begin to wreck havoc on the Cuban economy within a short time period. Also, over the long run, Cuba faces an energy problem after the mid-1980s: Cuba possesses few alternative sources of energy and will have to renegotiate new Soviet petroleum commitments for the Five-Year Plan of 1986-90 at a time when the Soviet Union is expected to face a shortfall in its export capacity owing to a leveling off of oil production and rising internal and East European demand.

early 1970s could work against a replication of the 1962 development. However, Ogarkov's speech, along with the speedup in Soviet arms deliveries to Cuba beginning in 1981, suggest that Cuba cannot expect the Soviet Union to render active military assistance in the event of U.S. aggression.

International Financial Vulnerability

Cuba's hard-currency indebtedness to Western governments and banks has steadily worsened, requiring Havana to request a rescheduling of a major portion of its medium- and long-term debt. As of the end of 1980, Cuba's total hard-currency debt stood at \$2.6 billion.[7] In September 1982, however, the Castro government reported that Cuba's medium- and long-term debt to the industrialized West had risen to \$3.5 billion. Of that amount, the National Bank of Cuba was proposing to Western creditors that \$1.2 billion due between the remainder of 1982 and 1985 be rescheduled: although interest payments would continue, repayments on loan principals would not start until 1986, thereafter continuing for seven years. Cuba's financial deterioration, the National Bank claimed, was due not only to the drop in world sugar prices, but also to a new credit restriction policy applied against the island by Western banks and governments. During the first eight months of 1982, for example, more than \$550 million had been withdrawn from short-term deposits and loans usually maintained by international banks in Cuba. Meanwhile, Cuba had had to make ever higher interest payments, increasing from \$195 million in 1981 to \$233 million in 1982.[8]

Although Havana is not likely to obtain the grace period and terms it has proposed, Western banks and governments most probably will roll over Cuba's current debt in order to forestall default. Still, the Castro government will find it increasingly difficult to obtain the hard-currency loans and credits necessary to import 30-35 percent of the island's

[7] Lawrence H. Theriot, Cuba Faces the Economic Realities of the 1980s, A Study Prepared for the Use of the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress of the United States, March 22, 1982, p. 37.

[8] Granma Weekly Review, September 19, 1982, p. 7.

foodstuffs, quality consumer goods, and Western machinery and technology that are essential to restoring vitality to the island's economy. In the meantime, Moscow is not likely to supply Cuba with additional hard-currency loans, while the island's growing integration into the Soviet bloc economic system will severely restrict Cuba's potential for earning convertible currency. Consequently, the prospects are that the regime will be forced to further curtail the importation of consumer goods and industrial products from the West, to postpone new projects, and to use an ever increasing share of Cuba's hard-currency earnings to cover its larger interest payments.[9]

Domestic Economic Vulnerabilities

During the 1970s the political and military capabilities of the Cuban state grew enormously, and the regime could boast of numerous social accomplishments in public health and education, and in achieving a more equalitarian order. By the start of the 1980s, however, the Cuban economy remained the Achilles' heel of the Castro regime. After more than two decades of rule, the regime has been unable to transform the structure of the economy, to sustain high levels of economic growth, or to go much beyond satisfying the minimal food, clothing, and housing needs of the Cuban people.

Cuba is thus more dependent on its sugar exports than it was prior to the Revolution--83 percent of the value of Cuba's global exports in 1979 compared to 80 percent in 1957.[10] The growth of the Cuban

[9] See Theriot, Cuba Faces the Economic Realities of the 1980s, pp. 7-11, 37-39.

[10] Lawrence H. Theriot, 1982, p. 7.

economy, in turn, remains largely cyclical, despite large infusions of Soviet assistance, owing to its critical reliance on world sugar prices upon which Cuba must depend for hard-currency earnings and credits from the West. In the meantime, per capita consumption of most key food and consumer products scarcely increased, if at all, during the 1970s.[11] The availability of food items and other consumer goods has recently improved with the introduction of parallel and free markets in 1980-81, but consumers must pay exorbitant prices for these items.

The Mariel exodus of over 126,000 Cubans from the island in 1980, along with reports that still 600,000 more Cubans are prepared to leave in the event of another Mariel, are indicative of popular discontent that stems in part from Cuba's "hardship economy."

The present and future state of the Cuban economy and its principal weaknesses can be summarized thus:

- o After an initial recovery in the early to mid-1970s, the Cuban economy began stagnating once again as a result of major production shortfalls and low sugar prices that shattered the Five-Year Plan for 1976-80.[12]
- o The current Five-Year Plan for 1981-85 posits more "realistic" targets, but the majority of these more modest goals are not likely to be realized, according to knowledgeable observers.[13]

[11] For example, monthly per capita quotas were as follows for 1971-72 and 1978-79 (in pounds): meat, 3 and 2.5; rice, 3-6 and 5; beans, 1.5-3 and 1.25; tubers, not available despite abundance in prior years; coffee, 0.375 and 0.125; and sugar, 6-4 and 4. Carmelo Mesa-Lago, The Economy of Socialist Cuba, University of New Mexico Press, 1981, p. 158.

[12] See Fidel Castro's Main Report to the Second Party Congress, Granma Weekly Review, December 28, 1980.

[13] For a comprehensive analysis of the Cuban economy's performance under the First Five-Year Plan, and the difficulties that are likely to befall the Second Five-Year Plan, see Carmelo Mesa-Lago, "The Economy: Caution, Frugality, and Resilient Ideology," in Jorge I. Domínguez (ed.), Cuba: Internal and International Affairs, Sage Publications, 1982, pp. 113-166. See also Theriot, 1982, pp. 11ff.

- o In the meantime, Castro and other leaders have had to call for renewed austerity and sacrifice, while acknowledging a bleak outlook for the remainder of the 1980s.[14]
- o The economy's slow, spasmodic growth provides insufficient employment opportunities for Cuba's expanding and increasingly youthful labor force. This situation has been aggravated by the island's "baby boom" generation coming of working age in increasing numbers starting in the late 1970s.[15]

Indeed, Cuba's military involvements in Africa helped the regime siphon off the island's surplus labor as the size of the armed forces jumped from 117,000 in 1975 to 175,000 in 1976, with steady increases continuing thereafter. In his secret speech of December 27, 1979, before the National Assembly of People's Power, Castro also proposed sending 10,000 workers to cut timber in Siberia owing to the surplus labor force in Cuba and the shortage of manpower in the Soviet Union.

Regime Political Vulnerabilities

Notwithstanding economic problems and political disaffection, the regime can still rally rank-and-file Cubans as well as cadres to its side, while more than ever before it possesses the organizational capacity for controlling and mobilizing the populace. Nevertheless, the regime is vulnerable to rising popular alienation not only because of

[14] As with the plight of other Caribbean states, Cuba's economic downturn can be partly attributed to international forces beyond its control, the most important being depressed sugar prices. Unlike other non-oil exporting states in the region, however, Cuba's economy is heavily subsidized by the Soviet Union at a rate of about \$8 million per day, including oil imports that run approximately one-third of current OPEC prices.

[15] Between 1968-75, Cuba's population aged 15-19 ranged from 757,630 to 809,683 per year. In 1976, this age cohort jumped to 852,877, and by 1980 it reached 1,116,340 per year. Sergio Diaz Briquets and Lisandro Perez, Cuba: The Demography of Revolution, Washington, D.C., Population Reference Bureau, Inc., Vol. 26, No. 1, April 1981, p. 22.

its poor economic performance. It also confronts the likelihood of growing discontent owing to the highly regimented, unresponsive, and unrepresentative political order that has been imposed for over two decades:

- o Cubans began to enjoy a more ordered and responsive political system in the mid-1970s. But now increased intolerance of domestic dissent, growing concern over national security, and the resurgence of hard-liners within the top leadership point to a system that is becoming once again more regimented and less responsive to popular demands.
- o Although expanded, the 1980 Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba continues to be unrepresentative of the Cuban population. Blacks and mulattos account for only 12 percent, while Castro's generation and his province alone account for 56 percent and 36.5 percent, respectively, of the new body's membership.
- o The two Castro brothers and their personal followers constitute a guerrilla elite that has been in power for 23 years and that, because of its exclusionary character, must assume sole responsibility for recurrent economic mismanagement and political oppression.

Foreign Policy Vulnerabilities

Cuba's activist foreign policy has suffered major reversals in recent years and remains overcommitted. Because of its close ties to Moscow, Cuba's aggressive Third World strategy was suddenly in shambles owing to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Upward of 33,000 Cuban military advisors and combat troops remain deployed overseas in Angola, Ethiopia, and other remote regions, while another 2000 military personnel are in Nicaragua. To expand its influence in Africa, the Caribbean Basin, and the Third World in general, Havana has also committed an extraordinarily large share of its scarce resources to the

detriment of the island's own population.[16] Meanwhile, Havana's growing involvement in Central American and Colombian insurgencies since the late 1970s has alarmed Caribbean Basin states, leading in some instances to the suspension of diplomatic ties with Havana, to sharp condemnation of its policies, and to the possibility of renewed isolation within the region.

Cuba's increased integration into the Soviet bloc has resulted in several economic advantages. But it has at the same time transformed the island into a dependent client state which strictly limits the regime's range of autonomy and economic options, i.e., two of its core interests:

- o By 1978 Cuban exports to the Soviet Union accounted for 73 percent of total exports compared with 56 percent in 1975, whereas Cuban imports from the Soviet Union represented 65 percent of total imports compared with only 40 percent in 1975.
- o Under the Second Five-Year Plan for 1981-85, Cuba's trade with the Soviet Union and other Communist bloc countries is to increase 30 percent over the previous Five-Year Plan.
- o The viability of the Cuban economy has become increasingly dependent on Soviet subsidies, with these amounting to \$9.6 billion in the 1976-79 period alone and payment on the repayable portion of Cuba's Soviet debt to begin in 1986.
- o Cuba is critically dependent on Soviet oil supplies, with the Soviet Union having thus far committed itself to providing the island with 11 million metric tons per annum out of the 13.6 million metric tons per annum (81 percent) that will ultimately be needed by 1985 if Cuba is to fulfill its targets under the current Five-Year Plan.

[16] For example, the Five-Year Plan for 1976-80 called for the construction of 150,000 housing units, but only 83,000 units were completed. In the meantime, Cuba gave priority to the expansion of its overseas construction industry and the export of Cuban cement, not only to earn hard currency but also to strengthen its political ties with Third World states. On Cuba's overseas construction industry, see Latin America Weekly Report, December 19, 1980.

The next two sections discuss the types of U.S. pressures--ranging from military actions to political and diplomatic measures--that might exploit Cuban vulnerabilities. As was noted, however, pressures alone may result only in a temporary cessation of objectionable Cuban activities, to be resumed once Washington turns its attention elsewhere, and they can be resisted through the regime's countermeasures. To gain the most effective fulcrum for leverage, therefore, the United States needs to couple pressures with inducements in order to provide elements of the Cuban leadership with positive incentives for fundamentally changing Cuban foreign policy.

EXPLOITABLE CUBAN INTERESTS

Inducements would exploit the Castro regime's core interests in (a) ensuring regime survival over the long run, (b) in regaining regime autonomy from the Soviet Union, and (c) in promoting the island's economic development. The United States is in a unique position to advance the first two sets of interests: Ultimately, regime survival can only be assured if the United States ceases its pressures and accepts the existence of a socialist Cuba. And the regime can only gain greater international latitude if the United States provides Cuba with less reason for security ties with the Soviet Union and with ways to ease its dependence.

The United States is, however, constrained in providing Cuba with the economic ties that would advance the regime's developmental goals. The United States cannot compete with--much less supplant--the Soviet Union as the guarantor of the Cuban economy. By importing 3.8 million tons of Cuban sugar in 1979, for example, the Soviets remain the major purchaser of the island's principal crop, for which they paid about 44

cents per pound, or five times the world price for sugar. Cuba's nickel exports to the Soviet Union also receive preferential pricing. And the Soviet Union not only supplies Cuba with almost all of its petroleum, but does so at a price that was pegged at \$12.80 per barrel, less than one-third the OPEC price of \$35 per barrel.

Yet, in spite of heavy Soviet subsidies, the economy continues to perform poorly. In the meantime, as one observer has stated, "the U.S. embargo has condemned and will continue to condemn the Cuban economy to continued stagnation, with occasional temporary blips of modest improvement tied to the sugar price increases." [17] Thus, the bleak state of the Cuban economy could provide the United States with additional opportunities for gaining the necessary leverage with which to obtain Cuban policy concessions. As will be discussed later, the United States is in a position to provide Cuba with some needed (albeit limited) advantages in the areas of trade, investments, and energy alternatives.

However, U.S. economic inducements under a leverage strategy must be coupled with pressures in order to secure major quid pro quos from Havana. We turn next to the need for policy coordination under a leverage strategy, with particular emphasis on the proper sequencing of U.S. pressures and inducements.

ENSURING POLICY COORDINATION FOR OPTIMUM LEVERAGE

The Need for Coupling

Coupling of inducements and pressures is required because pressures alone may be insufficient for leverage if Castro can offset his

[17] Theriot, 1982, p. 11.

vulnerabilities by countermeasures on the domestic and international fronts. During 1981-82, for example, he organized the 500,000-man Territorial Troop Militia, maintained the Cuban armed forces in a state of readiness, secured even higher levels of Soviet arms deliveries, and sought to turn American as well as world public opinion against U.S. "aggression." Nor can inducements alone alter Cuba's international behavior: As was demonstrated following the initial thaw in U.S.-Cuban relations in 1977, the fidelistas and raulistas ruling elites, and the FAR, are prepared to forsake improved relations with Washington to pursue their maximum foreign policy objectives of increasing Cuba's influence and presence on both the regional and international planes.

Applied together, however, pressures and inducements tend to close off or at least make prohibitive alternative options for the regime. The costs of noncompliance are raised owing both to the pressures felt and the loss of quid pro quos that could minimize vulnerabilities and ensure core regime interests. Together, they may also cause dissension between the fidelistas-raulistas and military leaders who support a maximalist stance, and the more moderate elites who are less committed to an expansionist and confrontational foreign policy. When combined, they could in addition undermine the regime's basis of mass support since the United States would be making clear its readiness to improve relations with Cuba, including trade and credits, provided there were fundamental changes in Havana's foreign policy. Over the long run, therefore, the coupling of pressures and inducements could have the effect of fragmenting rather than solidifying inter-elite and regime-mass relations.

Ensuring Proper Sequencing

While pressures and inducements need to be coupled, they also must be properly sequenced. Since leverage is gained by working on regime vulnerabilities and interests, pressures must be first applied and maintained, followed subsequently by the offering of inducements in exchange for policy concessions. Such a sequencing minimizes the possibilities of cognitive dissonance on the part of Cuban audiences as a result of mixed or confusing signals. Once inducements are offered at the same time that pressures are maintained, U.S. intentions are clarified for the regime as a whole, for select elites within the regime, and for the Cuban people at large.

Military as well as political and economic pressures are needed to intensify the regime's threat perception, to raise the costs of its objectionable international behavior, and to create psychological predispositions for eventually resolving the U.S.-Cuban conflict on the part of both leadership elements and the general public.[18] In regard to the latter, the existence of multiple crises could heighten the Cuban leadership's anxieties, thereby increasing the possibilities for irrational or erratic decisionmaking. Erratic leadership behavior can in turn adversely affect public morale by disrupting the economy and causing military alerts or full-scale mobilizations, as in fact occurred during 1980.[19]

[18] Specific recommendations regarding both pressures and inducements are presented in Sections VII and VIII.

[19] The following pattern of behavior emerged in 1980: Confronted with the occupation of the Peruvian Embassy by over 10,000 Cubans in April, Castro suddenly opened the port of Mariel to a mass exodus of Cubans beginning later that month. With tensions running high over Mariel and the scheduled (but later cancelled) U.S. military maneuvers under Operation "Solid Shield 80," the Cuban air force attacked and sank

Whatever their form, the United States has to be prepared to augment and sustain its pressures not only to raise the direct costs of Cuba's objectionable foreign policy behavior, but also to increase the relative attractiveness of U.S. inducements. Set in the context of pressures, inducements may acquire a multiplier effect which would otherwise not be present were the U.S. Government solely to propose quid pro quos that satisfied the regime's interests in enhancing its security, autonomy, and economic prospects. Hence, pressures provide the essential context with which to make inducements effective as instruments of U.S. policy.

The Need for Policy Consensus and Orchestration

A leverage strategy that actively and visibly employs both pressures and inducements not only requires sophistication in its implementation, but also a broad-based consensus within the U.S. Government and among the American public at large. As will be discussed shortly, such a consensus will have to begin with agreement on the stakes involved in the Caribbean Basin, the nature of the Cuban challenge to U.S. interests, and the ultimate objectives of U.S.-Cuban policy. Hence, the Departments of State and Defense, and the White House itself, will need to embark on an educational campaign to generate the political support necessary to implement a new strategy toward Cuba and to sustain it under future Administrations. The Reagan Administration has already begun to take steps in this direction with the President's Caribbean Basin Initiative, the testimony of State and

the Bahamian gunboat Flamingo and harassed a Bahamian island on May 10-11. In the meantime, the regime mobilized mass demonstrations of political support throughout the island, causing considerable production losses for the Cuban economy.

Defense officials before Congress, and the State Department's issuance of reports documenting the Cuban and Soviet military presence in the Basin, as well as Cuban support on behalf of insurgencies in the region. Nevertheless, still more efforts will be required over the long run if consensus is to develop.

Additionally, the orchestration of pressures and inducements will require centralized coordination by an office commanding both the responsibility for the making of Cuban policy and the authority for its implementation. Wherever its location within the Executive Branch, such an office should be headed by a skilled and intellectually tough senior official. Perhaps the office itself might best be structured along the lines of a permanent inter-agency task force to obtain optimal bureaucratic cooperation and policy coordination among various departments. It is these specific military, political, economic, and diplomatic policies that we next explore.

VII. THE MILITARY DIMENSION OF A LEVERAGE STRATEGY

POLITICAL REQUISITES FOR THE USE OF MILITARY POWER

Certain political as well as military requirements need to be met if military power is to form an integral and employable dimension for developing leverage against Cuba. Whether undertaken at the lower or upper end of the spectrum, military action against Cuba requires the realization of three geopolitical requisites: establishing the importance of the Caribbean Basin for U.S. security, securing consensus on the nature of the Cuban threat, and securing agreement on U.S.-Cuban objectives. In effect, the development of a broad-based political consensus within the United States must necessarily precede the use of military power in the post-Vietnam era. It is also essential for the employment of the political, economic, and diplomatic instruments that will be elaborated in the next section. Hence, part of the foregoing should also be considered as requisites for effectively implementing an overall leverage strategy against Castro.

A New Priority for the Caribbean Basin

Before any medium to long-term strategy can be devised and implemented, greater agreement is needed on the relative priority of the Caribbean Basin within the overall context of U.S. global commitments. President Reagan singled out the region's importance with his Caribbean Basin Initiative, and in fact the CBI constitutes the Administration's only major foreign policy proclamation thus far. Yet not all military and civilian leaders fully recognize that the Basin is uniquely critical to the United States. While there is general agreement concerning the

region's importance because of its vital sea lanes and its role as a petroleum, natural gas, and raw material strategic reserve, there is less awareness as to how regional developments have direct consequences for U.S. security on the domestic, international, and strategic planes.

Revolutionary turmoil in the Caribbean Basin directly affects U.S. society because, along with depressed economic conditions, it contributes to increased immigration flows. Including Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela, the Basin's population numbered 159 million in 1979 and it could grow by nearly another 100 million by the year 2004 if recent population trends continue. In the meantime, the Basin alone accounted for the migration of an estimated 465,000 to 565,000 legal and illegal aliens into this country in 1980, including Cuban and Haitian refugees.

The apparent inability of the United States to manage Caribbean Basin developments also affects the perceptions of allies and adversaries alike--not only within the region but also in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East--regarding U.S. power and resolve in international affairs. This is particularly so because the United States is itself a Caribbean nation and remains the paramount power in the Basin. In an era of complex strategic interdependence, what happens in the Basin can affect developments elsewhere, as well as vice versa.

Most critical in this respect, the possibilities of new Cubas and further Soviet intrusions in the region create the danger of the United States becoming outflanked on its southern perimeter. In themselves, new Communist regimes in Nicaragua, El Salvador, or elsewhere in the Basin scarcely constitute major threats to U.S. security given the American preponderance of power. But as Cuba demonstrated in the 1962 missile crisis and during the past decade, and as is presently occurring

with Nicaragua, Marxist-Leninist regimes have a propensity for aligning themselves militarily as well as politically with the Soviet Union.

Thus, it is the increased potential for a new and even greater Soviet presence, either directly or through Cuba, that creates the principal military and strategic problem for the United States and other states in the region. Were such a contingency to arise, the United States could not pursue its traditional "economy of force" doctrine in the Basin. Instead, it would need to greatly enlarge its military presence in the region, thereby affecting its capacity to project U.S. military power on a global scale. Governmental as well as public consensus must thus be developed regarding (a) the new strategic priority of the Caribbean Basin and (b) the commensurate military as well as economic commitment that needs to be made to the region.

Agreement on the Nature of the Cuban Threat

A far greater consensus needs to be reached within and outside the U.S. Government regarding the precise ways in which Castro's Cuba imperils U.S. interests, and the stakes that are involved between the two countries, before action can be taken against Cuba. This is no easy task. Fear of a Vietnam-like escalation, and the War Powers Act, greatly constrain the latitude available to the President in foreign policy, particularly if military measures are contemplated.[1] For many

[1] The U.S. Senate voted to prevent by any means, "including the use of arms," the extension of Cuban influence in the Western Hemisphere, an action intended to reaffirm a 1962 law authorizing the President to use force to block Cuban subversive activities and Soviet use of the island for offensive purposes. Later, however, the Senate voted that its action did not constitute approval of a long-term military involvement. If beyond 30 days, such an involvement requires Senate approval under the War Powers Act. The New York Times, August 12, 1982.

Americans, particularly on the left, Cuba rather than the United States remains the threatened state. The legacy of earlier U.S. efforts to overthrow or assassinate Castro further erodes the moral basis for taking action against Cuba. Among intellectual circles it continues to be unfashionable to emphasize U.S. security issues in discussing U.S. policy, with concern placed instead on "North-South" issues, human rights concerns, and matters of social injustice.

Despite its strenuous efforts, a still stronger and more coherent case thus needs to be made by the Administration that Cuba does in fact constitute a potential strategic threat as an ally of the Soviet Union, as well as a source of subversion and unrest in the adjacent Caribbean Basin. It is imperative, for example, that the U.S. Government publicly underscore the potential risks that current trends could pose to both Cuba and the United States: if left unchecked, the latent security threat now posed by Cuban and Soviet activities in the Basin could become so grave in the years ahead that Washington would have no recourse but to resort to a military solution for the "Cuba problem," as occurred in 1962. Equally important, domestic consensus needs to be nourished and maintained by one U.S. Administration to the next in order that there be sufficient domestic support for sustained pressures against Cuba during the course of the 1980s.

Agreement on U.S. Objectives: Finlandizing Cuba

For its Cuban policy to become effective domestically as well as internationally, the U.S. Government needs to clarify its objectives. It should specify that U.S. opposition to Cuba is directed against those aspects of the Castro regime's international behavior that threaten

world peace and regional stability. Such a narrow formulation of U.S. objectives could broaden the basis of domestic (and international) support for U.S. policy because it would not be ideologically based or motivated, however abhorrent Communism and totalitarianism are to most Americans. Accordingly, U.S. objectives should be confined to (1) neutralizing the strategic threat posed by the Havana-Moscow axis, (2) stopping Cuban efforts to promote insurgencies abroad, and (3) discouraging Cuban military operations overseas.

Such policy objectives amount to the "Finlandization" of Cuba in the true historical meaning of that concept: The integrity of the smaller country's political institutions and economic system, and its international autonomy, are observed by the neighboring superpower on condition that the smaller state respect the superpower's security interests.[2] Thus, as long as a "socialist," "Marxist-Leninist," or fidelist regime does not imperil the security interests of the United States and its allies in the region, "peaceful coexistence" with Havana, and "ideological pluralism" in the Basin, could become acceptable policy outcomes for the United States.

[2] Finland's special relationship with Moscow, of course, stems from a combination of factors, including Finland's two wars with the Soviet Union during World War II, the Soviet annexation of Finnish territory in 1944, the satellization of Eastern Europe in the post-war period, and Finnish perceptions as to the realistic options available given these experiences and the Soviet Union's emergence as the dominant power in the region. While a leverage strategy could not replicate the same conditions short of a U.S. war with Cuba, it nevertheless seeks to create a situation which would similarly alter Cuban perceptions as to Havana's ultimate policy options. In the Finnish case, however, Moscow has possessed an effective veto over the selection of the President and Prime Minister. Still, Finland's political and institutional integrity has been preserved over the decades, with a center-left coalition remaining in power, including the recent election of President Mauno Koivisto, while the basic structure of the economy remains capitalist.

Finland also serves as the ideal model for U.S.-Cuban economic relations because Finland's principal economic ties in recent years have been with the West; only about 25 percent of its exports and 24 percent of its imports were with the Soviet Union last year. In terms of Cuba, therefore, "Finlandization" implies that the island would remain economically dependent on the Soviet Union, with its economy continuing to be largely integrated with the Soviet bloc countries. As in the Soviet-Finnish relationship, the United States could account for a qualitatively important but smaller portion of Cuba's exports and imports. The United States would not resume the burden of assuring the viability of the Cuban economy.

Without domestic consensus on the above issues, it is virtually impossible to develop a credible military posture against Castro, as the Reagan Administration quickly learned. Additionally, public clarification of the nature of the Castro threat and of U.S. policy objectives toward Cuba is also indispensable for greater regional and international understanding--if not backing--of U.S. policy. Mexico, for example, was at odds with Secretary of State Haig's confrontational approach to Cuba to the extent of inserting itself as a broker between the two countries. Still other Basin governments became concerned over prospects of a U.S.-Cuban military confrontation during the first year of the Reagan Administration.[3] Clarification of U.S. goals in particular could thus go far in obtaining at least the tacit endorsement of U.S. policy by our allies in the Basin and in Western Europe as well.

[3] According to U.S. officials, several governments expressed their alarm to U.S. diplomats following press leaks in late October and early November 1981 concerning the various military options being reviewed by the Reagan Administration.

MILITARY REQUISITES FOR MILITARY ACTIONS

The strictly military requisites for successful military measures against Cuba are no less difficult to attain than those in the geopolitical arena. Specifically, the following five requirements should be fulfilled to optimize the utility of military force as an integral element of U.S. strategy against Cuba:

Matching means to ends. Under the present U.S. military posture, the United States is prepared to deal with general war contingencies involving Cuba, but not with Cuban-connected threats that are below that threshold. Thus, besides coping with Cuba in a general war situation, the United States should endeavor to develop a broader spectrum of military capabilities for different tasks:

- o Harassment measures aimed at provoking false alerts by the Cuban armed forces might be carried out with the minimal deployment of U.S. forces, as with electronic spoofing, or surprise naval or air sorties outside of Cuban territorial waters.
- o On the other hand, increased levels of Cuban support for the FMLN forces in El Salvador might require specialized U.S. army units in that country, as well as increased U.S. air and naval surveillance for the monitoring--and possible interdiction--of Cuban supplies across the Caribbean Sea.
- o In contrast, cutting off Cuba's energy supplies by air strikes and/or sea blockade would require a major redeployment of U.S. Air Force and Navy units under combat conditions.
- o At a still higher end of the military spectrum, the elimination of the Castro regime through an invasion and occupation of the island would entail an even greater long-term commitment of U.S. air, naval, and ground forces given Cuban defenses.

Choosing parsimonious options. The choice of military options against Cuba must be measured against other U.S. global commitments.

Even when matching means to ends, the United States cannot risk weakening those commitments by the excessive deployment of scarce military assets to deal with Cuba. Hence, the options to be assessed must also be parsimonious. They should entail a force commitment sufficient to assure success under a worst case situation, without requiring a significant redeployment of U.S. air, naval, and ground units that are needed elsewhere in the world. Compliance with such a requisite will necessarily constrain the range of military options against Cuba.

- o A U.S. naval quarantine of arms shipments to Cuba, for example, would appear to require a far greater number of U.S. naval and air units than can be currently mustered without undermining U.S. force capabilities in other military theaters.
- o In contrast, increasing U.S. air and satellite surveillance of Cuba and portions of the Caribbean might well be within present U.S. capabilities.

Building in an escalation capability. A military action against Cuba should be undertaken only after all conceivable Cuban and Soviet responses have been assessed as to their probabilities, and only after U.S. force capabilities are deemed sufficient to win in a rapidly escalating military conflict--in the Caribbean Basin or in another theater. Prudential planning thus requires that the United States assess not only the initial but also the secondary and tertiary measures that may be needed to assure success in the event of unexpected resistance or protracted conflict.

- o A punitive air strike against one of Cuba's three oil refineries, for example, is not likely to cripple the island's economy unless such an act of war is followed up by a naval blockade to prevent stepped-up Soviet shipments of refined petroleum to Cuba.

- o However, a sea blockade would require not only a considerable number of U.S. naval units, but also ample air cover to minimize the risk of Cuban attacks against U.S. surface vessels.
- o Additionally, the United States would have to be prepared to defend itself against Cuban air attacks against Miami and the Gulf coast, and especially to deter the Soviets from applying military pressures in other more vulnerable theaters of the world.

Minimizing adverse consequences. An apparent and highly visible "act of aggression" by the United States is certain to precipitate strong opposition within the Congress and the U.S. public at large. It could trigger any number of diplomatic and possibly military moves not only by Cuba, but also by the Soviet Union and radical Third World states. Within Western Europe and Latin America, mass opposition to Washington would surely be organized by Communist, Social Democratic, religious, and pacifist movements, and they might place pro-U.S. governments under intense public pressure. In addition, terrorist groups allied with Havana or controlled by the General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI) might mount retaliatory attacks against petroleum or other vulnerable facilities within the United States, and/or undertake assassination attempts against U.S. Government officials. Two operational axioms thus apply:

First, the greater the time needed for a military operation against Cuba, the more the United States will expose itself to the kinds of constraints and adverse consequences described above. To minimize such repercussions, the United States would need to opt for military measures against Cuba that are of short duration.

- o For example, the sinking of a single Cuban ship laden with supplies for the Salvadoran insurgents should be a lower risk option than a naval blockade against arms or petroleum shipments to Cuba, which may require several months.

Second, the more a U.S. military action directly affects Cuba itself, the greater the political and military risks will be for the United States on the domestic, regional, and international fronts. If the United States is not prepared to take such risks, it should minimize the risk factor by taking military actions that are of lower intensity and/or that are directed against targets outside Cuba.

- o Lower-intensity actions might take the form of harassment activities, increased air surveillance and sea patrols off Cuba, and joint military exercises and operations with friendly governments in the region.
- o Outside of Cuba, the United States could, for example, increase its military assistance programs to El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and other countries facing the threat of Cuban-supported insurgencies; interdict military supplies from Cuba that are destined for El Salvador and Nicaragua; and provide covert assistance to Jonas Savimbi's UNITA forces in an attempt to raise the costs of Cuba's military presence in Angola.[4]

Sustaining a military posture for leverage. At the tactical level, the precise military measures to be used against Cuba should strive to meet the above requisites--i.e., matching means to ends, being parsimonious, ensuring an escalation capability, and minimizing adverse consequences. As an integral element of a leverage strategy, however,

[4] At present, the Clark Amendment prohibits the provision of covert assistance to the UNITA forces. Moreover, the UNITA option would have to be weighed against U.S. interests in southern Africa as well as in terms of its probabilities for success. Thus, U.S. support for UNITA could antagonize African states who are pressing for South African withdrawal from and independence for Namibia; it could also lead to increased MPLA dependence on Cuba and the Soviet Union, and to still further Cuban and Soviet bloc inroads in Angola.

the general military posture chosen must also be sustainable over the medium to long term if it is to serve as an effective instrument for pressuring Cuba during the 1980s. Three related strategic axioms need to be observed in devising such a posture:

First, the presence, threat, or application of U.S. military power needs to be lasting rather than fleeting: Castro could ride out an occasional short-lived military exercise in the Caribbean, for example, or even a punitive air or naval strike, and then resume the offensive once Cuba recovered and the military action had passed.

Second, U.S. military power must be perceived by Castro as remaining actualized in the years ahead. That is, it should be fully credible in his eyes and thus capable of repeatedly raising the costs of Cuba's military collaboration with the Soviets and its subversive activities in the Basin.

And third, to ensure that Castro does in fact perceive U.S. military power as being actualized rather than simply putative, the United States may have to demonstrate that it can employ military measures on a sustained basis to cope with security threats arising in the Caribbean Basin.

MILITARY LEVERAGE INSTRUMENTS

To develop a sustainable and usable military posture, therefore, a wide spectrum of military policies needs to be pursued that can be converted into active leverage against Castro. As first steps toward this end, the United States could proceed on several fronts:

1. Increase U.S. surveillance and interdiction capabilities in the Caribbean to stem Cuban support for insurgent groups.
2. Visibly strengthen U.S. air defense and attack capabilities in Florida and along the Gulf coast under NORAD and the Caribbean Command Joint Task Force.
3. Reinforce the U.S. naval, air, and troop presence in Guantanamo, Puerto Rico (Roosevelt Roads), and the Southern Command in the Panama Canal Area.
4. Regularly employ the Caribbean Basin for naval, air, and amphibious training exercises, and secure USAF landing privileges in Honduras or elsewhere off Central America, to bolster the U.S. military presence in the region.
5. Increase the levels of direct U.S. military support--arms and equipment, counterinsurgency training, and professionalization of the local armed forces--for those allied governments in the region that are endangered by Cuban-supported revolutionary movements.
6. Modernize the defense capabilities of friendly and relatively stable Caribbean Basin states that are potentially vulnerable to Cuban air or sea attacks, or to paratroop drops, such as Jamaica, the Bahamas, and the Dominican Republic.
7. Promote the upgrading of the conventional war capabilities of Venezuela, Colombia, and, if possible, Mexico through the sale of naval patrol craft, F-5s and F-16s, and other advanced weapon systems so these countries can assume stabilizing roles as second-order powers in the region.
8. Promote the concept of coalitional defense in the Basin through the assumption of greater and more active security roles by individual states for both regional and national defense by
 - o carrying out joint intelligence, surveillance, and interdiction operations through the stationing of observers from Venezuela and other Caribbean states, including eventually Mexico, on board U.S.-manned AWACS and other patrol craft;
 - o engaging in joint military training exercises with Caribbean and Central American states on a routine basis; and
 - o encouraging great cooperation and burden sharing among Basin states in the region's defense against direct and indirect Cuban aggression through the Inter-American Defense Board, Inter-American Defense College, and Inter-American Security System conferences and training activities.

The above recommendations in effect call for reallocating greater Defense Department spending, and military assets and priorities, in the Caribbean Basin. Hence, one could argue that they run counter to the Basin's "economy of force" rationale, and that they in fact would work to the Soviet advantage by diverting U.S. forces to the region. However, the above steps are long-term endeavors that would augment the U.S. presence in the region on a steady incremental basis, rather than entailing a sudden and major diversion of U.S. resources. Also, where possible, they would be undertaken with U.S. allies in the region in order to gradually share the security burden over time. Whatever their ultimate cost or form, however, they are required for the national interest.[5]

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

The legacy left by the Falklands crisis may, however, present new obstacles for realizing the above measures, particularly for those recommendations that call for building coalitional security ties among key actors such as Venezuela. U.S.-Venezuelan relations were damaged by the U.S. stance in the crisis, with the result that Caracas cancelled U.S. port calls and Venezuelan participation in a scheduled joint naval exercise. Nevertheless, Venezuela is still purchasing 24 F-16s, and is

[5] A "rational" economic calculus suggests that it might be cheaper for the United States to "buy off" the Castro regime to reduce the future level of defense spending that would be required to safeguard the Basin from both the Soviets and Cuba. For reasons already discussed, however, the Cuban leadership is not likely to realign itself with the United States even if the latter offered to subsidize the Cuban economy at levels comparable to current rates of Soviet assistance--i.e., about \$3 billion per annum. Even if Havana were willing to switch patrons, moreover, such a package would surely be blocked by the Congress and opposed by U.S. allies in the region.

likely to continue modernizing its armed forces because its security interests remain unchanged in the Basin.[6] The same also applies to Mexico and other Basin countries, who were far less exorcised over the Falklands crisis. Hence, the political fallout from the Falklands could dissipate with time, and a stronger coalitional security system may yet emerge in the Basin.

Indeed, the Reagan Administration has already begun implementing several of the above measures, while still others could be adopted within a relatively short time without entailing major new outlays of funding or causing significant Congressional or public opposition. However, most of the proposed measures to be undertaken by the USAF, USN, and USA would require a much higher allocation of both military spending and assets in the Caribbean Basin. Thus, they are likely to be fiercely resisted within each of the three services. The strengthening of U.S. air defense and attack capabilities on the mainland, for example, runs counter to the continental defense priorities set by the USAF. Similarly, both the USN and USA have thus far been disinclined to raise their respective naval and troop presence in the Basin to significantly higher levels because of priorities given to Europe, the Middle East, and the Pacific.

Yet, if adverse military-strategic trends in the area are not arrested, the situation in Cuba or elsewhere in the Basin could deteriorate later in the 1980s. At that time, the United States is certain to confront an even stronger Cuba, and possibly a greater Soviet

[6] In the words of William H. Luers, recently returned from Venezuela after four years as U.S. Ambassador, "Venezuela looks to the Caribbean and sees a highly armed Cuba, a potential for a highly armed Nicaragua, possibly with MiGs. It sees Grenada with military potential and I think it believes it [Venezuela] should have top line military equipment." San Diego Union, August 1, 1982.

presence, which would then require a much larger U.S. military commitment than at present to neutralize the Cuban-Soviet threat to U.S. security. Hence, the issue becomes one of assigning a greater military priority to the Basin in the near term in order to conserve resources over the long term. In the final analysis, such a reassignment of defense priorities requires a presidential decision.

The proposed military posture does not offer a quick-fix solution for the Cuban problem. On the contrary, multilateral security measures especially will require considerable time for negotiation, evolution, and development before they can effectively restrain Castro or serve as leverage instruments for redirecting Cuban behavior. Thus, whether unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral in scope, the proposed military measures need to be augmented by political, economic, and diplomatic policies that can be adopted in the more immediate period, and that could begin serving as effective leverage instruments against Castro as integral parts of a long-range strategy.

VIII. POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND DIPLOMATIC INSTRUMENTS

Military measures constitute pressures that the United States could apply against Cuba. In contrast, the political, economic, and diplomatic leverage instruments discussed below can not only provide pressures that further exploit Cuban vulnerabilities, but can also serve as inducements targeted at the regime's core interests. Examples are the U.S. economic embargo and official public pronouncements and postures. Whether as pressures or inducements, however, the effectiveness of these instruments depends on their orchestration and timing as well as on their explicit content.

EXPLOITING VULNERABILITIES THROUGH RADIO MARTI

Both White House and State Department officials have labored hard in recent months to obtain Congressional legislation approving the establishment of Radio Marti. In spite of these efforts, and passage by the House, Radio Marti still awaits expected Senate approval as of this writing.[1] The delay in establishing Radio Marti is unfortunate because, perhaps more than any other political measure, future broadcasts from Radio Marti could intensify the domestic strains confronting the Castro regime. The totalitarian aspects of the Cuban

[1] The House passed the legislation by a 2:1 margin in early August 1982, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee gave its approval the following month. Much of the opposition to Radio Marti is partisan, but it also comes from different quarters. Some liberal legislators fear the station will engage in heavy-handed propaganda warfare; fiscal conservatives are critical of the station's estimated \$7.5 to \$10 million cost; and American broadcasters fear that Cuban radio jamming will interfere with their broadcasts in the United States. While Senate passage is anticipated, a Congressional appropriation for Radio Marti still needs to be passed in this session of Congress.

political system enable the regime to control political behavior and mobilize mass support. But the system's very strength is also one of its potential weaknesses: the closed nature of the Cuban political order could make the regime highly vulnerable to an alternative information system beamed from the United States provided that the information were credible, relevant, and appealing to the Cuban population on the island.

Intensifying Domestic Strains

Besides the Voice of America, there are Spanish-speaking commercial stations in Miami, New Orleans, and other U.S. cities offering a potpourri of news and entertainment that can be heard in Cuba. Save for radio broadcasts by Cuban exiles on such stations as Miami's WQBA, however, few programs are directed exclusively at the island's population.[2] By and large, therefore, the Cuban people are forced to rely on the Party newspaper, Granma, on State-controlled radio and television, and especially on Fidel Castro himself for their principal sources of political information.

Constantly adhering to the party line, Cuba's closed information system is highly pedantic, selective, and politicized in its dissemination of news--whether it be through the official media or in work centers and classrooms. According to Cuba's most renowned contemporary poet, Heberto Padilla, who was exiled to the United States in March 1980, the pervasiveness and message of the system is truly Orwellian:

[2] Even when news programs are directed to Cuba, their impact may be minimal because of the hyperbole or extremism of such exile commentators as the 80-year-old Herminio Portell-Vila, whose views may no longer be of much relevance to a society that has undergone radical social change since 1959, and whose younger generations have been reared in Marxist-Leninist dogma for over two decades.

During the last 20 years, I lived in a world made up of ideas painted in black and white. Everything that came from the United States was anathema--a product of imperialism. Not even the TV broadcasts of the landing of the first man on the moon were available to Cuban audiences. This sense of things black and white is implacable, and extends to every terrain of human endeavor.[3]

For an anonymous Cuban, who fled the island in the Mariel exodus, the constant propaganda creates a form of political "schizophrenia" in individuals, whereby they outwardly conform to but inwardly disbelieve the regime's pronouncements. For them, "reality" ultimately becomes suspended.

When the closed Cuban system was recently breached, however, the effect was explosive. The return to the island for brief visits of some 100,000 Cuban exiles from the United States starting in late 1978 provided the catalyst for the mass exodus of 1980. After having had American life portrayed in "black and white," and after having existed in a state of "schizophrenia," Cubans on the island were suddenly confronted with returning exiles whose "reality" could not be denied by either the regime or themselves. The exiles' return gave lie to the regime's repeated portrayal of racial oppression and economic exploitation suffered by Cubans living in the United States. Perhaps worst of all, the islanders discovered that the returning gusanos (worms) were far better off materially than were the Cubans who had remained behind, experiencing revolutionary sacrifices and regimentation under the Castro regime for nearly two decades.

[3] Heberto Padilla, "After 20 Cuban Years," New York Times, September 17, 1981.

The catalytic effect of the exile visits suggests that alternative sources of news and information could present the regime with serious internal problems by forcing it on the defensive vis-a-vis the island's population. Indeed, younger sectors of the population may potentially be the most disaffected, judging from surveys of recent Cuban refugees.[4] Specifically, the regime is vulnerable to information that would document, among other things:

- o Its mismanagement of the Cuban economy for more than two decades;
- o Its record of broken promises regarding improvements in the Cuban standard of living, particularly in the availability of housing, foodstuffs, and consumer goods;
- o Its increasing subordination to the Soviets in both domestic and foreign affairs, including Afghanistan and Poland;
- o Its stationing of combat troops overseas, with continuing casualties in Angola and Ethiopia;
- o Its allocation of scarce resources on behalf of ambitious foreign policy aspirations to the detriment of the Cuban population;
- o Its unrepresentativeness and exclusiveness as a ruling guerrilla elite;

[4] In a statistical survey of 31,000 Cuban refugees processed by U.S. authorities in the Mariel exodus of 1980, the post-Castro generation of 21- to 34-year-olds constituted a disproportionate share of the refugees sampled--35 percent--compared to that age group's representation in the entire Cuban population of 1980 (21 percent). The author's own open-ended interviews of 11 refugees, 7 of whom were under 28 years of age, revealed different levels of alienation from the regime among the younger respondents, ranging from diffused discontent to intense hatred. Most of the younger respondents had left Cuba for political reasons, citing the regime's political oppressiveness and hypocrisy, but two university students had left because they foresaw little upward mobility for themselves in their future technical careers.

- o Its status as a privileged elite that enjoys amenities not available to most Cubans despite a professed commitment to equalitarianism; and
- o Its betrayal of the original ideals of the Cuban Revolution--as initially enunciated by Fidel Castro himself--in adopting an alien totalitarian-like system under the Soviet model of "socialism."

Radio programs that document the performance of the Castro regime on these and other issues could well intensify elite-mass divisions within Cuba. Even if they do not create security problems for the regime, the programs could further erode popular support for the regime and thus weaken it. Because domestic and international events have constantly been portrayed in black and white, and because Cubans have experienced more than two decades of revolutionary change, great care will have to be taken in the programming and content of Radio Marti for it to have optimal political-psychological impact on Cuban society in the years ahead.

Ensuring Credibility, Relevance, and Appeal

For it to be effective in reaching Cuban audiences, Radio Marti's programs must be credible, relevant, and appealing to broad segments of the Cuban population.

Credibility will be established only if Radio Marti is not perceived by Cubans as a propaganda mouthpiece of either the United States or Cuban exile groups. Its reporting and commentaries must be accurate, balanced, and, where possible, verifiable by Cubans residing on the island. This means, for example, that its news coverage should report on both the positive and negative aspects of the Castro regime, and on the problems as well as attractive features of American or other

societies. In contrast with the Castro regime, therefore, Radio Marti should be perceived not only as an alternative news source, but also as a comprehensive, reliable, and objective source of information.

Relevancy in Radio Marti's programming--addressing the Cuba of the 1980s rather than of the 1950s--also needs to be pursued for maximum effectiveness. Cuban society has undergone socioeconomic and political change since Castro came to power, including changes in values--however subtle--as a result of the government's policies and pervasive socialization efforts for over two decades.[5] Consequently, Radio Marti's political approach may well have to be considerably to the left of the Administration as well as the Cuban exile community.

The appeal of Radio Marti must be broad-based if it is to become an effective instrument for leverage. Its programming should not be a steady diet of news and commentary, or political messages: such a format would only compete with and thus be lost in the din of regime propaganda. Instead, it should offer a wide variety of programming, including entertainment shows. In any case, Radio Marti might increase its political impact within Cuba, and place the regime on the defensive, were it to include the following:

- o A daily 15 minute program on promesas de Fidel that played back the Cuban leader's earlier speeches in which he made political and economic pledges that remain unfulfilled or otherwise forgotten by the regime;

[5] An in-depth attitudinal survey of a representative sample of exiles in the Mariel exodus of 1980 could provide invaluable data on the Cuban population's political values and its attitudes regarding the regime's positive and negative attributes. The limited interviews of exiles conducted by U.S. military and intelligence personnel in 1980 were not aimed at developing this kind of politically relevant data. Radio Marti's effectiveness could be greatly enhanced were such an attitudinal survey carried out.

- o Daily programs devoted to political jokes about the regime and life in Communist Cuba;
- o A long-playing docudrama tracing the evolution of a Cuban family through several generations, from the struggle for independence in the 19th century through the anti-Batista struggle and contemporary times, with the family's members belonging to the regime or opposing it, and with some in exile as well as remaining on the island;
- o A weekly analysis of the regime that employed a Marxist framework and that focused on the "new class" emerging in Communist Cuba, and the evidence of continued "class struggle" and "exploitation" under the Castro regime; and
- o Comprehensive news coverage of world events, with particular emphasis on such developments as the repression of workers in Poland, the Soviet war in Afghanistan, and the Cuban military role in Angola, Ethiopia, and South Yemen.

Later, as Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty have done over the years, Radio Marti's programming can be refined through feedback from listeners in Cuba. But whatever its program content, Radio Marti should be operated on the basis that, as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy, it is to serve U.S. national interests and not those of the Cuban exile community or its leaders. It thus needs to be insulated from strong political and ideological forces in this country which might undermine or distort its primary mission.

EXPLOITING ECONOMIC VULNERABILITIES

Set against the context of Cuba's renewed austerity and poor economic outlook, the U.S. trade embargo could now become an effective means for pressuring and inducing policy changes in Cuba. Having closed off U.S. trade and financial markets, it restricts Cuba's trade and investments with other Western countries, thus narrowing the island's options by intensifying its dependence on the Eastern bloc. As an instrument for applying pressure, therefore,

the U.S. embargo has been and continues to be not only a major, but a crucial impediment to Cuba's efforts at diversifying and expanding its hard currency trade, the key to improved economic growth and living standards.[6]

Continued enforcement of the embargo thus damages Cuba at a moment when its economy and society are facing perhaps their greatest difficulties since the decade of the 1960s.

In addition, the embargo is potentially more effective than a decade ago because Cuba now enjoys fewer international options owing to its \$2.6 billion hard-currency external debt, of which \$1.7 billion is owed to Western commercial banks. As in the past, Cuba today cannot generate needed hard-currency earnings through exports to the United States. But unlike the 1970s, commercial and public banks in Western Europe have become unwilling to shore up the Cuban economy with new long-term loans and credits. Given West European concern over Cuba's debt problem, Washington's opposition to further European loans is more likely to find a receptive audience among the Europeans than in previous years. In 1981, for example, the Reagan Administration reportedly succeeded in obtaining the cancellation of a German loan to Cuba amounting to 150 million marks that was being arranged by France's Credit Lyonnais. Hence, continued Administration pressure on European and other allies to curtail loans and credits to Havana could further compound Cuba's economic problems.

Conversely, the worsening of Cuba's economic difficulties and isolation could make the offer to lift the U.S. embargo a more effective lever for securing fundamental changes in Cuban foreign policy than was

[6] Lawrence H. Theriot, 1982, p. 11.

the case in the past. The attractiveness of such an inducement is likely to be all the greater because it will target the regime's core interests in economic development, regime autonomy, and survival precisely when these interests are not being advanced owing to a worsening economy. At a time of heightened vulnerability, the offer to lift the embargo thus becomes another lever for prying major policy concessions from Havana.[7] Specifically, the removal of the embargo could provide Cuba with three modest but essential advantages.

Access to U.S. trade: The lifting of the U.S. trade embargo would allow Cuba to export sugar, nickel, cigars, and fresh or frozen fish and seafood to the U.S. market, which could result in sales of upward of \$350 million per year.[8] Combined with the extension of trade credits, such sales would enable Cuba to purchase needed agricultural, mining, food processing, and computer equipment for promoting the island's economic growth.

Access to U.S. investments: The U.S. Government could also lift restrictions on industrial investments in Cuba by U.S. business enterprises. Indeed, for the first time since it came to power in 1959, the Castro government enacted new legislation in March 1982 designed to

[7] Former President Richard Nixon recently wrote: "Some people think of economic leverage simply as the punitive use of economic sanctions, with highly publicized conditions set for their removal. This is usually ineffective, and sometimes counterproductive. The real leverage we gain from East-West trade is both more subtle and more complex. The Soviet leaders want what the West produces, and they are willing to give up something to get it. They will give up more in private than they will in public. The key is to make very clear that there is an iron link between their behavior and the West's willingness to make the trade deals they hope for, while not doing so in such a way that they lose face." The New York Times, August 19, 1982.

[8] Lawrence H. Theriot, Cuban Foreign Trade: A Current Assessment, Staff Paper, Industry and Trade Administration, Office of East-West Policy and Planning, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1979.

attract foreign investors from any country. This heretical act provides for joint ventures with the state, allowing private or public foreign companies up to 49 percent ownership, and offers tax, profit remittance, labor, and other advantages to the foreign investor.[9] The reentry of U.S. companies could thus improve the performance of the Cuban economy in the years ahead. In turn, the U.S. Government's posture on Cuba is likely to affect the disposition of American--and other--potential foreign investors.

Access to U.S. coal: The United States could supply Cuba with coal for use in its thermoelectric power plants, which alone consume about 25 percent of the island's oil imports.[10] Cuba has little potential for developing alternative energy sources of its own, nor is it likely to secure petroleum imports from radical Arab states or Mexico at preferential prices it can afford.[11] In the meantime, Cuba could face a shortfall by the mid-1980s between its anticipated petroleum consumption and Soviet oil commitments, a shortfall which could be eased by the importation of U.S. coal.

EXPLOITING CUBAN INTERESTS THROUGH PUBLIC POSTURES

At the same time that U.S. military, political, and economic pressures are intensified, Washington's public posture could further enhance U.S. leverage through the exploitation of Cuban interests in assuring regime survival, regaining international autonomy, and

[9] See Latin American Weekly Report, April 2, 1982, pp. 9-10.

[10] Theriot, 1982, p. 27.

[11] According to Theriot, replacing Soviet deliveries with OPEC oil at \$35 per barrel would cost Cuba \$2.84 billion, or \$1.8 billion more than it presently pays for Soviet oil; such an outlay would exceed Cuba's hard-currency earnings in 1980--a banner year--by \$700 million. Theriot, 1982, p. 28.

accelerating economic development. By thus publicly coupling inducements with pressures, the United States would seek to provide positive incentives for the regime to change its policies while simultaneously raising the costs of its objectionable behavior:

- o The Department of State and especially the White House should repeatedly underscore U.S. determination to maintain a range of pressures on the regime so long as the latter persists in endangering U.S. interests through its close military collaboration with the Soviets, its subversive activities in the Caribbean Basin, and its military operations overseas.
- o On the other hand, both the State Department and the White House should reiterate an explicit readiness to relieve pressures, to coexist with Cuba, and to work toward a normalization of relations, including trade and economic ties, once the Castro regime alters its objectionable behavior with the Soviet Union, in the Caribbean Basin, and in Africa.

Normally, effective diplomacy requires that such a posture be communicated privately to improve the chances that the other party in the negotiations will acquiesce to the desired quid pro quo. A similar practice should be followed with Cuba once Washington and Havana commence genuine diplomatic negotiations. To gain leverage over Castro, however, it becomes essential that the above position first be affirmed publicly so that the U.S. Government can provide strong and unambiguous signals to both the Castro regime and the Cuban people regarding U.S. intentions.

Within the regime, such signals could intensify internal divisions between the ruling fidelista and raulista civilian and military elites, and the more technocratic elites who are less committed to an activist Cuban foreign policy and who desire stability and normalization instead to enhance the island's developmental prospects. Among the population at large, such an explicit set of signals by Washington might ultimately

persuade many Cubans that "Yankee imperialism" was not the major reason for continuing hostility and conflict between the two countries. Thus, even if the leverage attained was insufficient to compel the Castro leadership to make fundamental changes in its behavior, it could at least contribute to internal regime fragmentation and to increased strains between the regime and the popular masses.

The clarification and reaffirmation of U.S. intentions through public pronouncements would also directly contribute to the building of greater political consensus within the United States regarding Cuba. Similarly, it would help develop greater international backing from countries within the Caribbean Basin and Western Europe for a long-term U.S. strategy toward Cuba.

GAINING LEVERAGE THROUGH DIPLOMATIC MEASURES

The prospects for U.S. leverage over Cuba are diminished to the degree that Castro is able to enlist the support of governments and political movements in the Caribbean Basin and Western Europe. Such governments and political movements constrain U.S. policy options; they can undermine the execution of policy through their refusal to cooperate with Washington, or they can provide Havana with viable political and economic alternatives with which to elude U.S. leverage. Thus, the United States will need to work on various international fronts to gain regional and European support if it is to strengthen its leverage potential.

Obtaining the Cooperation of Caribbean Basin States

With a few exceptions such as Guatemala and Jamaica, most of the major Caribbean Basin states either are reluctant to openly back present U.S. policy toward Castro or they oppose it despite their growing vulnerability to Cuban-supported insurgencies. The principal reason for this situation is the perceived decline of U.S. hegemony in the region, but there are some additional indigenous factors that are responsible as well:

- o The domestic political situation in most countries, particularly the strength of left-wing nationalist sentiment, prevents their governments from supporting the United States openly, especially when Washington's rhetoric smacks of a return to U.S. interventionism. The best example, of course, is Mexico, which has publicly opposed U.S. policy pronouncements.
- o Additionally, such governments as those in Costa Rica, Panama, and the Dominican Republic may either feel intimidated by Cuba or expect that the United States will defend them from direct or indirect Cuban aggression.
- o Others are attempting to neutralize the Cuban threat by means of their own policy initiatives and friendly ties with Havana. Again, Mexico is the foremost example: by expanding its political and economic relationship with Cuba, and by serving as a self-appointed broker between Washington and Havana, the Lopez Portillo government sought to co-opt Castro and deflect his interest in revolutionary insurgencies away from Mexico.

The diversity as well as timidity of Caribbean Basin responses on the Cuban problem thus undercut U.S. policies. In the meantime, the political fallout from the Falklands crisis has strained traditionally close U.S. ties with Venezuela, a country whose cooperation is essential in both the Caribbean and Central America. Thus, Washington needs to regain both leadership and policy consensus within the region on the

Cuban problem. In addition to clarifying U.S. intentions regarding Castro, the following generalized measures could be undertaken to build greater regional support for U.S.-Cuban policy:

1. Strengthen the U.S. military presence in and economic commitment to the Caribbean Basin to demonstrate the resolve of the United States to remain the paramount political, economic, and military power in the region.
2. Employ U.S. military force against Cuba or elsewhere in the region selectively, and only as a last resort where there is a high probability that the military operation will succeed in its objectives.
3. Curtail rhetoric that alarms friendly or allied states, but which may not intimidate the Cubans in the long run, and which may thus weaken U.S. credibility both regionally and internationally.
4. Persuade Caribbean Basin governments of the seriousness of the Cuban threat to regional stability by the systematic sharing of intelligence information, including through periodic high-level meetings and other interactions among U.S. and Basin civilian and military officials.
5. Broaden and intensify efforts to obtain the collaboration of Caribbean Basin governments in collective security arrangements, beginning in the areas of intelligence, AWAC-type surveillance, and air and sea patrols.

The Reagan Administration has taken steps to implement the first measure through its security policies toward Central America, not only in El Salvador and Honduras, but also with the new Rios Montt regime in Guatemala. The President's Caribbean Basin Initiative also demonstrates a long-needed--albeit modest--economic commitment to the Basin. However, the difficulties that the Administration has encountered in securing Congressional support for military assistance to El Salvador, the CBI, and Radio Marti all suggest that the Administration will be best able to undertake those Basin-oriented measures which are not dependent on Congressional approval, but which can be initiated and

implemented within the Executive Branch. While doing this, the White House and State Department need to give special high-level attention to Mexico.

The Mexican Connection

Although Mexico has generally pursued parallel interests with the United States with regard to both Central America and Cuba, the policies of the Lopez Portillo Administration often worked at cross purposes with those of the State Department. As a result, Mexico's independent line and self-avowed role as a broker between Washington and Havana afforded Castro opportunities for eluding U.S. pressures. Thus, the prospects for gaining greater leverage over Cuba would be considerably enhanced by closing off the Mexican option to Castro. In that event, his regime would be deprived of support from one of the regional powers in the Caribbean Basin, thereby increasing the regime's sense of regional and international isolation.

However, the uncertainties as to Mexico's future role as a regional power in the Basin have now been heightened as a result of that country's near financial collapse. There has historically been a strong link between Mexico's domestic politics and its leftist foreign policy posture, with the latter often used to legitimize a political, economic, and social order that no longer was revolutionary. Lopez Portillo followed that pattern, except that he--even more than Echeverria before him--embarked upon a much more activist foreign policy, especially toward Central America. Now, however, Mexico's massive economic problems will probably force both the government and the Mexican public alike to turn their attention inward. Increased social unrest, including signs of revolutionary activity, could further deflect Mexico

away from an activist foreign policy in the region, while also intensifying concerns over Mexican national security. Mexico's staggering economic problems could thus provide the United States with both a more compliant but less effective ally in the region.

These considerations suggest that the incoming administration of Miguel de la Madrid should not be pressed to assume a strident anti-Castro posture, or even to curtail its economic ties with Cuba. In fact, Mexico could be considered a special case in the U.S. strategy toward Havana: U.S. as well as Mexican interests might best be served if Mexico quietly cooperated with the United States on security issues directed against Castro, while simultaneously exporting oil to Cuba. In that event, Mexico would promote its own national security interests though (a) increased military ties with the United States and (b) its new economic linkages with Cuba, both of which could provide leverage with which to restrain Castro. For its part, the United States would gain an indirect means for leveraging Cuba as a result of the Mexican-Cuban petroleum connection.

Coordinating U.S.-Mexican policies will be difficult, however. Still it is essential to gain at least de la Madrid's tacit support for U.S. policy toward Castro in the years ahead to minimize the latter's international options. Such an effort in turn needs to be undertaken at the highest policy levels in Washington because of the centrality of the Mexican presidency in both domestic and foreign affairs.

Neutralizing West European Involvement

Along with Canada and Japan, several West European states have long had credit and trade ties with Cuba. Such ties have helped Cuba overcome the effects of the U.S. embargo, and Cuba probably will

continue to have recourse to trade with these countries in the years ahead. In implementing a leverage strategy, therefore, it is very unlikely that the United States will be able to obtain the cooperation of its allies in curtailing trade with Cuba.

However, a new actor of some potential importance for both the United States and Cuba has emerged on the scene. In recent years, the Social Democratic Movement in Western Europe has become active throughout the Caribbean Basin in decrying human rights abuses, and in seeking an end to the civil war in El Salvador. The active involvement of the Socialist International on these and other issues has been enlisted by the Social Democratic parties in Venezuela, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, and other states, and by Mexico's non-affiliated ruling PRI as well. European Social Democratic leaders have also visited Cuba. Consequently, the Socialist International has become a player in the Caribbean Basin.[12]

The European Social Democratic Movement is thus important for the United States because of its Caribbean Basin ties and growing influence in the region, and because of its critical political importance in a number of West European and Scandinavian countries. Therefore, the United States needs to discuss Cuba with the European Social Democrats to minimize their opposition to U.S. policy toward Castro, and if possible, to gain their tacit if not explicit backing for the United States in their communications with both Havana and the various Social Democratic or other dominant parties in the Caribbean Basin.

[12] For different perspectives on the Socialist International, see Constantine Menges, "Central America and Its Enemies," in Commentary, August 1981, pp. 32-38; Karl-Ludolf Hubener, "The Socialist International and Latin America: Problems and Possibilities," in Caribbean Review, Spring 1982, Vol. XI, No. 2, pp. 38-41; and Carlos Alberto Montaner, "The Mediation of the Socialist International: Inconsistency, Prejudice and Ignorance," Caribbean Review, pp. 43-45 and 57.

The first as well as second goal will be difficult to accomplish, if only because of sharp ideological differences between the Administration and the European Social Democrats. The United States will thus have to make a forceful case on behalf of its Cuban policy in any effort to persuade the Social Democrats. It can begin to do so under the proposed leverage strategy by fully delineating the dimensions of the Cuban security threat to the United States and its allies in the Caribbean Basin, and by clarifying and reiterating both U.S. policy demands and intentions toward the Castro regime.

IX. CONCLUSIONS

Effective leverage over Castro has eluded Washington since 1959. Part of the problem lies in the fact that the United States did not elaborate and sustain a carefully orchestrated strategy that would seek to manipulate both the Castro regime's vulnerabilities and interests with the aim of magnifying the limited power and influence that Washington has had over Havana's policies. Instead, the United States primarily relied on covert activities and on a policy of diplomatic and economic denial to undermine the regime or at least raise the costs of its behavior. After the futility of this approach became apparent, a conciliatory policy was briefly attempted, with counterproductive results.

Other reasons for the failure to develop effective leverage resided in the nature of the U.S.-Cuban relationship and in Cuba itself. The United States did not possess direct political, economic, or military linkages with Cuba after 1961 that could be employed as leverage instruments. In the meantime, the values, goals, and interests of Fidel Castro and the dominant guerrilla elites in his regime were not susceptible to either U.S. "sticks" or "carrots." Moreover, Castro was remarkably successful in exploiting Cuba's distant benefactor, securing not only a lifeline to ensure the economic and military survival of his regime, but also raising levels of Soviet economic and military assistance in the post-1975 period.

As has been argued in the body of this study, however, new developments on the international stage as well as in Cuba itself have

now heightened the Castro regime's vulnerabilities and intensified its concern over securing the regime's core interests in regime survival, autonomy, and economic development. More so than at any time in the past, these conditions provide the United States with exploitable opportunities for developing leverage over the regime. Additionally, both global and regional trends make it essential to implement a systematic leverage strategy. Fortunately, the Administration's political, economic, and military policy initiatives in the Caribbean Basin, along with its backing for Radio Marti, already provide some of the instruments for such a strategy.

There are problems, however, in implementing a leverage strategy that need to be addressed and overcome. First, the strategy requires a subtle, sophisticated, and coordinated approach to policy that may well be beyond the capabilities of the highly bureaucratized U.S. policymaking structure that is both fragmented and compartmentalized. It has been suggested that a new high-level post may be needed within the Executive Branch to orchestrate policy, and particularly to effectively couple and sequence both pressures and inducements. Second, the strategy will require the development of a greater public consensus than presently exists regarding the Basin and Cuba, especially U.S. policy objectives toward Castro. Third, it will require that a higher military priority be assigned to the Basin by the Department of Defense, entailing thereby the allocation of greater military assets to the region.

The very success of a leverage strategy could raise additional problems for the United States. A strategy that succeeds in intensifying political discontent and tensions within Cuba could

precipitate another Mariel-type mass exodus from the island, but on an even larger scale. Indeed, the prospects of unregulated waves of refugees to the U.S. mainland might become Castro's principal counter to U.S. policies. The U.S. Government has the power to effectively preclude such an exodus, however, by its ability to prohibit Cuban exiles in the United States from leaving U.S. territorial waters to pick up Cubans on the island.

A more complex and subtle issue concerns the implications surrounding the goal of "Finlandizing" Cuba. Were it to succeed, "Finlandization" would render Cuba's strategic-military relationship with the Soviet Union benign. Potentially, however, it could also reduce Castro's capacity to continue extracting high levels of Soviet economic support for Cuba given the latter's decreasing value to the Soviets in promoting Moscow's global interests in Africa, the Middle East, and in the Caribbean Basin itself.

Thus, the latter prospect could present two problems for U.S. policy: it would make "Finlandization" difficult to attain given Castro's awareness of its high costs for the Cuban economy; and relatedly, it could leave the United States as the only alternative economic benefactor for a "Finlandized" Cuba. This problem could be at least partly overcome, however, through Fidel Castro himself.

Ever since the evolution of Cuban-Soviet ties in 1960, Castro has shown remarkable skill in securing and then increasing Moscow's commitment to his regime. Among his sources of leverage over the Soviet Union has been the latter's "internationalist" obligations, as the leading socialist state, to render assistance to bona fide socialist and Marxist-Leninist regimes such as has existed in Cuba since the 1960s.

Hence, a "socialist" but "Finlandized" Cuba could still obligate the Soviets to maintain sufficient levels of economic assistance to the Castro regime to assure the "irreversibility" of socialism as a historical process. Thus, for the United States, we need to know how a leverage strategy can be fine-tuned to ensure a sufficient Soviet commitment to Cuba for the purpose of minimizing the U.S. economic burden with a "Finlandized" Cuba, while advancing U.S. security interests through the reduction of Soviet military ties to Havana and the cessation of Cuban destabilizing activities in the Basin.

Of more immediate urgency for an effective leverage strategy, however, is the need to identify and evaluate the basic elements of the Cuban negotiating style. Based on previous U.S. diplomatic encounters with the Castro leadership, for example, how successful has the latter been in setting the negotiating agenda, in working on a U.S. guilt complex toward Cuba, and in exploiting the Congress, the U.S. media and other circles, and various international actors to strengthen Havana's position? In turn, how can the United States effectively counter the Cuban approach and exploit its weaknesses, if any, to the U.S. advantage? Such an assessment could be invaluable not only for the application of leverage, but also for effectively dealing with the Cubans in future high-level encounters between Washington and Havana.